PLEASE CIRCULATE
By Roland Watson
June 4, 2010
INTRODUCTION
The most populous nation in the world, China, is a dictatorship. It has been ruled for the last sixty-one years by the Communist Party (CCP). Under Mao Zedong, the CCP was a typical communist regime. The population was kept equal – equally poor. Since Deng Xiaoping, it has become more properly a “capitalist dictatorship.” China today has great, and still growing, inequality. It is a merger of the worst in authoritarian political and economic rule.
The CCP provides material and/or diplomatic support to many other dictatorial regimes around the world. These include: North Korea, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Russia, Belarus, Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, and Venezuela. In addition, Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia are so dominated by the CCP – for the moment at least – that they have been annexed into China itself.
We should also not forget all of the problems that emanate from China and which affect the entire planet. These include support for the rogue nuclear states North Korea and Iran (and now Burma); the host of deadly consumer products that have been exported from China (and which the CCP refuses to regulate); as well as wide-ranging environmental abuses. The last extends from an uncontrolled demand for timber, mineral resources and endangered species, which is driving environmental destruction and extinction throughout the earth; to air-borne industrial pollution which circulates it; as well as the CCP's maneuvering last year in Copenhagen to sabotage international efforts to address climate change.
China's more than one billion people are being denied freedom and human rights. The CCP's client states have a total population that approaches another billion, and which similarly are denied their rights. Approximately one-third of the world's population is repressed, either directly or indirectly, due to the CCP.
All of these countries, starting with China, have human rights movements and associated advocacy groups, which protest against the manifold ways in which the regimes abuse the peoples' rights. Many of these groups, though, while laudable, in particular because of the dangers – of arrest and torture, even murder – that their leaders and members regularly face, are nonetheless based on an incorrect premise. They believe, or at least they act on, the assumption that human rights can be improved without change to the regime itself, in other words, that human rights can coexist with dictatorship.
This is a fallacy. There can be no human rights without democracy. A dictatorship may pay lip service to human rights, even allow the people some specific rights from time to time, but our full spectrum of rights can never be established and preserved within a dictatorial system. Indeed, democracy is a system designed to protect human rights. Dictatorship is predicated on their rejection and abuse.
The people of China, and also Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia, will continue to be denied their rights until the CCP loses power and China becomes a democracy. Other dictatorial regimes will continue to receive CCP support. The rest of the world will continue to suffer the problems that arise out of mainland China.
The question, then, is how can the Chinese people achieve democracy? What will this profound transformation require?
CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
The CCP is strong, and its strength is increasing every day. Notwithstanding factionalism within the Party, the leaders are united around the goal to preserve their rule. A key element underlying this unity is the CCP’s wealth. Chinese businesses have profited enormously from the sale of consumer and industrial products, which the world has been happy to buy. The Party takes a substantial percentage of this trade, hence its accumulated reserves of $2.4 trillion. In addition, with its wealth the Party has been rapidly upgrading its military capability. The People's Liberation Army is now equipped with advanced weapons systems that have been internally developed, secured through espionage, or purchased from authoritarian allies such as Russia.
The International Community has been dithering about the rise of the new China. The hunger for cheap goods has convinced the rest of the world to ignore the totalitarian nature of the CCP and its many, many abuses. The Party further has conducted a full-scale charm offensive, buying loyalty from different nations around the globe, particularly in lesser-developed regions and whose own leaders are also authoritarian. China is actually creating a dictatorial block that constitutes a modern form of imperialism. Whereas Rome conquered other nations and peoples by force, China, the new Rome, is doing it quietly and with money.
THE PEOPLE OF CHINA
The natural source for resistance to CCP rule and a demand for democracy is the Chinese public. Within the country's large population, though, there are many different groups. A great number of people actually belong to the Party, or work for or otherwise benefit from it. The CCP further has created the largest propaganda machine in history, which has the dual goals to promote communist rule and to silence all dissent. This propaganda machine is coupled with the similarly largest censorship exercise in history, notably through the Great Firewall that restricts access by the Chinese people to the Internet.
The basic argument that the CCP makes is that “The Party Knows Best.” The leaders are arguing that they are “benevolent dictators,” and that for China this is the only type of political system that will work. (The irony here is that benevolent dictatorship has roots in Confucianism, and the CCP was formed in part to destroy China's ancient traditions. Now, at least in this case, it is embracing them.)
Benevolent dictatorship is the theoretical alternative to democracy. It claims, among other things, that people are unable to govern themselves: that like sheep we must be led. This is certainly arguable, but the position also has numerous obvious flaws. How do we choose who gets to lead, and how do we prevent them from abusing their power? As China saw under Mao, absolute power often has horrific consequences. And, even if under a particular ruler, or emperor, life is good, there is no guarantee that the next will also be benevolent. Indeed, the odds are, as Rome itself experienced, that tyrants will follow just leaders. Finally, as the people in such a society experience abuse, they become resentful and ultimately attempt to rebel. It is an inevitable cycle with this type of system.
In China, CCP members and cronies, and some portion of the general population, accept dictatorship. Most people, though, cannot be bothered with political concerns. They are too absorbed with their daily struggle to worry about such matters.
Contrasting the pro-regime factions, and on the other side of the silent majority, is an active and growing movement for change. This movement, though, is fractured. The largest elements are human rights groups, which are seeking relief for a wide variety of problems, including corruption, inequitable land distribution, sweatshop working conditions, religious persecution, political prisoners, and environmental crimes. A key participant here is the Falun Gong, which is seeking freedom to practice its spiritual exercises. This is a human rights motivation, and it is notable that the Falun Gong fully supports Confucian ideals.
The largest independent “internal” movements, for Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia, also focus on improving human rights, for the Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian peoples, not an outright demand for freedom and independence (although such groups have made it clear that they support democracy in China as well). The few internal groups that actually focus on democracy are small (although they are highly motivated), and include the Charter 08 movement and the China Democracy Party.
Finally, there is a large population of Chinese people who reside outside the mainland yet have an active concern for its problems. Many of these people advocate through groups that focus, once again, on human rights issues. A few, though, such as the international branches of the China Democracy Party, and also the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition, concentrate their efforts on opposition to the CCP and the need for a transition to democracy.
HOW TO CHANGE CHINA TO A DEMOCRACY
The world for the most part backs the CCP. Multinational corporations have lobbied countless governments to ignore the regime’s abuses and to accept the idea that trade with China is acceptable. Also, while the U.S. has consistently held this position as well, it did periodically speak up for democracy and human rights. Under President Obama, though, these gestures have been suspended. The American government is openly “pragmatic.” (One would have thought that the Obama Administration would choose progressive values over corporate lobby positions.)
This means that the burden for change falls to the Chinese people. Of course, one can argue that this is as it should be. People are responsible for themselves, and if they are the subjects of tyrannical rule, they must lead the way to overthrow it.
The problem with China then is how can Chinese people who are already pro-democracy activists encourage more people, ultimately a critical mass of the population, to support this change. There are two factors here. First, the Chinese need to be taught about democracy. They need to understand the ideas on which democracy is based; why it is preferable to benevolent dictatorship; and also the different aspects and variations of the democratic system that are in use around the world. This way they will become politicized, and develop a strong desire for democracy, and through this a willingness to act, and sacrifice, to fulfill this desire.
Secondly, they need to learn that human rights are predicated on democracy. If they want human rights for China, and if their own rights have been abused, in addition to making such a demand, and protesting such abuses, they should join the movement for democratic change. The Charter 08 document and the China Democracy Party should have millions of signatures and members.
The challenge of course is disseminating this education in the face of the CCP’s propaganda and Internet blockade. It is here that the International Community can be of assistance. The Great Chinese Firewall is not impregnable. Initiatives such as the Global Internet Freedom Consortium, through which Chinese people can bypass the Firewall, are already having a large impact. (The Falun Gong is the primary organizer of the GIFC.) The democratic nations of the world, notably the U.S. (which has budgeted large sums to support the GIFC, but dispensed only a small amount), should do everything possible to create a free information flow. And, all democratic nations and groupings, e.g., the E.U., should again make democracy and human rights the foundation of their foreign policy for China.
Will China require a revolution? Must there be a pro-democracy revolution to erase the results of the 1949 communist revolution? One would hope not: that democratic change can be accomplished in China non-violently. Unfortunately, however, having hopes and dreams does not guarantee that they will come true. In the real world change to democracy has invariably been accompanied by either a popular uprising or a military coup, or both.
As a result of the global financial crisis, business activity in China began to slow down and popular unrest to escalate. I have argued for years that there should be a global boycott of consumer products from China. Call it tough love, or whatever you like, but the Chinese people do have the power to overthrow the CCP. A little push wouldn’t hurt. Then, when China is free, trade can be resumed and the proceeds used to build schools and hospitals, not guns and missiles.
CONCLUSION
Two things are certain with China. For the first, democracy is preferable to the rule of the CCP, but defeating the Party and establishing it will be difficult. All human rights groups, including the Falun Gong, Tibetans, East Turkestanis and Southern Mongolians, should actively organize – both underground operations and international diplomacy – for democratic change. Indeed, if they maintain their primary focus on human rights concerns, such concerns will never be resolved.
Secondly, we, the people of the world, can work to make a difference. If our own political leaders, because of corporate lobbying, choose to back the CCP, we can act on our own to help the Chinese people.
Other than activism within China, the biggest impetus for change will be if either of the neighboring regimes in North Korea and Burma collapse. We can help bring this about as well.
The CCP’s goal is to create a one thousand year empire, that dominates a globe filled with authoritarian allies. This is identical to Adolf Hitler’s dream. Everyone who enjoys or aspires to freedom must work to prevent this from happening.
Dictator Watch
MORE ARTICLES ON BURMA DEMOCRACY
www.dictatorwatch.org
Showing posts with label opinion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label opinion. Show all posts
Sunday, 6 June 2010
Sunday, 2 November 2008
Comparison of BSPP's and SPDC's Political Manipulation
Wed 29 Oct 2008 (Mon News) - The Burmese Army took power not during the bloodshed of 1988, but through a coup in 1962. The military has ruled the country under many different names. The commanders of Burma’s Army have noticed how delicious power tastes, and do not want the make way for democratic governance. They continuously manipulate the situation in Burma to maintain power. They will again during the election of 2010.
Under the name “Revolutionary Council,” General Ne Win ruled the country from 1962 to 1974. He ruled without any constitution, like the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – and subsequent State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – ruled from 1988 to 2008, and maybe will past 2010.
Ne Win imprisoned hundreds of democratic and ethnic leaders, including former Prime Minister U Nu and Mon leaders Nai Aung Tun. Similarly, SLORC's Gen. Saw Maung and Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt arrested many activists – student leaders, NLD members and 1990 MPs – and imprisoned them for many years. SPDC's Sr. Gen. Than Shwe has been more aggressive and notorious. He ordered the imprisonment of almost all of ‘88 Generation Student leaders and killed unarmed monks and civilians during the 2007 September's Saffron Revolution.
Ruling the country without a legitimate constitution is lawlessness. And it is illegitimate in the eyes of international and diplomatic communities. Ne Win and his military men drafted a socialist constitution in 1974 and called for a sham “People’s Referendum.” Unsurprisingly, 99% of the people were said to support the one-party rule Socialist Constitution. Burmese Army's commanders took off their uniform, and took over politics through one-party elections and seats in the parliament and cabinet.
History is repeating itself. The SPDC's Sr. Gen. Than Shwe held a sham “National Convention” to draft a sham constitution. The product guarantees the military controls 25% of seats in parliament. After the 2010 Elections, the military will rule without taking off a uniform.
If compared with these situation, the current regime more openly expresses that they love the taste of power and will continue military rule of the country as long as possible. As prominent Journalist U Win Tin said, “all of us will die in this roadmap.” This roadmap cleared the way for military rule and it is the genuine political will of this regime. Therefore, there will be no liberal or participatory democracy in Burma.
Under the name “Revolutionary Council,” General Ne Win ruled the country from 1962 to 1974. He ruled without any constitution, like the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – and subsequent State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – ruled from 1988 to 2008, and maybe will past 2010.
Ne Win imprisoned hundreds of democratic and ethnic leaders, including former Prime Minister U Nu and Mon leaders Nai Aung Tun. Similarly, SLORC's Gen. Saw Maung and Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt arrested many activists – student leaders, NLD members and 1990 MPs – and imprisoned them for many years. SPDC's Sr. Gen. Than Shwe has been more aggressive and notorious. He ordered the imprisonment of almost all of ‘88 Generation Student leaders and killed unarmed monks and civilians during the 2007 September's Saffron Revolution.
Ruling the country without a legitimate constitution is lawlessness. And it is illegitimate in the eyes of international and diplomatic communities. Ne Win and his military men drafted a socialist constitution in 1974 and called for a sham “People’s Referendum.” Unsurprisingly, 99% of the people were said to support the one-party rule Socialist Constitution. Burmese Army's commanders took off their uniform, and took over politics through one-party elections and seats in the parliament and cabinet.
History is repeating itself. The SPDC's Sr. Gen. Than Shwe held a sham “National Convention” to draft a sham constitution. The product guarantees the military controls 25% of seats in parliament. After the 2010 Elections, the military will rule without taking off a uniform.
If compared with these situation, the current regime more openly expresses that they love the taste of power and will continue military rule of the country as long as possible. As prominent Journalist U Win Tin said, “all of us will die in this roadmap.” This roadmap cleared the way for military rule and it is the genuine political will of this regime. Therefore, there will be no liberal or participatory democracy in Burma.
The Faltering Asean Way
By MICHAEL VATIKIOTIS
The Irrawaddy News
It is ironic that just as the much-heralded Asean Charter received its final approval through ratification by Indonesia, two Asean member states faced off across a disputed patch of land and started shooting at each other. It was an inauspicious start to what the Charter's preamble refers to as 'a region of lasting peace, security and stability...'
The Thai-Cambodian border is not the only fault line that threatens peace in South-east Asia. In recent weeks, Malaysia has rattled Indonesian nerves with the threatened exploitation of disputed waters off the island of Borneo. The reaction in Jakarta? Instead of requesting the good offices of the Asean Secretary-General to mediate as envisaged in the Charter, security agencies hurriedly planned a military exercise to practice confrontation with the Malaysian navy.
Southeast Asian nations have lived in relative peace and harmony for the past half-century. But they have been reluctant up till now to formalize the mechanism by which peace is maintained. Asean member states have displayed an allergy to formal security cooperation. They have preferred instead to use informal channels and personal connections to resolve disputes.
This was a fine arrangement when Southeast Asia was a more clubbable place, its leaders more or less on the same political plane, sharing the same demons (communist insurgency and uppity peasantry). But today, Southeast Asia has become a patchwork of rather different political landscapes.
In Indonesia, a vibrant democracy has injected nationalist stridency to the country's diplomacy. In Thailand, bitter domestic political conflict is doing the same as one side seeks to undermine the other by questioning its nationalist credentials. In the Philippines, the legislature holds the threat of impeachment over the President's head and makes it hard for the country's chief executive to follow a consistent foreign policy agenda.
Pluralism, therefore, is making it hard for Asean officials to knit together the much-vaunted regional consensus. Now more than ever, Asean needs to build a framework for dispute resolution that will allow the collective security of the region to trump domestic politics and nationalist breast-beating. The Asean Charter lays a good foundation for doing so.
But despite the Charter's ratification, there are few signs this is happening. The other day when Thai and Cambodian troops started trading fire, Asean officials were at a loss to know how to intervene. Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan asked regional leaders like Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to appeal for restraint, which he did. Foreign ministers from Indonesia and Malaysia fell over themselves to offer mediation, but no invitation came from either of the parties. The current Asean chairman, Thailand, is a party to the dispute.
Eventually, calm was restored when it emerged that the Thai and Cambodian leaders would meet on the fringes of an Asia-Europe meeting in Beijing, which they did. That is hardly an endorsement of Asean's ability to resolve disputes.
At the heart of the problem is the reluctance of Asean member states to yield an inch of sovereignty in the interests of collective security. The past few months have seen a number of attempts to gently push the boundaries of acceptable intervention, but it has not been easy.
Witness how easily domestic politics derailed a Malaysian-brokered deal between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao. Often, when regional mediation does get under way, jealous or competitive neighbors seek to sabotage or hamper these efforts. Not only has Bangkok been reluctant to embrace Jakarta's good offices as a mediator in the southern Thailand conflict, but also Malaysia appears to be unhappy to see Jakarta involved in a dispute along its border with Thailand.
Ever since the high-profile resolution of the long-running conflict in Aceh on the back of the devastating December 2004 tsunami, many in the region saw the so-called 'Aceh model' as a path to peacemaking easily replicated elsewhere, which is not necessarily the case.
Without a more formal mechanism to channel and regulate conflict management, with the implicit role of third-party intervention, Asean's efforts to forge a region of peace and security will fall on stony ground. There is something of a built-in contradiction between bedrock principles in the Asean Charter: on the one hand, it stresses respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; and on the other, a 'shared commitment and collective responsibility' for peace and security. Put another way: How can Asean ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes when the Charter insists on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states?
This contradiction needs resolving.
When neighbours cannot settle quarrels between themselves, outsiders should be called on to do so. The irony of not allowing more space for regional mediation is that it leaves the door open for larger powers—like China in the case of the current Thai-Cambodian dispute—to act as the mediator.
The writer is Asia Regional Director for the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and this article recently appeared on Jakarta Post.
The Irrawaddy News
It is ironic that just as the much-heralded Asean Charter received its final approval through ratification by Indonesia, two Asean member states faced off across a disputed patch of land and started shooting at each other. It was an inauspicious start to what the Charter's preamble refers to as 'a region of lasting peace, security and stability...'
The Thai-Cambodian border is not the only fault line that threatens peace in South-east Asia. In recent weeks, Malaysia has rattled Indonesian nerves with the threatened exploitation of disputed waters off the island of Borneo. The reaction in Jakarta? Instead of requesting the good offices of the Asean Secretary-General to mediate as envisaged in the Charter, security agencies hurriedly planned a military exercise to practice confrontation with the Malaysian navy.
Southeast Asian nations have lived in relative peace and harmony for the past half-century. But they have been reluctant up till now to formalize the mechanism by which peace is maintained. Asean member states have displayed an allergy to formal security cooperation. They have preferred instead to use informal channels and personal connections to resolve disputes.
This was a fine arrangement when Southeast Asia was a more clubbable place, its leaders more or less on the same political plane, sharing the same demons (communist insurgency and uppity peasantry). But today, Southeast Asia has become a patchwork of rather different political landscapes.
In Indonesia, a vibrant democracy has injected nationalist stridency to the country's diplomacy. In Thailand, bitter domestic political conflict is doing the same as one side seeks to undermine the other by questioning its nationalist credentials. In the Philippines, the legislature holds the threat of impeachment over the President's head and makes it hard for the country's chief executive to follow a consistent foreign policy agenda.
Pluralism, therefore, is making it hard for Asean officials to knit together the much-vaunted regional consensus. Now more than ever, Asean needs to build a framework for dispute resolution that will allow the collective security of the region to trump domestic politics and nationalist breast-beating. The Asean Charter lays a good foundation for doing so.
But despite the Charter's ratification, there are few signs this is happening. The other day when Thai and Cambodian troops started trading fire, Asean officials were at a loss to know how to intervene. Asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan asked regional leaders like Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to appeal for restraint, which he did. Foreign ministers from Indonesia and Malaysia fell over themselves to offer mediation, but no invitation came from either of the parties. The current Asean chairman, Thailand, is a party to the dispute.
Eventually, calm was restored when it emerged that the Thai and Cambodian leaders would meet on the fringes of an Asia-Europe meeting in Beijing, which they did. That is hardly an endorsement of Asean's ability to resolve disputes.
At the heart of the problem is the reluctance of Asean member states to yield an inch of sovereignty in the interests of collective security. The past few months have seen a number of attempts to gently push the boundaries of acceptable intervention, but it has not been easy.
Witness how easily domestic politics derailed a Malaysian-brokered deal between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao. Often, when regional mediation does get under way, jealous or competitive neighbors seek to sabotage or hamper these efforts. Not only has Bangkok been reluctant to embrace Jakarta's good offices as a mediator in the southern Thailand conflict, but also Malaysia appears to be unhappy to see Jakarta involved in a dispute along its border with Thailand.
Ever since the high-profile resolution of the long-running conflict in Aceh on the back of the devastating December 2004 tsunami, many in the region saw the so-called 'Aceh model' as a path to peacemaking easily replicated elsewhere, which is not necessarily the case.
Without a more formal mechanism to channel and regulate conflict management, with the implicit role of third-party intervention, Asean's efforts to forge a region of peace and security will fall on stony ground. There is something of a built-in contradiction between bedrock principles in the Asean Charter: on the one hand, it stresses respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; and on the other, a 'shared commitment and collective responsibility' for peace and security. Put another way: How can Asean ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes when the Charter insists on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states?
This contradiction needs resolving.
When neighbours cannot settle quarrels between themselves, outsiders should be called on to do so. The irony of not allowing more space for regional mediation is that it leaves the door open for larger powers—like China in the case of the current Thai-Cambodian dispute—to act as the mediator.
The writer is Asia Regional Director for the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and this article recently appeared on Jakarta Post.
Tuesday, 28 October 2008
Myanmar's failed non-violent opposition
By Norman Robespierre
YANGON - The one-year anniversary of Myanmar's military crackdown on non-violent protests in Yangon and several other cities calling for political change came and went without incident.
While the Buddhist monk-led demonstrations briefly raised global awareness of the Burmese people's plight, it also highlighted the failure of the opposition's long-held non-violence strategy as the best means to bring change to the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime that views the failure to use violence as a sign of weakness.
While outwardly a spontaneous gesture in reaction to economic woes, the demonstrations were the culmination of years of planning by opposition forces inside and abroad for non-violent action to confront the regime. Opposition to the ruling regime is figuratively headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San, the founding father of Burmese independence. Her commitment to non-violent struggle for political change has earned her the Nobel Peace Prize and global admiration, but two decades since soldiers opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators, there is little else to show for her two decades of non-violent struggle.
The resounding victory of Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party in the 1990 elections was the political high-water mark for the opposition. While the regime refused to honor the poll's results, the election provided political legitimacy to the NLD and a handful of opposition activists. Many of those elected still cling to demands that the election's results be honored, but with each passing year those claims to legitimacy become less germane. Close to 40% of the elected members of parliament have been dismissed or resigned and a full 20% have died.
The opposition defined broadly is comprised of a plethora of political organizations. Among the best known are the National Coalition Government for the Union of Burma, headed by Dr Sein Win, Suu Kyi's cousin, the All-Burma Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF), Democratic Alliance for Burma, National League for Democracy-(Liberated Areas).
Additionally, there are several umbrella organizations such as the democratic Alliance for Burma (DAB) and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), which count membership from various political groups and ethnic insurgent armies. These organizations receive substantial backing from Western organizations, such as the Open Society Institute and National Endowment for Democracy.
The vast majority of the opposition follows Suu Kyi's guidance that political change can and should be achieved through non-violence. That doctrine was further promulgated by the Albert Einstein Institute of Geneva and New York. In 1994, it sponsored a consultation on political defiance for Burmese democracy leaders. Included in the audience were representatives of ABSDF, NLD-LA, DAB, and the NCGUB, represented by Dr Sein Win. A key speaker at the pivotal event was the institute's founder, Gene Sharp.
Sharp's involvement with the Burmese opposition was specifically mentioned in a June 1997 press conference condemning foreign support to terrorists by then Secretary-1of the SPDC, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt. In hindsight, rather than condemnation, Khin Nyunt should have heaped laurels on Sharp for promoting non-violence.
The opposition's adherence to non-violence has given the regime a monopoly on fear that allowed it to solidify its position, condemning generations of Burmese to life (and in some cases, death) under the military regime. Additionally, limiting the prospect of violent consequences removed one aspect which may have motivated the regime to negotiate change.
Further, the promotion of non-violence undermined the united opposition against the regime. Under the tutelage of Khin Nyunt, the regime succeeded in enticing numerous armed ethnic opposition groups to surrender their arms and "enter the light" - or at least accept a ceasefire. Khin Nyunt used a variety of incentives to the groups and particularly their leaders to gain their cooperation. The elevated principle of non-violence made it easier for group leaders to accept the bribery.
The success of the regime's effort to pursue ceasefire deals continues to haunt the opposition with fragmentation and conflicting interests. Ethnic armies whose cooperation could have tilted the "Saffron" revolution to effect real change, sat and watched, perhaps out of concern that armed rebellion would jeopardize their lucrative mining or other concessions. As a result, the regime was able to focus its military might on the unarmed protesters and monks.
Incentives and self-interest affect not only limited ceasefires and peace groups, but also some ethnic armies that continue to put forces in the field against the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw. According to a senior Thai military officer, the SPDC is able to continue to benefit from the vulnerable Yadana-Yetagun gas pipelines because the Mon insurgents in the area are receiving payoffs from both the regime and the Thai authorities. Construction of a third foreign exchange earning pipeline in the same area is reportedly slated for this dry season.
A valuable experience
The Einstein Institute's website comments that while the non-violent struggles in Myanmar, China and Tibet "have not brought an end to the ruling dictatorships or occupations, they have exposed the brutal nature of those repressive regimes to the world community and have provided the populations with valuable experience with this form of struggle".
How 20 years of mostly ineffectual resistance can be summed up as a "valuable experience" is a mystery. One wonders to what valuable experience those sitting comfortably in their ideological ivory towers refer: languishing in a Myanmar prison, being knocked senseless by a police truncheon, having family members disappear, torture, death? How much longer before the Burmese people realize the opposition's strategy of non-violence is ineffective against those who have the means and determination to kill to maintain control and decide to pursue a different, more assertive course?
Opposition optimists say that the regime was weakened by last year's crackdown, arguing that the violence police and soldiers perpetrated against Buddhist monks irked the populace and many military officers, the majority of them Buddhist. Further, they cite perennial rumors of infighting among the generals and lower ranks that could lead to fractures in the leadership and eventually a democracy-promoting mutiny.
However, earlier leadership struggles in which top generals fell from grace - including Tun Kyi, Saw Maung, Ne Win and Khin Nyunt - only brought changes in military personalities, not a transformation of the military-dominated system. Indeed, the system is highly resilient and endures with a new crop of military officers entering the top ranks of the Tatmadaw each year. Although many of the officers are not enthusiastic that monks were beaten, most believe that the majority of the protesters were recent novices who had donned monk's robes expressly to carry out illegal political demonstrations.
The optimists also claim that the regime's inadequate response to Cyclone Nargis, which killed over 80,000 people and adversely affected the livelihoods of over 2 million, also weakened the SPDC. As evidence, they mention that many military personnel and government workers had relatives in the worst-hit Ayeyawady Division and were upset at the delayed response. The actual intensity of disenchantment caused by the slow reaction to the killer storm, of course, is hard to quantify without public opinion polls.
However, the fact that Burmese people are used to being self-sufficient and not in the habit of relying on the government for anything likely means the fallout from such a callous official response was less severe than it would have been in other countries. Whatever disenchantment the government's limp response to Nargis and the September 2007 crackdown may have sown, to date it has not been exploited to cause the Tatmadaw to split or the military government to fall.
From another perspective, it could just as easily be argued that Cyclone Nargis made the regime stronger by opening up a new tap of foreign aid. Millions of dollars of humanitarian aid poured into the economy as foreign nations rallied to assist the storm's survivors. The regime's multi-tiered foreign exchange system allowed them to extract an estimated 20% to 25% from all foreign exchange certificates converted into the local kyat currency.
The diversion of United Nations (UN) funds alone resulted in at least US$1.5 million (some estimates are as high as $10 million) of humanitarian aid being delivered straight into the regime's coffers. The tilted exchange system also affected non-UN aid agencies for an undetermined amount of donations. Hard currency intended to relieve the suffering of cyclone survivors instead directly benefited the regime.
Nargis also brought a recent call from the International Crisis Group (ICG) to repeal sanctions and provide more aid than beyond what is necessary to recover from Nargis to develop the impoverished country. While few share the ICG's sentiment, which in the past was criticized by the Open Society Institute for its unscholarly approach with respect to Myanmar, its call would allow the regime to reap even more foreign money to consolidate its position.
Nargis brought not only financial benefit, but also is believed to have increased the regime's confidence. Certainly, the regime's confidence soared when French and US warships withdrew from waters off Myanmar's coast in the aftermath of the killer storm. While the vessels were sent to deliver humanitarian aid, antagonistic rhetoric about the humanitarian "right to protect" Myanmar's citizens by Western diplomats preceded the vessels' arrivals, raising the regime's suspicions about their mission.
Rather than appear to submit to Western threats, and fearful of a possible uprising by opposition activists should foreign forces land on Myanmar soil, the regime barred the aid from being delivered by other than their own naval personnel. Eventually the vessels withdrew without a shot being fired and much of the aid went undelivered. The regime's ability to diplomatically ward off the perceived threat posed by French and American warships is believed to have boosted the regime's confidence in its ability to stand up to neo-colonialist adversaries.
Confidence in the regime's decision-making, often portrayed as daft or worse in the international media, has recently reportedly grown among the rank and file. In particular, the decision to move the political capital to Naypyitaw from Yangon is - after the cyclone which hit the old capital - viewed in a favorable new light. Prior to Nargis, the abrupt move in late 2005 was widely criticized for its exorbitant expense and ridiculed for its reliance on astrology. It is now looked at by many Burmese as cosmic confirmation of the wisdom and even prescience of the senior leadership - or at least that of their astrologers.
More important is the regime's growing confidence in the reliability of government forces to deploy as instruments of control. The ability to successfully extinguish the pro-democracy protests in September 2007, without notable dissension within the ranks of the police and military, left the Tatmadaw stronger and the regime more self-assured. According to several foreign diplomats based in Yangon, the regime is now reportedly more confident in the loyalty of its forces and its ability to control unrest.
On the other hand, the position of the political opposition is decidedly weaker. More opposition members are in prison than before, while countless others have fled the country due to very real concerns for their personal security. An untold number have perished. Despite the overwhelming support of the populace, the opposition was unable to capitalize on social discontent in 2007, when the junta removed fuel price subsidies and fuel costs shot up 500% overnight. Nor have they been able to leverage the chaos and suffering brought on by the junta's inept handling of the cyclone disaster this year into a renewed call for political change.
Instead of maintaining offensive pressure and preparing adequate defensive measures to protect their supporters, they have blindly clung to the gospel of non-violence in the hope that international pressure would eventually lead to democratic change. As many Saffron Revolution demonstrators can attest, hope is a weak defensive shield against a police baton, a charging truck, or the ammunition of soldiers trained to kill.
Asymmetric violence
While pursuing a moral high ground of non-violence, the opposition has ceded the battlefield to its military enemy. Unlike themselves, the ruling SPDC junta is more than willing to use violence to achieve its goals. One means at the regime's disposal are Swan-ar-Shin thugs, whose actions undoubtedly are directed by elements of the military regime, most likely the Sa Ya Pha , or military intelligence. Swan-ar-Shin often intimidate and cower the populace with the threat of violence and physical assault and many were captured on film beating unarmed demonstrators after they had been arrested.
The regime's asymmetric use of violence breeds fear in the populace, forcefully enabling the regime to squash even the faintest hint of opposition to its rule. Viewed through that lens, the Swan-ar-Shin has been an unqualified success for the regime and instrumental in its staying power. Their ability to use violence with impunity and intimidate those holding dissenting political views has muzzled open expression of support for political change.
As the Einstein Institute's Sharp points out in his writings, it is the fear of violent sanctions, rather than the violence itself, that creates the climate of fear which causes the populace to yield. In the absence of a functioning legal system, the opposition would be wise to pursue extra-legal action against the regime's violent henchmen. For instance, makeshift justice squads of the people could be formed to mete out street punishment to the Swan-ar-Shin members known to be guilty of the most heinous abuses.
These Swan-ar-Shin agents are well known to their neighbors and a few instances of vigilante justice would no doubt cause others to consider the consequences of their unjust actions and embolden those who oppose them. While opposition-led vigilante squads may not totally remove the climate of fear, at least fear would be more equally distributed to both sides of the political aisle.
In February, the Democratic Voice of Burma reported on a rare example of focused direct action against the junta's henchmen. According to the report, a regime-linked United Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) member from Hlaing Tharyar township with a local reputation for abuse was found beheaded. The circumstances of his death caused other USDA members to fear a similar fate and their harassment of people noticeably reduced, according to the report. Were this fear of retribution more widespread, the regime would have fewer resources to strangle dissent and added incentive to negotiate with the opposition.
Instead, the exiled opposition blindly adheres to non-violence and is now mounting a major effort to petition the UN to revoke Myanmar's diplomatic credentials. There is nothing original in petitioning the UN: a similar initiative met with no success in 1996 and there is no reason to think the current initiative has any better chance of succeeding. Numerous other countries in the UN General Assembly are also far from being democracies and they would be reluctant to support such punitive measures out of fear that some day a similar procedure might be launched against them.
China and Russia certainly are no proponents of democracy and without their support inside the UN Security Council the latest effort will also fail. Even were the effort successfully staged and Myanmar lost its seat at the UN, the domestic impact on the regime would be marginal. While the UN initiative helps maintain global awareness, the opposition's international efforts might be better deployed in targeting the regime's primary enabler, Singapore, which is particularly vulnerable because of its global commercial interests, including the recent stakes it took in big Western banks.
Singapore has successfully deflected criticism for its role by pointing the finger at China or other neighboring countries as principal supporters of the regime. But it is Singaporean support that is the regime's lifeblood. Many of the regime's leaders and their family members are known to have Singaporean bank accounts. The regime's tyrants frequently travel to Singapore for state-of the-art medical treatment and receive cordial official welcomes. Burmese democracy activists in Singapore, on the other hand, risk arrest or revocation of their visas should they protest their regular arrivals.
Singapore also allows numerous Myanmar businesses with direct links to the regime to incorporate in Singapore. Singapore's willingness to sacrifice ethics for money gives the Myanmar regime a cloak of international legitimacy to do business and enables it in many cases to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by Western countries. One example of Myanmar's Singaporean commercial fronts is Silver Wave Energy, reported in the media as a Singaporean company that brokered oil and gas deals between the regime and Indian and Russian companies. However, research into the firm indicates its phone numbers and offices are in Yangon at the Trader's Hotel.
Meanwhile, the expatriate opposition leadership continues to be led by the same inept strategists that espouse non-violence as the sole implement to effect political change in Myanmar. Nearly two decades have passed without a democratic election and the opposition's leadership has grown stale, devoid of new ideas and lacking a coherent strategy. Indeed, they continue down the path of failed tactics that has degraded the opposition into its present sad, ineffectual state.
Perhaps the opposition finds itself in this position because it relies so heavily on Western financial aid, which is explicitly tied to non-violent action. Accepting such financial aid should not preclude coordinating a unified offense that complements non-violent action, nor should it divert resources from potentially successful operations targeting the regime and its enablers with violent and non-violent methods to those historically proven to be without merit.
Expatriate opposition leaders are known to travel in business class on democracy grants and other donations recycling old ideas that simply don't work in Myanmar's military-run context. They are neither up for re-election, nor beholden to an electorate - apart from their Western government patrons. Many, it seems through conversations, expect to retain their exile status and cushy positions for life. They suffer no adverse consequences for their failed policies, although those actually inside Myanmar often bear a heavy burden for their bravado.
Opposition leaders inside the country, including Suu Kyi, have likewise failed on numerous fronts. They failed to capitalize on the regime's temporary weaknesses in 2004 when it disbanded its military intelligence network amid an intra-junta power struggle. They failed to coordinate offensive actions of the various ethnic armies to support the broader movement for political change. Meanwhile, the opposition as a whole continues to fail to adequately target Singapore, China and other key international enablers of the regime. In sum, they have failed to seize the initiative. And they still fail to realize that they will fail again if they use the same tactics under the same conditions.
Brothers in arms
Perhaps the opposition's biggest failure has been its lack of a concerted effort to split the armed forces. This should be their most critical strategic objective if they are ever to liberate their country from the SPDC's oppressive rule. Although the Tatmadaw itself generally follows collective responsibility and duty, outsiders placing collective guilt upon all members of the army serves to unite the armed forces rather than divide them.
As an example, an opposition supporter authored a list entitled "Enemies of the Revolution" that anonymously circulated on the Internet. The list, while notable for its implicit threat of violence, was unfocused and included the director of medical services for the military. Presumably, he was placed on the list for the crime of wearing a uniform. However, the simplistic, carte blanche approach of painting the entire Myanmar military as evil is self-defeating and undermines the strategy needed to weaken the strongest pillar of the regime.
Unfortunately, this has been the general approach used by the opposition as well as many Western diplomats. The opposition needs at least some military officers to support them in order to fracture the regime's main power base. Despite this, rarely will an opposition leader talk of any positive accomplishments of the armed forces. Rather the military is universally equated with the regime rather than being seen for what it is: an implement of national power, as necessary for the opposition should it assume control as it is for the current regime.
Opposition leaders would be well advised to cultivate junior military officers by openly recognizing the national importance of the military and outlining how military service and the abysmal conditions soldiers currently endure would be better under a more democratic government. Last year's crackdown clearly demonstrates the opposition has failed to undermine government forces' reliability to impose violent sanctions on behalf of the regime.
The opposition has had two decades to infiltrate the military with those who would willingly carry the banner of democracy to leapfrog their own promotions. It has had 20 years to tempt military officers to abandon the carrot of self-interest that supporting the military government holds for them. The opposition should have sought to reassure the army and police that they would have a key role in any new government and that a system of compensation and benefits will be maintained and in places improved. It has made little headway in that direction and there is scant evidence to suggest they even really endeavored to do so. Had they swayed even a faction of military or police officials that political change offered a better future for them and their families, last September's "Saffron" revolution could have had a decidedly different finale.
The failures of the past two decades may in large part be attributed to the movement binding itself too tightly to Suu Kyi's personality cult and the philosophy of non-violence. Her reported intolerance of any type of violent dissent and willingness to dismiss members who seek alternate solutions to problems may be why the NLD and other opposition groups have failed to groom a new generation of leadership. In any case, the "Saffron" revolution may have succeeded where Suu Kyi has failed. A number of her supporters now recognize that non-violent dissent alone will not change the status quo and her increasing marginalization from years of house arrest may yet serve as impetus for more confrontational tactics.
Violence alone, of course, is not a solution. But tougher tactics coupled with constructive engagement or inducements for the regime to change its behavior would mark a welcome departure from the current dogmatic adherence to non-violence. The opposition now suffers from 20 years of pushing for change without a logical and realistic strategy.
To be sure, its leadership has suffered immensely from arrests and crackdowns. But unless the opposition soon infuses a dose of realism into its strategic mix and uses all available tactics at its disposal, including efforts to undermine support within the military for the SPDC leadership, its efforts are unlikely to result in democratic political change. Meanwhile, the next generation of emboldened soldiers will come of age and take up positions of power in defense of the oppressive status quo.
Norman Robespierre, a pseudonym, is a political scientist and freelance journalist specializing in Southeast Asian affairs. He may be reached at normanrobespierre@gmail.com.
(ATimes)
23 Oct'08
YANGON - The one-year anniversary of Myanmar's military crackdown on non-violent protests in Yangon and several other cities calling for political change came and went without incident.
While the Buddhist monk-led demonstrations briefly raised global awareness of the Burmese people's plight, it also highlighted the failure of the opposition's long-held non-violence strategy as the best means to bring change to the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime that views the failure to use violence as a sign of weakness.
While outwardly a spontaneous gesture in reaction to economic woes, the demonstrations were the culmination of years of planning by opposition forces inside and abroad for non-violent action to confront the regime. Opposition to the ruling regime is figuratively headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San, the founding father of Burmese independence. Her commitment to non-violent struggle for political change has earned her the Nobel Peace Prize and global admiration, but two decades since soldiers opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators, there is little else to show for her two decades of non-violent struggle.
The resounding victory of Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party in the 1990 elections was the political high-water mark for the opposition. While the regime refused to honor the poll's results, the election provided political legitimacy to the NLD and a handful of opposition activists. Many of those elected still cling to demands that the election's results be honored, but with each passing year those claims to legitimacy become less germane. Close to 40% of the elected members of parliament have been dismissed or resigned and a full 20% have died.
The opposition defined broadly is comprised of a plethora of political organizations. Among the best known are the National Coalition Government for the Union of Burma, headed by Dr Sein Win, Suu Kyi's cousin, the All-Burma Student's Democratic Front (ABSDF), Democratic Alliance for Burma, National League for Democracy-(Liberated Areas).
Additionally, there are several umbrella organizations such as the democratic Alliance for Burma (DAB) and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), which count membership from various political groups and ethnic insurgent armies. These organizations receive substantial backing from Western organizations, such as the Open Society Institute and National Endowment for Democracy.
The vast majority of the opposition follows Suu Kyi's guidance that political change can and should be achieved through non-violence. That doctrine was further promulgated by the Albert Einstein Institute of Geneva and New York. In 1994, it sponsored a consultation on political defiance for Burmese democracy leaders. Included in the audience were representatives of ABSDF, NLD-LA, DAB, and the NCGUB, represented by Dr Sein Win. A key speaker at the pivotal event was the institute's founder, Gene Sharp.
Sharp's involvement with the Burmese opposition was specifically mentioned in a June 1997 press conference condemning foreign support to terrorists by then Secretary-1of the SPDC, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt. In hindsight, rather than condemnation, Khin Nyunt should have heaped laurels on Sharp for promoting non-violence.
The opposition's adherence to non-violence has given the regime a monopoly on fear that allowed it to solidify its position, condemning generations of Burmese to life (and in some cases, death) under the military regime. Additionally, limiting the prospect of violent consequences removed one aspect which may have motivated the regime to negotiate change.
Further, the promotion of non-violence undermined the united opposition against the regime. Under the tutelage of Khin Nyunt, the regime succeeded in enticing numerous armed ethnic opposition groups to surrender their arms and "enter the light" - or at least accept a ceasefire. Khin Nyunt used a variety of incentives to the groups and particularly their leaders to gain their cooperation. The elevated principle of non-violence made it easier for group leaders to accept the bribery.
The success of the regime's effort to pursue ceasefire deals continues to haunt the opposition with fragmentation and conflicting interests. Ethnic armies whose cooperation could have tilted the "Saffron" revolution to effect real change, sat and watched, perhaps out of concern that armed rebellion would jeopardize their lucrative mining or other concessions. As a result, the regime was able to focus its military might on the unarmed protesters and monks.
Incentives and self-interest affect not only limited ceasefires and peace groups, but also some ethnic armies that continue to put forces in the field against the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw. According to a senior Thai military officer, the SPDC is able to continue to benefit from the vulnerable Yadana-Yetagun gas pipelines because the Mon insurgents in the area are receiving payoffs from both the regime and the Thai authorities. Construction of a third foreign exchange earning pipeline in the same area is reportedly slated for this dry season.
A valuable experience
The Einstein Institute's website comments that while the non-violent struggles in Myanmar, China and Tibet "have not brought an end to the ruling dictatorships or occupations, they have exposed the brutal nature of those repressive regimes to the world community and have provided the populations with valuable experience with this form of struggle".
How 20 years of mostly ineffectual resistance can be summed up as a "valuable experience" is a mystery. One wonders to what valuable experience those sitting comfortably in their ideological ivory towers refer: languishing in a Myanmar prison, being knocked senseless by a police truncheon, having family members disappear, torture, death? How much longer before the Burmese people realize the opposition's strategy of non-violence is ineffective against those who have the means and determination to kill to maintain control and decide to pursue a different, more assertive course?
Opposition optimists say that the regime was weakened by last year's crackdown, arguing that the violence police and soldiers perpetrated against Buddhist monks irked the populace and many military officers, the majority of them Buddhist. Further, they cite perennial rumors of infighting among the generals and lower ranks that could lead to fractures in the leadership and eventually a democracy-promoting mutiny.
However, earlier leadership struggles in which top generals fell from grace - including Tun Kyi, Saw Maung, Ne Win and Khin Nyunt - only brought changes in military personalities, not a transformation of the military-dominated system. Indeed, the system is highly resilient and endures with a new crop of military officers entering the top ranks of the Tatmadaw each year. Although many of the officers are not enthusiastic that monks were beaten, most believe that the majority of the protesters were recent novices who had donned monk's robes expressly to carry out illegal political demonstrations.
The optimists also claim that the regime's inadequate response to Cyclone Nargis, which killed over 80,000 people and adversely affected the livelihoods of over 2 million, also weakened the SPDC. As evidence, they mention that many military personnel and government workers had relatives in the worst-hit Ayeyawady Division and were upset at the delayed response. The actual intensity of disenchantment caused by the slow reaction to the killer storm, of course, is hard to quantify without public opinion polls.
However, the fact that Burmese people are used to being self-sufficient and not in the habit of relying on the government for anything likely means the fallout from such a callous official response was less severe than it would have been in other countries. Whatever disenchantment the government's limp response to Nargis and the September 2007 crackdown may have sown, to date it has not been exploited to cause the Tatmadaw to split or the military government to fall.
From another perspective, it could just as easily be argued that Cyclone Nargis made the regime stronger by opening up a new tap of foreign aid. Millions of dollars of humanitarian aid poured into the economy as foreign nations rallied to assist the storm's survivors. The regime's multi-tiered foreign exchange system allowed them to extract an estimated 20% to 25% from all foreign exchange certificates converted into the local kyat currency.
The diversion of United Nations (UN) funds alone resulted in at least US$1.5 million (some estimates are as high as $10 million) of humanitarian aid being delivered straight into the regime's coffers. The tilted exchange system also affected non-UN aid agencies for an undetermined amount of donations. Hard currency intended to relieve the suffering of cyclone survivors instead directly benefited the regime.
Nargis also brought a recent call from the International Crisis Group (ICG) to repeal sanctions and provide more aid than beyond what is necessary to recover from Nargis to develop the impoverished country. While few share the ICG's sentiment, which in the past was criticized by the Open Society Institute for its unscholarly approach with respect to Myanmar, its call would allow the regime to reap even more foreign money to consolidate its position.
Nargis brought not only financial benefit, but also is believed to have increased the regime's confidence. Certainly, the regime's confidence soared when French and US warships withdrew from waters off Myanmar's coast in the aftermath of the killer storm. While the vessels were sent to deliver humanitarian aid, antagonistic rhetoric about the humanitarian "right to protect" Myanmar's citizens by Western diplomats preceded the vessels' arrivals, raising the regime's suspicions about their mission.
Rather than appear to submit to Western threats, and fearful of a possible uprising by opposition activists should foreign forces land on Myanmar soil, the regime barred the aid from being delivered by other than their own naval personnel. Eventually the vessels withdrew without a shot being fired and much of the aid went undelivered. The regime's ability to diplomatically ward off the perceived threat posed by French and American warships is believed to have boosted the regime's confidence in its ability to stand up to neo-colonialist adversaries.
Confidence in the regime's decision-making, often portrayed as daft or worse in the international media, has recently reportedly grown among the rank and file. In particular, the decision to move the political capital to Naypyitaw from Yangon is - after the cyclone which hit the old capital - viewed in a favorable new light. Prior to Nargis, the abrupt move in late 2005 was widely criticized for its exorbitant expense and ridiculed for its reliance on astrology. It is now looked at by many Burmese as cosmic confirmation of the wisdom and even prescience of the senior leadership - or at least that of their astrologers.
More important is the regime's growing confidence in the reliability of government forces to deploy as instruments of control. The ability to successfully extinguish the pro-democracy protests in September 2007, without notable dissension within the ranks of the police and military, left the Tatmadaw stronger and the regime more self-assured. According to several foreign diplomats based in Yangon, the regime is now reportedly more confident in the loyalty of its forces and its ability to control unrest.
On the other hand, the position of the political opposition is decidedly weaker. More opposition members are in prison than before, while countless others have fled the country due to very real concerns for their personal security. An untold number have perished. Despite the overwhelming support of the populace, the opposition was unable to capitalize on social discontent in 2007, when the junta removed fuel price subsidies and fuel costs shot up 500% overnight. Nor have they been able to leverage the chaos and suffering brought on by the junta's inept handling of the cyclone disaster this year into a renewed call for political change.
Instead of maintaining offensive pressure and preparing adequate defensive measures to protect their supporters, they have blindly clung to the gospel of non-violence in the hope that international pressure would eventually lead to democratic change. As many Saffron Revolution demonstrators can attest, hope is a weak defensive shield against a police baton, a charging truck, or the ammunition of soldiers trained to kill.
Asymmetric violence
While pursuing a moral high ground of non-violence, the opposition has ceded the battlefield to its military enemy. Unlike themselves, the ruling SPDC junta is more than willing to use violence to achieve its goals. One means at the regime's disposal are Swan-ar-Shin thugs, whose actions undoubtedly are directed by elements of the military regime, most likely the Sa Ya Pha , or military intelligence. Swan-ar-Shin often intimidate and cower the populace with the threat of violence and physical assault and many were captured on film beating unarmed demonstrators after they had been arrested.
The regime's asymmetric use of violence breeds fear in the populace, forcefully enabling the regime to squash even the faintest hint of opposition to its rule. Viewed through that lens, the Swan-ar-Shin has been an unqualified success for the regime and instrumental in its staying power. Their ability to use violence with impunity and intimidate those holding dissenting political views has muzzled open expression of support for political change.
As the Einstein Institute's Sharp points out in his writings, it is the fear of violent sanctions, rather than the violence itself, that creates the climate of fear which causes the populace to yield. In the absence of a functioning legal system, the opposition would be wise to pursue extra-legal action against the regime's violent henchmen. For instance, makeshift justice squads of the people could be formed to mete out street punishment to the Swan-ar-Shin members known to be guilty of the most heinous abuses.
These Swan-ar-Shin agents are well known to their neighbors and a few instances of vigilante justice would no doubt cause others to consider the consequences of their unjust actions and embolden those who oppose them. While opposition-led vigilante squads may not totally remove the climate of fear, at least fear would be more equally distributed to both sides of the political aisle.
In February, the Democratic Voice of Burma reported on a rare example of focused direct action against the junta's henchmen. According to the report, a regime-linked United Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) member from Hlaing Tharyar township with a local reputation for abuse was found beheaded. The circumstances of his death caused other USDA members to fear a similar fate and their harassment of people noticeably reduced, according to the report. Were this fear of retribution more widespread, the regime would have fewer resources to strangle dissent and added incentive to negotiate with the opposition.
Instead, the exiled opposition blindly adheres to non-violence and is now mounting a major effort to petition the UN to revoke Myanmar's diplomatic credentials. There is nothing original in petitioning the UN: a similar initiative met with no success in 1996 and there is no reason to think the current initiative has any better chance of succeeding. Numerous other countries in the UN General Assembly are also far from being democracies and they would be reluctant to support such punitive measures out of fear that some day a similar procedure might be launched against them.
China and Russia certainly are no proponents of democracy and without their support inside the UN Security Council the latest effort will also fail. Even were the effort successfully staged and Myanmar lost its seat at the UN, the domestic impact on the regime would be marginal. While the UN initiative helps maintain global awareness, the opposition's international efforts might be better deployed in targeting the regime's primary enabler, Singapore, which is particularly vulnerable because of its global commercial interests, including the recent stakes it took in big Western banks.
Singapore has successfully deflected criticism for its role by pointing the finger at China or other neighboring countries as principal supporters of the regime. But it is Singaporean support that is the regime's lifeblood. Many of the regime's leaders and their family members are known to have Singaporean bank accounts. The regime's tyrants frequently travel to Singapore for state-of the-art medical treatment and receive cordial official welcomes. Burmese democracy activists in Singapore, on the other hand, risk arrest or revocation of their visas should they protest their regular arrivals.
Singapore also allows numerous Myanmar businesses with direct links to the regime to incorporate in Singapore. Singapore's willingness to sacrifice ethics for money gives the Myanmar regime a cloak of international legitimacy to do business and enables it in many cases to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by Western countries. One example of Myanmar's Singaporean commercial fronts is Silver Wave Energy, reported in the media as a Singaporean company that brokered oil and gas deals between the regime and Indian and Russian companies. However, research into the firm indicates its phone numbers and offices are in Yangon at the Trader's Hotel.
Meanwhile, the expatriate opposition leadership continues to be led by the same inept strategists that espouse non-violence as the sole implement to effect political change in Myanmar. Nearly two decades have passed without a democratic election and the opposition's leadership has grown stale, devoid of new ideas and lacking a coherent strategy. Indeed, they continue down the path of failed tactics that has degraded the opposition into its present sad, ineffectual state.
Perhaps the opposition finds itself in this position because it relies so heavily on Western financial aid, which is explicitly tied to non-violent action. Accepting such financial aid should not preclude coordinating a unified offense that complements non-violent action, nor should it divert resources from potentially successful operations targeting the regime and its enablers with violent and non-violent methods to those historically proven to be without merit.
Expatriate opposition leaders are known to travel in business class on democracy grants and other donations recycling old ideas that simply don't work in Myanmar's military-run context. They are neither up for re-election, nor beholden to an electorate - apart from their Western government patrons. Many, it seems through conversations, expect to retain their exile status and cushy positions for life. They suffer no adverse consequences for their failed policies, although those actually inside Myanmar often bear a heavy burden for their bravado.
Opposition leaders inside the country, including Suu Kyi, have likewise failed on numerous fronts. They failed to capitalize on the regime's temporary weaknesses in 2004 when it disbanded its military intelligence network amid an intra-junta power struggle. They failed to coordinate offensive actions of the various ethnic armies to support the broader movement for political change. Meanwhile, the opposition as a whole continues to fail to adequately target Singapore, China and other key international enablers of the regime. In sum, they have failed to seize the initiative. And they still fail to realize that they will fail again if they use the same tactics under the same conditions.
Brothers in arms
Perhaps the opposition's biggest failure has been its lack of a concerted effort to split the armed forces. This should be their most critical strategic objective if they are ever to liberate their country from the SPDC's oppressive rule. Although the Tatmadaw itself generally follows collective responsibility and duty, outsiders placing collective guilt upon all members of the army serves to unite the armed forces rather than divide them.
As an example, an opposition supporter authored a list entitled "Enemies of the Revolution" that anonymously circulated on the Internet. The list, while notable for its implicit threat of violence, was unfocused and included the director of medical services for the military. Presumably, he was placed on the list for the crime of wearing a uniform. However, the simplistic, carte blanche approach of painting the entire Myanmar military as evil is self-defeating and undermines the strategy needed to weaken the strongest pillar of the regime.
Unfortunately, this has been the general approach used by the opposition as well as many Western diplomats. The opposition needs at least some military officers to support them in order to fracture the regime's main power base. Despite this, rarely will an opposition leader talk of any positive accomplishments of the armed forces. Rather the military is universally equated with the regime rather than being seen for what it is: an implement of national power, as necessary for the opposition should it assume control as it is for the current regime.
Opposition leaders would be well advised to cultivate junior military officers by openly recognizing the national importance of the military and outlining how military service and the abysmal conditions soldiers currently endure would be better under a more democratic government. Last year's crackdown clearly demonstrates the opposition has failed to undermine government forces' reliability to impose violent sanctions on behalf of the regime.
The opposition has had two decades to infiltrate the military with those who would willingly carry the banner of democracy to leapfrog their own promotions. It has had 20 years to tempt military officers to abandon the carrot of self-interest that supporting the military government holds for them. The opposition should have sought to reassure the army and police that they would have a key role in any new government and that a system of compensation and benefits will be maintained and in places improved. It has made little headway in that direction and there is scant evidence to suggest they even really endeavored to do so. Had they swayed even a faction of military or police officials that political change offered a better future for them and their families, last September's "Saffron" revolution could have had a decidedly different finale.
The failures of the past two decades may in large part be attributed to the movement binding itself too tightly to Suu Kyi's personality cult and the philosophy of non-violence. Her reported intolerance of any type of violent dissent and willingness to dismiss members who seek alternate solutions to problems may be why the NLD and other opposition groups have failed to groom a new generation of leadership. In any case, the "Saffron" revolution may have succeeded where Suu Kyi has failed. A number of her supporters now recognize that non-violent dissent alone will not change the status quo and her increasing marginalization from years of house arrest may yet serve as impetus for more confrontational tactics.
Violence alone, of course, is not a solution. But tougher tactics coupled with constructive engagement or inducements for the regime to change its behavior would mark a welcome departure from the current dogmatic adherence to non-violence. The opposition now suffers from 20 years of pushing for change without a logical and realistic strategy.
To be sure, its leadership has suffered immensely from arrests and crackdowns. But unless the opposition soon infuses a dose of realism into its strategic mix and uses all available tactics at its disposal, including efforts to undermine support within the military for the SPDC leadership, its efforts are unlikely to result in democratic political change. Meanwhile, the next generation of emboldened soldiers will come of age and take up positions of power in defense of the oppressive status quo.
Norman Robespierre, a pseudonym, is a political scientist and freelance journalist specializing in Southeast Asian affairs. He may be reached at normanrobespierre@gmail.com.
(ATimes)
23 Oct'08
Tuesday, 7 October 2008
The pro-junta militia: how can they do it?
By Gemma Dursley
Oct 6, 2008 (DVB)–One of the more distinctive aspects of recent repression in Burma has been the involvement of apparently non-state agents – ‘patriotic citizens’ in the words of the SPDC.
Forming the shadowy, unofficial group known as Swan Arr Shin, these people were active during last September’s crushing of the Saffron Revolution and continue to put in uninvited appearances at events on Burma’s political calendar. They often make ‘citizens’ arrests’ on activists, have been implicated in numerous violent assaults, and engage in routine neighbourhood and activist surveillance.
This is worrying. If political change is certain because, as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi says, “all the military have are guns”, then it is disconcerting to think that the military might also have hearts and minds of some ordinary people. Soldiers follow orders of whoever is in government, but the ‘masters of force’ are tools of this administration only, and they stand and fall with it.
Many are drawn from the 23 million strong Union Solidarity and Development Association. The techniques the junta has used to build membership are well known: membership is mandatory for teachers and civil servants (and their families), it brings particular benefits such as educational opportunities, and human rights violations fall disproportionately on non-USDA members.
A large number of USDA members have also been tricked into joining. But it is hard to believe people can be fooled into beating monks or peaceful activists, or organising such violence. Many, perhaps most, of the USDA membership is indifferent to the SPDC’s ambition to crush the pro-democracy movement. But some actively engage in it. Why?
Selective incentives
Unsurprisingly, money is a significant factor. Many SAS are mobilised as and when needed by ward and township USDA or SPDC officials, and are paid a daily allowance for their work. To this they are usually quite indifferent. There is also a ‘hardcore’ SAS who have received training in riot control and surveillance techniques and who, according to Human Rights Watch, receive a small monthly salary and food allowance in addition to any daily ‘work’ they might do.
Many individuals within the core of the SAS group are already on the margins of society – ex-convicts, alcoholics, persons of ill-repute – and, with such low community standing, find no benefits to investing in being a ‘good person’. There is little for them to lose by participating in violence.
Organising violence demands more intelligence and strategic acumen. Individuals possessing this are unlikely to be interested in small cash sums and might be slightly more ‘respectable’ than hardcore SAS. Consequently, they probably look more to the long-term. Not by chance they find this within the USDA, which provides them with many lucrative corruption opportunities, as reported by DVB for many years. Their position within the USDA, and all the violent responsibilities that comes with it, becomes their career.
Team spirit
It is not completely correct, however, to see the average violence worker in Burma as a sociopath out solely for himself (they are mostly men). It is in the militia member’s interest to work for the good of the group: the more effectively the group works, the bigger or more secure are the individual benefits. Consequently, there is a ‘norm of contribution’ within the group.
Usually, such a collective norm gives rise to a free rider problem. People do nothing, as they can – hopefully – enjoy a common good without expending any effort. However, because the core of the pro-junta militia is a relatively tight-knit, closed structure, each person’s decision affects the other. Everybody has an interest in seeing the group norm enforced so group members ‘do their bit’, and encourage and support each other. The rational thing to do, in this instance, is not to free ride – it is to contribute and uphold the group norm.
This is one reason why those SAS mobilised for the day, simply to make up the numbers, are disinterested, unenthusiastic and quite often ashamed. Among the hardcore of SAS and USDA members, however, there is a real interest in collective action. They police one another’s contribution and encourage each other to go beyond the call of duty.
The response of the Sangha to pro-junta militia activity has been an overturning of the alms bowl, while much of the public shun militia members in daily life. However, this means that active members of SAS and USDA become even more independent of the wider community, strengthening the militia structure as recruits rely on themselves.
Compare this to the communities the SAS terrorise. Within relatively open social structures – indeed, they are far more open now than in the past – individuals opposing political violence cannot depend on the support of others. Here, it is rational to free ride.
A collective identity
Organisations are powerful shapers of individual behaviour. With their own conventions, procedures and rituals they are more than just a collection of individuals. Certain behaviour within the organisation is appropriate, whilst other behaviour is frowned upon. The pro-junta militia is an organisation with expectations and obligations like any other, and its core members usually act according to their given role.
Not only do people come to willingly perform their duties but also, even if they have joined for their own selfish needs, come to feel that group objectives are important to them. It is natural for people to perceive events like their associates perceive them, and this blurring of the military and the public means that recruits are increasingly likely to identify the pro-democracy movement as an enemy.
Consequently, the Orwellian propaganda which seems so absurd to the average citizen can easily strike a chord with the active militia member, helping to keep the group unified. This is exacerbated by the lack of free media to challenge such points of view and, again, the group’s ostracism by the wider public. Combined with their unique material benefits, this exclusion only serves to increase the arrogance of the militia.
It is not enough to say that people participate in militia activity for cash. Only by appreciating the range of techniques that the SPDC have used to assemble and maintain their militia can activists find a strategy to defeat it.
This is the second in a serious of articles by Gemma Dursley for DVB on Burma’s collective action problem.
Read Also:
Burma’s collective action problem
Oct 6, 2008 (DVB)–One of the more distinctive aspects of recent repression in Burma has been the involvement of apparently non-state agents – ‘patriotic citizens’ in the words of the SPDC.
Forming the shadowy, unofficial group known as Swan Arr Shin, these people were active during last September’s crushing of the Saffron Revolution and continue to put in uninvited appearances at events on Burma’s political calendar. They often make ‘citizens’ arrests’ on activists, have been implicated in numerous violent assaults, and engage in routine neighbourhood and activist surveillance.
This is worrying. If political change is certain because, as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi says, “all the military have are guns”, then it is disconcerting to think that the military might also have hearts and minds of some ordinary people. Soldiers follow orders of whoever is in government, but the ‘masters of force’ are tools of this administration only, and they stand and fall with it.
Many are drawn from the 23 million strong Union Solidarity and Development Association. The techniques the junta has used to build membership are well known: membership is mandatory for teachers and civil servants (and their families), it brings particular benefits such as educational opportunities, and human rights violations fall disproportionately on non-USDA members.
A large number of USDA members have also been tricked into joining. But it is hard to believe people can be fooled into beating monks or peaceful activists, or organising such violence. Many, perhaps most, of the USDA membership is indifferent to the SPDC’s ambition to crush the pro-democracy movement. But some actively engage in it. Why?
Selective incentives
Unsurprisingly, money is a significant factor. Many SAS are mobilised as and when needed by ward and township USDA or SPDC officials, and are paid a daily allowance for their work. To this they are usually quite indifferent. There is also a ‘hardcore’ SAS who have received training in riot control and surveillance techniques and who, according to Human Rights Watch, receive a small monthly salary and food allowance in addition to any daily ‘work’ they might do.
Many individuals within the core of the SAS group are already on the margins of society – ex-convicts, alcoholics, persons of ill-repute – and, with such low community standing, find no benefits to investing in being a ‘good person’. There is little for them to lose by participating in violence.
Organising violence demands more intelligence and strategic acumen. Individuals possessing this are unlikely to be interested in small cash sums and might be slightly more ‘respectable’ than hardcore SAS. Consequently, they probably look more to the long-term. Not by chance they find this within the USDA, which provides them with many lucrative corruption opportunities, as reported by DVB for many years. Their position within the USDA, and all the violent responsibilities that comes with it, becomes their career.
Team spirit
It is not completely correct, however, to see the average violence worker in Burma as a sociopath out solely for himself (they are mostly men). It is in the militia member’s interest to work for the good of the group: the more effectively the group works, the bigger or more secure are the individual benefits. Consequently, there is a ‘norm of contribution’ within the group.
Usually, such a collective norm gives rise to a free rider problem. People do nothing, as they can – hopefully – enjoy a common good without expending any effort. However, because the core of the pro-junta militia is a relatively tight-knit, closed structure, each person’s decision affects the other. Everybody has an interest in seeing the group norm enforced so group members ‘do their bit’, and encourage and support each other. The rational thing to do, in this instance, is not to free ride – it is to contribute and uphold the group norm.
This is one reason why those SAS mobilised for the day, simply to make up the numbers, are disinterested, unenthusiastic and quite often ashamed. Among the hardcore of SAS and USDA members, however, there is a real interest in collective action. They police one another’s contribution and encourage each other to go beyond the call of duty.
The response of the Sangha to pro-junta militia activity has been an overturning of the alms bowl, while much of the public shun militia members in daily life. However, this means that active members of SAS and USDA become even more independent of the wider community, strengthening the militia structure as recruits rely on themselves.
Compare this to the communities the SAS terrorise. Within relatively open social structures – indeed, they are far more open now than in the past – individuals opposing political violence cannot depend on the support of others. Here, it is rational to free ride.
A collective identity
Organisations are powerful shapers of individual behaviour. With their own conventions, procedures and rituals they are more than just a collection of individuals. Certain behaviour within the organisation is appropriate, whilst other behaviour is frowned upon. The pro-junta militia is an organisation with expectations and obligations like any other, and its core members usually act according to their given role.
Not only do people come to willingly perform their duties but also, even if they have joined for their own selfish needs, come to feel that group objectives are important to them. It is natural for people to perceive events like their associates perceive them, and this blurring of the military and the public means that recruits are increasingly likely to identify the pro-democracy movement as an enemy.
Consequently, the Orwellian propaganda which seems so absurd to the average citizen can easily strike a chord with the active militia member, helping to keep the group unified. This is exacerbated by the lack of free media to challenge such points of view and, again, the group’s ostracism by the wider public. Combined with their unique material benefits, this exclusion only serves to increase the arrogance of the militia.
It is not enough to say that people participate in militia activity for cash. Only by appreciating the range of techniques that the SPDC have used to assemble and maintain their militia can activists find a strategy to defeat it.
This is the second in a serious of articles by Gemma Dursley for DVB on Burma’s collective action problem.
Read Also:
Burma’s collective action problem
Burma’s collective action problem
By Gemma Dursley
Sep 22, 2008 (DVB)–In order to understand the problem of collective action in Burma, imagine the following scenario: citizens in a town of around 100,000 wish to convert a patch of waste ground into a public park.
Costing about $500,000, it’s too much for any individual to pay, but a bright spark comes up with a solution: everyone should contribute a little money, say $5 each, and eventually the total will be reached.
I quite like parks, enjoy a picnic now and then and consider contributing. However, I know that my $5 will make almost no difference to the park’s provision. I also understand that if everybody else contributes, the park will be provided whether I contribute or not. And if no others contribute, my $5 will again make no difference – the park will remain a dream.
If, like most people, I prefer having more money rather than less, then it would therefore be irrational for me to give $5 and rational to hold on to it. In the meantime I’ll just hope everybody else contributes, and enjoy the park and my picnics on the back of their efforts.
Of course, if everyone thinks as rationally as I do, there will be no park. This problem is analogous to that which faces the Burmese pro-democracy movement. Like the park, democracy and human rights are public goods, things everybody can enjoy. This inclusiveness is inspiring, but it is also problematic – if I haven’t contributed to the struggle, I can still benefit from democracy and human rights.
And, like the $5 contribution towards $500,000, my individual participation in pro-democracy activity is almost meaningless. Working for democracy will surely cost me time and the other things I could have done instead of going out onto the streets, but with almost 2100 political prisoners languishing in Burmese prisons, I stand to lose a lot more than just this – the potential costs of rebellion are very high indeed.
It is therefore rational for me, and you, to wait for others to contribute and to ‘free ride’ on their efforts. The net result? Nothing changes. No park, no democracy.
Political scientists call this ‘the problem of collective action’ and it is one which all social movements face. Some succeed in mobilising people to work for a public good and even succeed in attaining their ultimate objective. Most, however, fail.
Grievances and zealots
Whilst this problem seems obvious and fundamental, it is often forgotten. With most Burmese people living in the shadow of extreme poverty and systematic human rights abuses, seasoned Burma-watchers are often surprised at how much the people can endure. What will it take to see people rise up and refuse to be bullied into poverty?
A similar idea is prevalent in much Marxist thought: when the grievances of a group of people are intense enough, revolution is only a moment away. As Bob Dylan sang, when you got nothing, you got nothing to lose. Yet, alone, this is obviously false. Grievances and frustration towards states is commonplace throughout the world, yet large-scale protests are rare events, revolutions rarer still.
Thinking in terms of the collective action problem helps us understand this. If we lump people together in a group – ‘disadvantaged Burmese’, say – we can see that the group would be far better off if it rebelled. But it is individual persons who join groups and rebel, and unless the benefits of participation outweigh the costs, they are unlikely to contribute. Even impoverished, abused individuals have something to lose, leading a careful observer to wonder there was more to last year’s protests than just economic conditions.
Undoubtedly, there are individuals within the opposition, many now imprisoned, brave enough to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the costs of collective action. Across the world, movements have their own Daw Suu Kyi and their entrepreneurial zealots on the ground, but alone or as a small group these brave – and uncommon – people are almost powerless. Indeed, their primary task is to overcome the problem of collective action, mobilising ordinary citizens and persuading them to join up.
Pro-junta militia and collective action
In fact, it is not only movements which face a collective action problem but also states, elites, and their agents.
Although there are many within the SPDC, Union Solidarity and Development Association and the business community in Burma who benefit materially from the crushing of the pro-democracy movement, it is rational for these individuals not to spend time and forgo income participating in repression activities, but instead to free ride on the contributions of others who do this. How, then, has the SPDC managed to convince people to join in its programme of tyranny?
Particularly pertinent for the pro-democracy movement are the combined repressive activities of the Swan Arr Shin and USDA – the pro-junta militia. Talking about them as a group, however, makes us forget that they are a collection of rational individuals. How has the junta managed to mobilise thousands to take part in USDA and Swan Arr Shin operations? At many events, activists are outnumbered by these people and other state agents. How can this situation be reversed? How, in other words, has the SPDC solved its collective action problem, while the opposition has failed to solve theirs?
With so much emotion surrounding the courage and spirit of the pro-democracy movement and the rightness of the cause, it isn’t easy to start thinking in such dispassionate terms as ‘rationality’ and ‘individual costs and benefits’. However, it is because the SPDC has done exactly this that it has managed to solve its collective action problem; this is something the opposition must face if it is to be victorious.
Unless the pro-democracy movement examines ways to overcome the irrationality of participation in pro-democracy activities and faces the fact that it can, at present, be rational for people to join pro-militia groups, it will not be able to combat the forces of violence ranged against it.
Read Also:
The pro-junta militia: how can they do it?
Sep 22, 2008 (DVB)–In order to understand the problem of collective action in Burma, imagine the following scenario: citizens in a town of around 100,000 wish to convert a patch of waste ground into a public park.
Costing about $500,000, it’s too much for any individual to pay, but a bright spark comes up with a solution: everyone should contribute a little money, say $5 each, and eventually the total will be reached.
I quite like parks, enjoy a picnic now and then and consider contributing. However, I know that my $5 will make almost no difference to the park’s provision. I also understand that if everybody else contributes, the park will be provided whether I contribute or not. And if no others contribute, my $5 will again make no difference – the park will remain a dream.
If, like most people, I prefer having more money rather than less, then it would therefore be irrational for me to give $5 and rational to hold on to it. In the meantime I’ll just hope everybody else contributes, and enjoy the park and my picnics on the back of their efforts.
Of course, if everyone thinks as rationally as I do, there will be no park. This problem is analogous to that which faces the Burmese pro-democracy movement. Like the park, democracy and human rights are public goods, things everybody can enjoy. This inclusiveness is inspiring, but it is also problematic – if I haven’t contributed to the struggle, I can still benefit from democracy and human rights.
And, like the $5 contribution towards $500,000, my individual participation in pro-democracy activity is almost meaningless. Working for democracy will surely cost me time and the other things I could have done instead of going out onto the streets, but with almost 2100 political prisoners languishing in Burmese prisons, I stand to lose a lot more than just this – the potential costs of rebellion are very high indeed.
It is therefore rational for me, and you, to wait for others to contribute and to ‘free ride’ on their efforts. The net result? Nothing changes. No park, no democracy.
Political scientists call this ‘the problem of collective action’ and it is one which all social movements face. Some succeed in mobilising people to work for a public good and even succeed in attaining their ultimate objective. Most, however, fail.
Grievances and zealots
Whilst this problem seems obvious and fundamental, it is often forgotten. With most Burmese people living in the shadow of extreme poverty and systematic human rights abuses, seasoned Burma-watchers are often surprised at how much the people can endure. What will it take to see people rise up and refuse to be bullied into poverty?
A similar idea is prevalent in much Marxist thought: when the grievances of a group of people are intense enough, revolution is only a moment away. As Bob Dylan sang, when you got nothing, you got nothing to lose. Yet, alone, this is obviously false. Grievances and frustration towards states is commonplace throughout the world, yet large-scale protests are rare events, revolutions rarer still.
Thinking in terms of the collective action problem helps us understand this. If we lump people together in a group – ‘disadvantaged Burmese’, say – we can see that the group would be far better off if it rebelled. But it is individual persons who join groups and rebel, and unless the benefits of participation outweigh the costs, they are unlikely to contribute. Even impoverished, abused individuals have something to lose, leading a careful observer to wonder there was more to last year’s protests than just economic conditions.
Undoubtedly, there are individuals within the opposition, many now imprisoned, brave enough to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the costs of collective action. Across the world, movements have their own Daw Suu Kyi and their entrepreneurial zealots on the ground, but alone or as a small group these brave – and uncommon – people are almost powerless. Indeed, their primary task is to overcome the problem of collective action, mobilising ordinary citizens and persuading them to join up.
Pro-junta militia and collective action
In fact, it is not only movements which face a collective action problem but also states, elites, and their agents.
Although there are many within the SPDC, Union Solidarity and Development Association and the business community in Burma who benefit materially from the crushing of the pro-democracy movement, it is rational for these individuals not to spend time and forgo income participating in repression activities, but instead to free ride on the contributions of others who do this. How, then, has the SPDC managed to convince people to join in its programme of tyranny?
Particularly pertinent for the pro-democracy movement are the combined repressive activities of the Swan Arr Shin and USDA – the pro-junta militia. Talking about them as a group, however, makes us forget that they are a collection of rational individuals. How has the junta managed to mobilise thousands to take part in USDA and Swan Arr Shin operations? At many events, activists are outnumbered by these people and other state agents. How can this situation be reversed? How, in other words, has the SPDC solved its collective action problem, while the opposition has failed to solve theirs?
With so much emotion surrounding the courage and spirit of the pro-democracy movement and the rightness of the cause, it isn’t easy to start thinking in such dispassionate terms as ‘rationality’ and ‘individual costs and benefits’. However, it is because the SPDC has done exactly this that it has managed to solve its collective action problem; this is something the opposition must face if it is to be victorious.
Unless the pro-democracy movement examines ways to overcome the irrationality of participation in pro-democracy activities and faces the fact that it can, at present, be rational for people to join pro-militia groups, it will not be able to combat the forces of violence ranged against it.
Read Also:
The pro-junta militia: how can they do it?
Friday, 3 October 2008
Burma's economy: Does sanctions hinder development?
by Mungpi
02 October 2008
New Delhi (Mizzima)- Poverty and the slow-pace of economic development in Burma, which was once known as the 'Rice Bowl' of Southeast Asia, is not the result of the current economic sanctions imposed by western nations but because of the ruling junta's mismanagement and inept economic decision making, said an economic expert.
Sean Turnell, Associate Professor and member of the Burma Economic Watch, at the Economics Department of Macquarie University in Sydney said he disagrees with the Burmese Foreign Minister's statement that sanctions have hindered economic development in Burma.
Nyan Win, in his address to the UN General Assembly in New York on Monday, called for an end to what he described as 'immoral sanctions' against his country, saying sanctions hamper economic development and harm the people.
Nyan Win, in his speech, said sanctions are "unwarranted," and "They are not only unfair but immoral. They are counter-productive and deprive countries of their right to development."
But Sean, a long time observer of Burmese economy, said Burma's economy is hardest hit by the junta's mismanagement and its self-imposed isolation.
"Burma's poverty is not a result of sanctions, but 45 years of extraordinarily inept economic decision making by Burma's military regimes," Sean said in an email to Mizzima.
He added that the regime has self-imposed sanctions by creating an economic environment that makes international investment, in true productive industry, utterly impossible.
The United States and the European Union have recently stepped up sanctions against Burma's military government for its suppression of pro-democracy groups and its refusal to improve the situation of human rights including the release of political prisoners.
However, the Burmese Foreign Minister, in his speech said, for Burma to be able to implement economic development, it needs "unfettered access" to markets, modern technology and investment, which according to him has been deprived to Burma due to the imposition of sanctions.
"The sooner the unjust sanctions are revoked and the barriers removed, the sooner will the country be in a position to become the rice bowl of the region and a reliable source of energy," he added.
Economic development without sanctions?
Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese analyst based in Thailand, said while lifting economic sanctions cannot improve Burma's economy over-night, it will, however, allow space for development in the long-run.
According to him, Burma, which has been isolated for nearly half a century and suffered nearly two decades of economic sanctions, a 'command economy' is prevailing, whereby the ruling generals dictate the economy and provide opportunities only to their cronies.
He said, therefore, lifting sanctions and allowing free flow of direct foreign investments, in the long run, would help open up new space for development as well as create new political space.
He added that economic sanctions, which the opposition group led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have called for and was imposed by the US and EU, does not encourage political reconciliation in Burma.
The Burmese junta is annoyed with the west because of the sanctions but are even more so on the opposition led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for urging the west to impose sanctions, he said.
"[T]here has been a sore relationship between the junta and the opposition. So, international sanctions are an obstacle to reconciliation," Aung Naing Oo said.
However, he said, unless the junta drops its 'Command Economy', cronyism, and corruption, lifting sanctions will not help in developing the economy.
But Nyo Ohn Myint, the foreign affairs in-charge of the National League for Democracy – Liberated Area (NLD-LA), said sanctions have its causes and effects, but the deteriorating economic situation in Burma is mainly caused by the junta's corruption, nepotism and cronyism.
Nyo Ohn Myint, who closely monitors Burmese economy, said western sanctions does not put on hold the possibility of foreign investment, which mostly are from neighbouring countries including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
But he said, Burma failed to attract foreign investors due to the lack of political stability, and transparency, which investors see as an unhealthy atmosphere for business deals.
"Despite the sanctions, we see that Burma's bilateral trade with neighbouring countries like India and China are increasing," Nyo Ohn Myint said.
Even with sanctions imposed by US and EU, there are several companies still operating in Burma, Nyo Ohn Myint said, but he added that the junta's failure to demonstrate stability and mismanagement of the economy has slowed down Burma's economic development.
According to Sean, sanctions by any means are "not a full solution" they are, however, useful in an array of strategies.
"Often overlooked is that sanctions can be an avenue, through their progressive lifting, for sponsoring genuine reforms," he added.
Despite the sanctions Burma has several opportunities to implement economic development, Sean said, adding that Burma can still "bring about wholesale reform - especially in the areas of property rights and rational decision-making."
But under the current circumstance corporates and companies are "hardly going to invest in a place where expropriation is a real possibility, where poverty is such that a viable market is barely achievable, and where corruption imposes such high a 'tax' on genuine activity," Sean said.
02 October 2008
New Delhi (Mizzima)- Poverty and the slow-pace of economic development in Burma, which was once known as the 'Rice Bowl' of Southeast Asia, is not the result of the current economic sanctions imposed by western nations but because of the ruling junta's mismanagement and inept economic decision making, said an economic expert.
Sean Turnell, Associate Professor and member of the Burma Economic Watch, at the Economics Department of Macquarie University in Sydney said he disagrees with the Burmese Foreign Minister's statement that sanctions have hindered economic development in Burma.
Nyan Win, in his address to the UN General Assembly in New York on Monday, called for an end to what he described as 'immoral sanctions' against his country, saying sanctions hamper economic development and harm the people.
Nyan Win, in his speech, said sanctions are "unwarranted," and "They are not only unfair but immoral. They are counter-productive and deprive countries of their right to development."
But Sean, a long time observer of Burmese economy, said Burma's economy is hardest hit by the junta's mismanagement and its self-imposed isolation.
"Burma's poverty is not a result of sanctions, but 45 years of extraordinarily inept economic decision making by Burma's military regimes," Sean said in an email to Mizzima.
He added that the regime has self-imposed sanctions by creating an economic environment that makes international investment, in true productive industry, utterly impossible.
The United States and the European Union have recently stepped up sanctions against Burma's military government for its suppression of pro-democracy groups and its refusal to improve the situation of human rights including the release of political prisoners.
However, the Burmese Foreign Minister, in his speech said, for Burma to be able to implement economic development, it needs "unfettered access" to markets, modern technology and investment, which according to him has been deprived to Burma due to the imposition of sanctions.
"The sooner the unjust sanctions are revoked and the barriers removed, the sooner will the country be in a position to become the rice bowl of the region and a reliable source of energy," he added.
Economic development without sanctions?
Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese analyst based in Thailand, said while lifting economic sanctions cannot improve Burma's economy over-night, it will, however, allow space for development in the long-run.
According to him, Burma, which has been isolated for nearly half a century and suffered nearly two decades of economic sanctions, a 'command economy' is prevailing, whereby the ruling generals dictate the economy and provide opportunities only to their cronies.
He said, therefore, lifting sanctions and allowing free flow of direct foreign investments, in the long run, would help open up new space for development as well as create new political space.
He added that economic sanctions, which the opposition group led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have called for and was imposed by the US and EU, does not encourage political reconciliation in Burma.
The Burmese junta is annoyed with the west because of the sanctions but are even more so on the opposition led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for urging the west to impose sanctions, he said.
"[T]here has been a sore relationship between the junta and the opposition. So, international sanctions are an obstacle to reconciliation," Aung Naing Oo said.
However, he said, unless the junta drops its 'Command Economy', cronyism, and corruption, lifting sanctions will not help in developing the economy.
But Nyo Ohn Myint, the foreign affairs in-charge of the National League for Democracy – Liberated Area (NLD-LA), said sanctions have its causes and effects, but the deteriorating economic situation in Burma is mainly caused by the junta's corruption, nepotism and cronyism.
Nyo Ohn Myint, who closely monitors Burmese economy, said western sanctions does not put on hold the possibility of foreign investment, which mostly are from neighbouring countries including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
But he said, Burma failed to attract foreign investors due to the lack of political stability, and transparency, which investors see as an unhealthy atmosphere for business deals.
"Despite the sanctions, we see that Burma's bilateral trade with neighbouring countries like India and China are increasing," Nyo Ohn Myint said.
Even with sanctions imposed by US and EU, there are several companies still operating in Burma, Nyo Ohn Myint said, but he added that the junta's failure to demonstrate stability and mismanagement of the economy has slowed down Burma's economic development.
According to Sean, sanctions by any means are "not a full solution" they are, however, useful in an array of strategies.
"Often overlooked is that sanctions can be an avenue, through their progressive lifting, for sponsoring genuine reforms," he added.
Despite the sanctions Burma has several opportunities to implement economic development, Sean said, adding that Burma can still "bring about wholesale reform - especially in the areas of property rights and rational decision-making."
But under the current circumstance corporates and companies are "hardly going to invest in a place where expropriation is a real possibility, where poverty is such that a viable market is barely achievable, and where corruption imposes such high a 'tax' on genuine activity," Sean said.
Where Would Burma Be without Suu Kyi?
OCTOBER, 2008 - VOLUME 16 NO.10
By KYAW ZWA MOE
The Irrawaddy News
Recent events have raised concerns about Aung San Suu Kyi’s health—and questions about how the pro-democracy movement would cope without her
LET’S imagine a situation: Burma without Aung San Suu Kyi. Undoubtedly, the ruling generals would see this as a dream come true. But for the majority of Burmese, it would come as a great disappointment to lose the leader of the country’s pro-democracy movement.
Aung San Suu Kyi at her Inya Lake home in 1996 - (Photo: Nic Dunlop/Panos)
Suu Kyi may be a prisoner, but she still has immense power. She strikes fear into the hearts of heavily armed men, while giving moral strength to the powerless. She is the hope of the people of Burma, who have struggled to survive under the boot of their military rulers for the past 46 years.
Her recent refusal to receive food deliveries raised serious concerns about her health and worries about the country’s future without her.
According to her lawyer and her doctor—the only two people who were able to meet her during her month-long ordeal, which began in mid-August—Suu Kyi’s protest against her continued unlawful detention had left her thin and malnourished.
It was the first time in two decades that Suu Kyi had subjected herself to a hunger strike. Soon after beginning her first period of house arrest in 1989, she refused food and demanded to be placed in prison alongside her colleagues. After several weeks, she won guarantees that her fellow pro-democracy activists would not be tortured, and ended her protest. Her weight had dropped from 48 kg (106 lbs) to just 40 kg (90 lbs), and she suffered hair loss, impaired vision and a weakened immune system.
At the time, Suu Kyi was still in her early forties. Now she is in her sixties, and the impact on her health has presumably been much greater, even if she merely restricted her intake of food to the barest requirements for survival.
What would happen if Suu Kyi died or became so unhealthy that she couldn’t continue her role as the political leader of Burma’s pro-democracy movement? It is something we need to ask in light of the fact that she has spent 13 of the past 19 years under house arrest, without regular access to proper medical treatment and under immense psychological pressure.
Most people would prefer not to think of Burma’s future without Suu Kyi. Her absence from politics would probably be a death blow to the already weakened democracy struggle, because she has no obvious successor as leader of the movement.
On the other hand, the ruling generals would probably see Suu Kyi’s demise as an end to an era of trouble. After all, she is even now regarded as a threat to their hold on power.
From the generals’ viewpoint, there are many reasons to believe that the future without Suu Kyi would be very bright indeed. For one thing, they would not have to fear a repeat of the non-violent confrontation that she initiated in early 1989, when she called on people to resist unlawful decrees imposed by the junta. The movement continued for months, until July 19, when the regime used an overwhelming show of force to stop a planned Martyrs’ Day march. The next day, Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest for the first time.
Another reason the generals would be happy to see the back of Suu Kyi is that it would probably mean no more electoral upsets like the one the world witnessed in 1990. Despite the regime’s efforts to ensure a victory for the pro-junta party, Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy inflicted a stunning defeat, winning more than 80 percent of seats in parliament. It was Suu Kyi who urged her party to contest the election, despite the fact that she was still under house arrest at the time and not permitted to participate herself. Even within the confines of her home, she showed the generals that she could make life difficult for them.
It was also Suu Kyi who called for a boycott of the National Convention in 1995. She made this decision a few months after being released from six years of house arrest because she deemed the convention convened to draft a new constitution as undemocratic. The generals have never forgiven her for continuing to resist their plans even after they were good enough to give her back her freedom.
In 1998, Suu Kyi once again proved to be a thorn in the side of the generals. That was the year she spearheaded the creation of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament, a body that directly challenged the junta’s right to rule.
The generals wasted no time in arresting members of the newly formed group.
Since then, Suu Kyi has enjoyed a few brief interludes of relative freedom. Each time, she demonstrated that her immense appeal was in no way diminished by her long absence from the public eye. She campaigned around the country, drawing crowds of thousands eager to hear her speak. Her engaging and courageous speeches inspired hope in the hearts of countless ordinary Burmese—and intense anger among the country’s military rulers, who watched her every move and did everything they could to keep her away from her adoring audiences.
All of these episodes have only served to convince the generals that they need to keep her on a tight rein if they want to carry through their agenda. Last year, they finally succeeded in completing their constitution, which they will use to usher in a new era of military-dominated “democracy” that excludes a democratic opposition. It is doubtful that they would have been able to achieve this long-pursued goal if they hadn’t kept Suu Kyi confined within the walls of her residential compound for the past five years.
Suu Kyi’s reputation as a troublemaker within the military government’s ruling circles has earned her a further—illegal—extension of her current period of house arrest. Although she should have been released in May under Section 10 (b) of the State Protection Act, which only allows for a maximum sentence of five years, she is still in detention.
The regime is now preparing for the next stage in its transition to quasi-civilian rule—the 2010 election, which is intended to undo the damage of the 1990 vote. But in order to reverse the tide of history, the generals know that Suu Kyi must remain detained and silenced.
If Suu Kyi’s health were to fail prior to the election, it would probably deliver the regime the victory that has eluded it for the past two decades. Her death would not spell the end of the democracy movement, but it would leave it greatly weakened.
Although Suu Kyi has spent most of the past two decades almost completely cut off from the outside world, she is still Burma’s single greatest hope for democratic change. She is also a leader who is widely trusted by people of every ethnicity in Burma, and one who is respected by the international community, which will have a major role to play in helping to restore the country’s economy.
She has the rare ability to speak to the generals in a straightforward, unflinching manner. Indeed, her power derives almost entirely from what she calls “plain honesty in politics.” Her courage, dedication and steadfast adherence to the truth have empowered her to speak for the people of Burma in a way that no one else can at this point in the country’s history.
After 46 years under military rule, Burma is very lucky to have someone who can still command such immense power through the sheer force of her convictions. Without her, life would go on, but the country would be impoverished in a way that makes even its current circumstances seem tolerable by comparison.
By KYAW ZWA MOE
The Irrawaddy News
Recent events have raised concerns about Aung San Suu Kyi’s health—and questions about how the pro-democracy movement would cope without her
LET’S imagine a situation: Burma without Aung San Suu Kyi. Undoubtedly, the ruling generals would see this as a dream come true. But for the majority of Burmese, it would come as a great disappointment to lose the leader of the country’s pro-democracy movement.
Aung San Suu Kyi at her Inya Lake home in 1996 - (Photo: Nic Dunlop/Panos)Suu Kyi may be a prisoner, but she still has immense power. She strikes fear into the hearts of heavily armed men, while giving moral strength to the powerless. She is the hope of the people of Burma, who have struggled to survive under the boot of their military rulers for the past 46 years.
Her recent refusal to receive food deliveries raised serious concerns about her health and worries about the country’s future without her.
According to her lawyer and her doctor—the only two people who were able to meet her during her month-long ordeal, which began in mid-August—Suu Kyi’s protest against her continued unlawful detention had left her thin and malnourished.
It was the first time in two decades that Suu Kyi had subjected herself to a hunger strike. Soon after beginning her first period of house arrest in 1989, she refused food and demanded to be placed in prison alongside her colleagues. After several weeks, she won guarantees that her fellow pro-democracy activists would not be tortured, and ended her protest. Her weight had dropped from 48 kg (106 lbs) to just 40 kg (90 lbs), and she suffered hair loss, impaired vision and a weakened immune system.
At the time, Suu Kyi was still in her early forties. Now she is in her sixties, and the impact on her health has presumably been much greater, even if she merely restricted her intake of food to the barest requirements for survival.
What would happen if Suu Kyi died or became so unhealthy that she couldn’t continue her role as the political leader of Burma’s pro-democracy movement? It is something we need to ask in light of the fact that she has spent 13 of the past 19 years under house arrest, without regular access to proper medical treatment and under immense psychological pressure.
Most people would prefer not to think of Burma’s future without Suu Kyi. Her absence from politics would probably be a death blow to the already weakened democracy struggle, because she has no obvious successor as leader of the movement.
On the other hand, the ruling generals would probably see Suu Kyi’s demise as an end to an era of trouble. After all, she is even now regarded as a threat to their hold on power.
From the generals’ viewpoint, there are many reasons to believe that the future without Suu Kyi would be very bright indeed. For one thing, they would not have to fear a repeat of the non-violent confrontation that she initiated in early 1989, when she called on people to resist unlawful decrees imposed by the junta. The movement continued for months, until July 19, when the regime used an overwhelming show of force to stop a planned Martyrs’ Day march. The next day, Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest for the first time.
Another reason the generals would be happy to see the back of Suu Kyi is that it would probably mean no more electoral upsets like the one the world witnessed in 1990. Despite the regime’s efforts to ensure a victory for the pro-junta party, Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy inflicted a stunning defeat, winning more than 80 percent of seats in parliament. It was Suu Kyi who urged her party to contest the election, despite the fact that she was still under house arrest at the time and not permitted to participate herself. Even within the confines of her home, she showed the generals that she could make life difficult for them.
It was also Suu Kyi who called for a boycott of the National Convention in 1995. She made this decision a few months after being released from six years of house arrest because she deemed the convention convened to draft a new constitution as undemocratic. The generals have never forgiven her for continuing to resist their plans even after they were good enough to give her back her freedom.
In 1998, Suu Kyi once again proved to be a thorn in the side of the generals. That was the year she spearheaded the creation of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament, a body that directly challenged the junta’s right to rule.
The generals wasted no time in arresting members of the newly formed group.
Since then, Suu Kyi has enjoyed a few brief interludes of relative freedom. Each time, she demonstrated that her immense appeal was in no way diminished by her long absence from the public eye. She campaigned around the country, drawing crowds of thousands eager to hear her speak. Her engaging and courageous speeches inspired hope in the hearts of countless ordinary Burmese—and intense anger among the country’s military rulers, who watched her every move and did everything they could to keep her away from her adoring audiences.
All of these episodes have only served to convince the generals that they need to keep her on a tight rein if they want to carry through their agenda. Last year, they finally succeeded in completing their constitution, which they will use to usher in a new era of military-dominated “democracy” that excludes a democratic opposition. It is doubtful that they would have been able to achieve this long-pursued goal if they hadn’t kept Suu Kyi confined within the walls of her residential compound for the past five years.
Suu Kyi’s reputation as a troublemaker within the military government’s ruling circles has earned her a further—illegal—extension of her current period of house arrest. Although she should have been released in May under Section 10 (b) of the State Protection Act, which only allows for a maximum sentence of five years, she is still in detention.
The regime is now preparing for the next stage in its transition to quasi-civilian rule—the 2010 election, which is intended to undo the damage of the 1990 vote. But in order to reverse the tide of history, the generals know that Suu Kyi must remain detained and silenced.
If Suu Kyi’s health were to fail prior to the election, it would probably deliver the regime the victory that has eluded it for the past two decades. Her death would not spell the end of the democracy movement, but it would leave it greatly weakened.
Although Suu Kyi has spent most of the past two decades almost completely cut off from the outside world, she is still Burma’s single greatest hope for democratic change. She is also a leader who is widely trusted by people of every ethnicity in Burma, and one who is respected by the international community, which will have a major role to play in helping to restore the country’s economy.
She has the rare ability to speak to the generals in a straightforward, unflinching manner. Indeed, her power derives almost entirely from what she calls “plain honesty in politics.” Her courage, dedication and steadfast adherence to the truth have empowered her to speak for the people of Burma in a way that no one else can at this point in the country’s history.
After 46 years under military rule, Burma is very lucky to have someone who can still command such immense power through the sheer force of her convictions. Without her, life would go on, but the country would be impoverished in a way that makes even its current circumstances seem tolerable by comparison.
Time to Embrace the Truth
OCTOBER, 2008 - VOLUME 16 NO.10
The Irrawaddy News
The release last month of Burma’s longest-serving political prisoner, 79-year-old journalist Win Tin, must have briefly brightened up the restricted life of Aung San Suu Kyi, confined to her home for more than 13 of the past 19 years.
But, while more than 2,000 political prisoners remain behind bars, Win Tin’s newly won freedom is unlikely to have given her much hope that her ordeal would also soon be over.
Suu Kyi has described Win Tin as a “man of courage and integrity”—qualities these two champions of democracy share in equal measure.
In the eyes of Burma’s military regime, Win Tin was Suu Kyi’s “puppet master,” although he has rejected any suggestion that he was her mentor or the chief strategist of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD).
His wholehearted engagement in the pro-democracy struggle, however, earned him 19 years of incarceration in Rangoon’s infamous Insein Prison, which ended on September 23 when he was freed along with at least seven other political detainees in an amnesty cynically described by the state media as an act of “loving kindness.”
The regime said the amnesty—which also gave freedom to nearly 9,000 convicted criminals—was part of its plan for a “peaceful modern discipline-flourishing democratic nation.” Its true purpose, however, was clearly to deflect international criticism at a critical time, as the country marked the first anniversary of the September 2007 uprising and as the spotlight again fell on Burma at a UN General Assembly session.
The UN record on Burma also came under scrutiny, as the UN’s “Group of Friends of Burma,” which includes the US, the EU, China and Southeast Asian countries, again called on the junta to release all its political prisoners and open talks with the opposition. There was talk of a return to Burma by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, whose missions so far have achieved virtually nothing.
For all his ineffectiveness, Gambari is the victim of a capricious regime, which has treated him like a whipping boy because of its outrage at what it sees as UN bias and international pressure.
Apart from this pressure, the impact of Cyclone Nargis has led many Burmese government officials to realize that change is long overdue.
It’s still far from clear, however, whether relief efforts being conducted by the Tripartite Core Group, consisting of representatives of the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Burmese junta, are making any significant headway.
The group’s so-called experts, handling aid money from international donors, have naively come to believe that a “humanitarian space” has opened up in the country—with some international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), UN agencies and regime apologists claiming that this presents a window of opportunity for the 2010 election.
The regime view of this is contained in the minutes of a briefing Home Affairs Minister Maung Oo received from Than Shwe in July, in which the UN and INGOs were described as “puppets” of the US and the CIA.
Maung Oo accused the relief organizations of providing aid to the victims “just for show,” alleging that they spent humanitarian aid money on themselves and not, through regime channels, on the cyclone victims.
The US, the UN and INGOs were also accused by the minister of pushing Burma to the top of their agendas.
If a “humanitarian space” has been opened up in the Irrawaddy delta it can be closed at any time because the regime retains the sole power to do so, at any time it chooses.
It’s the same power that enables the regime to suppress the truth and imprison those who venture to speak out. Under the brutal totalitarianism of Burma, telling the truth requires great courage and brings fearful consequences.
Win Tin and Suu Kyi are victims of this perverse power. So is the activist Nilar Thein, who was hunted for more than a year, separated from her infant daughter, before being found and jailed, like her husband, for her role in the September 2007 uprising.
The release of Win Tin and a handful of other political prisoners is welcome news, but it isn’t going to change the image of the Burmese regime while Suu Kyi, Nilar Thein and more than 2,000 other pro-democracy activists remain confined.
If Burma’s generals want to show the world that they are sincerely interested in improving the country’s repressive political climate, they should set a timeframe for the release of all these prisoners. They should also make their seven-step political “road map” more inclusive, giving freedom to all political stakeholders to participate in the process and sharing power with opposition forces who were elected in the 1990 election.
No one expects that to happen anytime soon.
But there is a general belief that it’s time for the UN and the international community to push the generals to accept the words of Win Tin: “We have always believed in solving problems through democratic dialogue.”
The Irrawaddy News
The release last month of Burma’s longest-serving political prisoner, 79-year-old journalist Win Tin, must have briefly brightened up the restricted life of Aung San Suu Kyi, confined to her home for more than 13 of the past 19 years.
But, while more than 2,000 political prisoners remain behind bars, Win Tin’s newly won freedom is unlikely to have given her much hope that her ordeal would also soon be over.
Suu Kyi has described Win Tin as a “man of courage and integrity”—qualities these two champions of democracy share in equal measure.
In the eyes of Burma’s military regime, Win Tin was Suu Kyi’s “puppet master,” although he has rejected any suggestion that he was her mentor or the chief strategist of her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD).
His wholehearted engagement in the pro-democracy struggle, however, earned him 19 years of incarceration in Rangoon’s infamous Insein Prison, which ended on September 23 when he was freed along with at least seven other political detainees in an amnesty cynically described by the state media as an act of “loving kindness.”
The regime said the amnesty—which also gave freedom to nearly 9,000 convicted criminals—was part of its plan for a “peaceful modern discipline-flourishing democratic nation.” Its true purpose, however, was clearly to deflect international criticism at a critical time, as the country marked the first anniversary of the September 2007 uprising and as the spotlight again fell on Burma at a UN General Assembly session.
The UN record on Burma also came under scrutiny, as the UN’s “Group of Friends of Burma,” which includes the US, the EU, China and Southeast Asian countries, again called on the junta to release all its political prisoners and open talks with the opposition. There was talk of a return to Burma by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, whose missions so far have achieved virtually nothing.
For all his ineffectiveness, Gambari is the victim of a capricious regime, which has treated him like a whipping boy because of its outrage at what it sees as UN bias and international pressure.
Apart from this pressure, the impact of Cyclone Nargis has led many Burmese government officials to realize that change is long overdue.
It’s still far from clear, however, whether relief efforts being conducted by the Tripartite Core Group, consisting of representatives of the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Burmese junta, are making any significant headway.
The group’s so-called experts, handling aid money from international donors, have naively come to believe that a “humanitarian space” has opened up in the country—with some international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), UN agencies and regime apologists claiming that this presents a window of opportunity for the 2010 election.
The regime view of this is contained in the minutes of a briefing Home Affairs Minister Maung Oo received from Than Shwe in July, in which the UN and INGOs were described as “puppets” of the US and the CIA.
Maung Oo accused the relief organizations of providing aid to the victims “just for show,” alleging that they spent humanitarian aid money on themselves and not, through regime channels, on the cyclone victims.
The US, the UN and INGOs were also accused by the minister of pushing Burma to the top of their agendas.
If a “humanitarian space” has been opened up in the Irrawaddy delta it can be closed at any time because the regime retains the sole power to do so, at any time it chooses.
It’s the same power that enables the regime to suppress the truth and imprison those who venture to speak out. Under the brutal totalitarianism of Burma, telling the truth requires great courage and brings fearful consequences.
Win Tin and Suu Kyi are victims of this perverse power. So is the activist Nilar Thein, who was hunted for more than a year, separated from her infant daughter, before being found and jailed, like her husband, for her role in the September 2007 uprising.
The release of Win Tin and a handful of other political prisoners is welcome news, but it isn’t going to change the image of the Burmese regime while Suu Kyi, Nilar Thein and more than 2,000 other pro-democracy activists remain confined.
If Burma’s generals want to show the world that they are sincerely interested in improving the country’s repressive political climate, they should set a timeframe for the release of all these prisoners. They should also make their seven-step political “road map” more inclusive, giving freedom to all political stakeholders to participate in the process and sharing power with opposition forces who were elected in the 1990 election.
No one expects that to happen anytime soon.
But there is a general belief that it’s time for the UN and the international community to push the generals to accept the words of Win Tin: “We have always believed in solving problems through democratic dialogue.”
Thursday, 2 October 2008
Living under duress in Kachin State
by Shyamal Sarkar - KNG
30 September 2008
The Burmese military junta seems to have singled out Kachin State for some harsh treatment, one reason for which could be the daring level of dissidence among the student community, which has been repeatedly troubling the regime through poster campaigns, right under the very noses of junta officials.
The dissident students owing allegiance to the All Kachin Students Union (AKSU) have on a number of occasions in the past year put up posters demanding the ouster of the military dictators, freeing political prisoners, demanding a tripartite dialogue, putting a halt to environment unfriendly projects in the state, self determination rights among other demands, which are not new. Not just posters, activists are known to take to the streets either early in the morning or late at night and spray paint walls of government buildings, schools, colleges, markets and other key places making the same demands. The posters were put up despite the high alert in the township sounded by the junta since August.
The periodic movement carried out with precision has had junta officials including the police running from pillar to post trying to tear down the posters or white washing the spray painted walls, lest residents start getting ideas and join the angry students in their campaign against the junta.
The posting of a new Commander in the Northern Command, Maj-Gen Soe Win, who has taken charge of Kachin State, seems to have been done with a brief from the junta brass to come down on dissident activity with a heavy hand and keep people of the state on a leash.
He has gone about his mission with gusto, not uncommon among enthusiastic military officers of the regime. In the wake of students pasting anti-regime posters to denounce the 20th anniversary of the coup in the country on September 18, the Commander imposed night curfew in Myitkyina the capital of Kachin State from 10 p.m. to teach people a lesson. Then the harassment followed.
The police began rounding up people on the streets even before 10 p.m. before the curfew came into force. The idea was to create panic among people. To further hurt residents, the arrested began to be fined heavily to the tune of Kyat 10,000, equivalent to US $ 8. Shops were ordered to down shutters by 9 p.m. The police was taken to task by the Commander because they were unable to prevent activists from putting up posters.
In an effort to nab dissidents and check their activities the Military Affairs Security Unit (Sa-Ya-Pha) was told by the Commander to offer a reward of 100,000 Kyat equivalent to US $ 84 to anyone providing information about activists.
The form of harassment since the new Commander took over has been varied, but all are intent to keep people in the state under the thumb of the junta.
For instance, of a sudden junta officials began searching guest houses and hotels and started making arbitrary arrests of people they suspected. The police in Myitkyina began checking hotels which did not report overnight guests to the authorities. The hotels which allow prostitutes to operate came especially under the scanner. Prostitutes and guests were hauled away to police stations charged and detained. The prostitutes were released later. Even couples dating in parks or on roadsides were not spared.
People in Kachin state as such have been living on the edge. Suddenly the junta authorities decided that subscribers would have to shell out the costs of changing numbers of landline telephones in Myitkyina. The order issued stated that telephones starting with the code number 25 would be changed to 20 and subscribers would have to pay over 550,000 Kyat equivalent to US $ 464 each by September 30 to the State Telecommunication Office in the township.
The reason behind the change in number had to do with disruptions on landline telephones starting with the code number 25 being operated with China-made Telephone Service Operating Machines. These had to be replaced with a new Israel manufactured Telephone Service Operating Machines. Normally, the expense ought to be borne by the telephone department but here subscribers were fleeced, in all probability to save on government revenue or pocket the funds meant for the change.
From whichever angle one views the activities of the junta in Kachin State it is apparent that the people are at the receiving end and left holding the wrong end of the stick.
The Township Municipal Office in Myitkyina has been collecting increasing municipal taxes from residents but they are not getting the desired services whereas army officials do. While residents and shops and establishment owners pay enhanced tax for garbage collection, the civic body accords priority to the junta's Northern Command military headquarters in the township. Despite increased taxes the municipality has done nothing to enhance its fleet of garbage trucks. Only three trucks are in working condition.
Laws are flexible and used to suit the needs of the junta authorities. Without notice traffic police began seizing Chinese manufactured motorcycle rickshaws (three wheelers) called the Tong-bee-car in Myitkyina. All this while the traffic police have been levying a charge of 3,000 Kyat equivalent to US $ 2.5 on drivers operating unlicensed three wheelers. In a town where all three wheelers are unlicensed the very act of seizing them becomes meaningless because there are no provisions to provide a license.
It is such repression that has students up in arms and recently led to an instance where a traffic policeman was thrashed by irate people when the police was seizing unlicensed motorcycles in Myitkyina. The Township Land Transportation Department (Ka-Nya-Na) announced it would issue license for motorcycles till the end of October. But most unlicensed motorcycle owners are not even remotely interested because of the high fees pegged by the junta.
The high handedness of the junta continues in Kachin State despite the areas being under the control of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which boasts an armed wing. The KIO, which has a ceasefire agreement with the junta, has always appeased the regime given the business ventures it operates courtesy the regime and the wealth it enjoys. Of late, after supporting the junta's referendum on the draft constitution, the KIO seems to be toeing the regime's line even more vehemently.
30 September 2008
The Burmese military junta seems to have singled out Kachin State for some harsh treatment, one reason for which could be the daring level of dissidence among the student community, which has been repeatedly troubling the regime through poster campaigns, right under the very noses of junta officials.
The dissident students owing allegiance to the All Kachin Students Union (AKSU) have on a number of occasions in the past year put up posters demanding the ouster of the military dictators, freeing political prisoners, demanding a tripartite dialogue, putting a halt to environment unfriendly projects in the state, self determination rights among other demands, which are not new. Not just posters, activists are known to take to the streets either early in the morning or late at night and spray paint walls of government buildings, schools, colleges, markets and other key places making the same demands. The posters were put up despite the high alert in the township sounded by the junta since August.
The periodic movement carried out with precision has had junta officials including the police running from pillar to post trying to tear down the posters or white washing the spray painted walls, lest residents start getting ideas and join the angry students in their campaign against the junta.
The posting of a new Commander in the Northern Command, Maj-Gen Soe Win, who has taken charge of Kachin State, seems to have been done with a brief from the junta brass to come down on dissident activity with a heavy hand and keep people of the state on a leash.
He has gone about his mission with gusto, not uncommon among enthusiastic military officers of the regime. In the wake of students pasting anti-regime posters to denounce the 20th anniversary of the coup in the country on September 18, the Commander imposed night curfew in Myitkyina the capital of Kachin State from 10 p.m. to teach people a lesson. Then the harassment followed.
The police began rounding up people on the streets even before 10 p.m. before the curfew came into force. The idea was to create panic among people. To further hurt residents, the arrested began to be fined heavily to the tune of Kyat 10,000, equivalent to US $ 8. Shops were ordered to down shutters by 9 p.m. The police was taken to task by the Commander because they were unable to prevent activists from putting up posters.
In an effort to nab dissidents and check their activities the Military Affairs Security Unit (Sa-Ya-Pha) was told by the Commander to offer a reward of 100,000 Kyat equivalent to US $ 84 to anyone providing information about activists.
The form of harassment since the new Commander took over has been varied, but all are intent to keep people in the state under the thumb of the junta.
For instance, of a sudden junta officials began searching guest houses and hotels and started making arbitrary arrests of people they suspected. The police in Myitkyina began checking hotels which did not report overnight guests to the authorities. The hotels which allow prostitutes to operate came especially under the scanner. Prostitutes and guests were hauled away to police stations charged and detained. The prostitutes were released later. Even couples dating in parks or on roadsides were not spared.
People in Kachin state as such have been living on the edge. Suddenly the junta authorities decided that subscribers would have to shell out the costs of changing numbers of landline telephones in Myitkyina. The order issued stated that telephones starting with the code number 25 would be changed to 20 and subscribers would have to pay over 550,000 Kyat equivalent to US $ 464 each by September 30 to the State Telecommunication Office in the township.
The reason behind the change in number had to do with disruptions on landline telephones starting with the code number 25 being operated with China-made Telephone Service Operating Machines. These had to be replaced with a new Israel manufactured Telephone Service Operating Machines. Normally, the expense ought to be borne by the telephone department but here subscribers were fleeced, in all probability to save on government revenue or pocket the funds meant for the change.
From whichever angle one views the activities of the junta in Kachin State it is apparent that the people are at the receiving end and left holding the wrong end of the stick.
The Township Municipal Office in Myitkyina has been collecting increasing municipal taxes from residents but they are not getting the desired services whereas army officials do. While residents and shops and establishment owners pay enhanced tax for garbage collection, the civic body accords priority to the junta's Northern Command military headquarters in the township. Despite increased taxes the municipality has done nothing to enhance its fleet of garbage trucks. Only three trucks are in working condition.
Laws are flexible and used to suit the needs of the junta authorities. Without notice traffic police began seizing Chinese manufactured motorcycle rickshaws (three wheelers) called the Tong-bee-car in Myitkyina. All this while the traffic police have been levying a charge of 3,000 Kyat equivalent to US $ 2.5 on drivers operating unlicensed three wheelers. In a town where all three wheelers are unlicensed the very act of seizing them becomes meaningless because there are no provisions to provide a license.
It is such repression that has students up in arms and recently led to an instance where a traffic policeman was thrashed by irate people when the police was seizing unlicensed motorcycles in Myitkyina. The Township Land Transportation Department (Ka-Nya-Na) announced it would issue license for motorcycles till the end of October. But most unlicensed motorcycle owners are not even remotely interested because of the high fees pegged by the junta.
The high handedness of the junta continues in Kachin State despite the areas being under the control of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which boasts an armed wing. The KIO, which has a ceasefire agreement with the junta, has always appeased the regime given the business ventures it operates courtesy the regime and the wealth it enjoys. Of late, after supporting the junta's referendum on the draft constitution, the KIO seems to be toeing the regime's line even more vehemently.
'The Revolving Door': Plight of Burmese refugees in Malaysia
By Zarni
Chiang Mai (Mizzima)- In the first ever instance of highlighting the lives of refugees, particularly Burmese, Malaysian rights campaigners have launched a new book compiling eight stories on the pathetic situation of Burmese refugees.
The book titled, 'The Revolving Door', highlights the precarious state that Burmese refugees are in, in Malaysia while seeking refuge from persecution in their home country – Burma.
Dr. Irene Fernandez, author of the book, which was launched on Saturday, said, "I wrote this book as we need to present the responsibilities and understanding of the Malaysians, and also the international community to know more about violence towards these people."
Dr. Fernandez, in her book highlights the need for Malaysians to understand refugees and other foreign workers in their land. She said Burmese refugees and other foreign workers are often subjected to deportation from the border on arrest by the Malaysian authorities.
In the process of deportation of the refugees from the Malaysian border, the refugees are exposed and are vulnerable to human traffickers, who wait for Malaysian authorities to deport them and then charge a huge sum of money to help them get back into Malaysia, she said.
"This situation that the refugees are facing is like a revolving door, so I named the book 'The Revolving Door'," Dr, Fernandez told Mizzima.
According to her, most refugees, including women, children, pregnant women and elders, once arrested by Malaysian authorities are deported to the Thai-Malay border after the courts take a decision. And right at the border, the refugees are met by human traffickers, who demand huge sums of money to help them go back in.
Most often the refugees are charged between 1300 and 2000 Malaysian Ringgits (377 to 581 US Dollar) by the traffickers.
Dr. Fernandez hopes the book, which compiles eight stories of Burmese refugees, will bring about a better understanding about the lives and struggles of refugees and foreign workers in Malaysia.
"We hope that there will be some changes from this. Once people read this book they will understand these poor people and may think for them and they could recognize the refugees," said Dr. Fernandez.
Malaysia, an emerging economic tiger of Southeast Asia, in recent years has become a destination for many refugees and migrant workers from regional countries including Burma, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Nepal.
According to the Kuala Lumpur based Burma Workers' Rights Protection Committee, Malaysia hosts at least 400,000 refugees and migrants from Burma alone.
Meanwhile, Burmese refugees and migrant workers said with the continued harassment by Malaysian Volunteer Corps known as RELA, the book would bring some light on the plight they have long suffered.
"We welcome this book both for Burmese refugees and Burmese migrant workers. We feel like it is a ray of hope for Burmese in Malaysia, who are out of range of protection both from workers' rights and human rights groups," said Ye Min Htun, Secretary of BWRPC.
According to Burmese workers and refugees, they are often raided by RELA groups and are randomly arrested even if they hold legal work permits or refugee recognition certificates issued by the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR).
The Burmese then are forcibly imprisoned in detention camps and are sentenced for deportation.
Dr. Fernandez said her book urges the Malaysian government to recognise the Burmese refugees and stop violating their rights.
"We would also like to urge the international community to respond on this horrific situation of Burmese refugees in Malaysia," Dr. Fernandez added.
Dr. Fernandez was awarded 'The Right Livelihood Award' in 2005 for her courageous and outstanding work against human rights violations. The award was established in 1980 by Jakob von Uexkull, and is presented annually, usually on December 9, to honour those 'working on practical and exemplary solutions to the most urgent challenges facing the world today'.
In 1995, Dr. Fernandez was arrested by Malaysian authorities and charged with 'maliciously publishing false news' on the abuse of the rights of migrant workers, malnutrition, physical and sexual abuses, the appalling working conditions of workers and for presenting facts about the situation in detention camps, where many migrant workers end up and die.
Despite being on bail pending an appeal, she - the founder of Tenaganita organization, courageously carries on her work to stand for the rights of refugees and foreign workers.
Chiang Mai (Mizzima)- In the first ever instance of highlighting the lives of refugees, particularly Burmese, Malaysian rights campaigners have launched a new book compiling eight stories on the pathetic situation of Burmese refugees.
The book titled, 'The Revolving Door', highlights the precarious state that Burmese refugees are in, in Malaysia while seeking refuge from persecution in their home country – Burma.
Dr. Irene Fernandez, author of the book, which was launched on Saturday, said, "I wrote this book as we need to present the responsibilities and understanding of the Malaysians, and also the international community to know more about violence towards these people."
Dr. Fernandez, in her book highlights the need for Malaysians to understand refugees and other foreign workers in their land. She said Burmese refugees and other foreign workers are often subjected to deportation from the border on arrest by the Malaysian authorities.
In the process of deportation of the refugees from the Malaysian border, the refugees are exposed and are vulnerable to human traffickers, who wait for Malaysian authorities to deport them and then charge a huge sum of money to help them get back into Malaysia, she said.
"This situation that the refugees are facing is like a revolving door, so I named the book 'The Revolving Door'," Dr, Fernandez told Mizzima.
According to her, most refugees, including women, children, pregnant women and elders, once arrested by Malaysian authorities are deported to the Thai-Malay border after the courts take a decision. And right at the border, the refugees are met by human traffickers, who demand huge sums of money to help them go back in.
Most often the refugees are charged between 1300 and 2000 Malaysian Ringgits (377 to 581 US Dollar) by the traffickers.
Dr. Fernandez hopes the book, which compiles eight stories of Burmese refugees, will bring about a better understanding about the lives and struggles of refugees and foreign workers in Malaysia.
"We hope that there will be some changes from this. Once people read this book they will understand these poor people and may think for them and they could recognize the refugees," said Dr. Fernandez.
Malaysia, an emerging economic tiger of Southeast Asia, in recent years has become a destination for many refugees and migrant workers from regional countries including Burma, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Nepal.
According to the Kuala Lumpur based Burma Workers' Rights Protection Committee, Malaysia hosts at least 400,000 refugees and migrants from Burma alone.
Meanwhile, Burmese refugees and migrant workers said with the continued harassment by Malaysian Volunteer Corps known as RELA, the book would bring some light on the plight they have long suffered.
"We welcome this book both for Burmese refugees and Burmese migrant workers. We feel like it is a ray of hope for Burmese in Malaysia, who are out of range of protection both from workers' rights and human rights groups," said Ye Min Htun, Secretary of BWRPC.
According to Burmese workers and refugees, they are often raided by RELA groups and are randomly arrested even if they hold legal work permits or refugee recognition certificates issued by the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR).
The Burmese then are forcibly imprisoned in detention camps and are sentenced for deportation.
Dr. Fernandez said her book urges the Malaysian government to recognise the Burmese refugees and stop violating their rights.
"We would also like to urge the international community to respond on this horrific situation of Burmese refugees in Malaysia," Dr. Fernandez added.
Dr. Fernandez was awarded 'The Right Livelihood Award' in 2005 for her courageous and outstanding work against human rights violations. The award was established in 1980 by Jakob von Uexkull, and is presented annually, usually on December 9, to honour those 'working on practical and exemplary solutions to the most urgent challenges facing the world today'.
In 1995, Dr. Fernandez was arrested by Malaysian authorities and charged with 'maliciously publishing false news' on the abuse of the rights of migrant workers, malnutrition, physical and sexual abuses, the appalling working conditions of workers and for presenting facts about the situation in detention camps, where many migrant workers end up and die.
Despite being on bail pending an appeal, she - the founder of Tenaganita organization, courageously carries on her work to stand for the rights of refugees and foreign workers.
Win Tin’s Logical Principles
By KYAW ZWA MOE
The Irrawaddy News
The expression, Suu Hlut Twe, offers three simple ideas to break the country’s chronic political stand off between the military and political opposition groups.
Suu stands for pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the unconditional release of all political prisoners.
Hlut stands for Hluttaw (people’s parliament) and the convening of parliament with the representatives of the 1990 elections.
Twe stands for dialogue between the military government and opposition groups.
Those were three basic ideas that prominent journalist-turned-politician Win Tin held to during his 19-year imprisonment. It was his commitment to the pro-democracy movement that helped him overcome harsh obstacles in prison, said the 79-year-old NLD opposition leader days after his release in late September.
Win Tin said he will continue to work toward those simple principles in the ongoing struggle for democracy. Win Tin, who was a secretary in Suu Kyi’s opposition National League for Democracy before his arrest in 1989, was reappointed to his old position as a member of the party’s Central Executive Committee on September 27 during the NLD’s 20th anniversary in Rangoon.
Win Tin’s principles harkens back to the NLD policies in place following the 1990 elections. In the passage of years, the military regime has consistently dismissed all NLD proposals and, instead, gone its own way—following its “road map” to democracy that simply excludes all opposition groups and main ethnic political parties.
Burma’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win told the UN General Assembly on Monday, “Peace and stability now prevails in almost all parts of the country.” The former military officer said the government’s road map offers the best chance for a return to civilian rule.
The junta’s planned election in 2010 is the next step on its road map. After the election, the junta claims it will hand over power to a civilian government. Last year the junta concluded its 14-year National Convention, which drafted a constitution, since approved that guarantees the military will control the pseudo-civilian government.
The regime’s foreign minister told the UN assembly, “All citizens, regardless of political affiliation, will have equal rights to form political parties and to conduct elections campaigns.” However, some former political prisoners and activists are likely to be banned from taking part in the election.
The NLD boycotted the junta’s National Convention in 1995 and consistently criticized the regime’s road map as illegitimate, calling it one-sided and lacking the participation of the 1990-elected members of parliament. Last week, in a statement the NLD called for the junta to review the constitution.
The head of Burma’s police, Brig-Gen Khin Yi, warned NLD’s leaders to withdraw their critical statement, saying it could provoke citizens to make critical comments against the government, which—by law—is illegal in Burma because it could provoke instability.
Similar demand by the UN special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, was also ignored by the regime.
On Saturday, the UN’s Group of Friends of Myanmar—composed of the United States, Britain, China, Southeast Asian countries and the European Union—again called for the release of all political prisoners.
But it’s quite unlikely. The junta’s recent release of less than 10 political prisoners, including Win Tin, won it praise from some countries. The release was part of a general amnesty for about 9,000 prisoners convicted of criminal offenses.
The remaining 2,000 political prisoners are unlikely to enjoy an amnesty anytime soon. The junta considers the jailed pro-democracy advocates “destructive elements of the country” and, as a result, most of them have no chance of release until after the 2010 election.
Recently, The Irrawaddy learned from intelligence sources that an election law for the upcoming 2010 election is now on Than Shwe’s desk in Naypyidaw waiting to be signed. He’s still the only person who has the power to determine Burma’s course.
Win Tin’s Suu Hlut Twe policy is logical. Like everything in Burma, however, the ideas have to be acceptable to Than Shwe.
The Irrawaddy News
The expression, Suu Hlut Twe, offers three simple ideas to break the country’s chronic political stand off between the military and political opposition groups.
Suu stands for pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the unconditional release of all political prisoners.
Hlut stands for Hluttaw (people’s parliament) and the convening of parliament with the representatives of the 1990 elections.
Twe stands for dialogue between the military government and opposition groups.
Those were three basic ideas that prominent journalist-turned-politician Win Tin held to during his 19-year imprisonment. It was his commitment to the pro-democracy movement that helped him overcome harsh obstacles in prison, said the 79-year-old NLD opposition leader days after his release in late September.
Win Tin said he will continue to work toward those simple principles in the ongoing struggle for democracy. Win Tin, who was a secretary in Suu Kyi’s opposition National League for Democracy before his arrest in 1989, was reappointed to his old position as a member of the party’s Central Executive Committee on September 27 during the NLD’s 20th anniversary in Rangoon.
Win Tin’s principles harkens back to the NLD policies in place following the 1990 elections. In the passage of years, the military regime has consistently dismissed all NLD proposals and, instead, gone its own way—following its “road map” to democracy that simply excludes all opposition groups and main ethnic political parties.
Burma’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win told the UN General Assembly on Monday, “Peace and stability now prevails in almost all parts of the country.” The former military officer said the government’s road map offers the best chance for a return to civilian rule.
The junta’s planned election in 2010 is the next step on its road map. After the election, the junta claims it will hand over power to a civilian government. Last year the junta concluded its 14-year National Convention, which drafted a constitution, since approved that guarantees the military will control the pseudo-civilian government.
The regime’s foreign minister told the UN assembly, “All citizens, regardless of political affiliation, will have equal rights to form political parties and to conduct elections campaigns.” However, some former political prisoners and activists are likely to be banned from taking part in the election.
The NLD boycotted the junta’s National Convention in 1995 and consistently criticized the regime’s road map as illegitimate, calling it one-sided and lacking the participation of the 1990-elected members of parliament. Last week, in a statement the NLD called for the junta to review the constitution.
The head of Burma’s police, Brig-Gen Khin Yi, warned NLD’s leaders to withdraw their critical statement, saying it could provoke citizens to make critical comments against the government, which—by law—is illegal in Burma because it could provoke instability.
Similar demand by the UN special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, was also ignored by the regime.
On Saturday, the UN’s Group of Friends of Myanmar—composed of the United States, Britain, China, Southeast Asian countries and the European Union—again called for the release of all political prisoners.
But it’s quite unlikely. The junta’s recent release of less than 10 political prisoners, including Win Tin, won it praise from some countries. The release was part of a general amnesty for about 9,000 prisoners convicted of criminal offenses.
The remaining 2,000 political prisoners are unlikely to enjoy an amnesty anytime soon. The junta considers the jailed pro-democracy advocates “destructive elements of the country” and, as a result, most of them have no chance of release until after the 2010 election.
Recently, The Irrawaddy learned from intelligence sources that an election law for the upcoming 2010 election is now on Than Shwe’s desk in Naypyidaw waiting to be signed. He’s still the only person who has the power to determine Burma’s course.
Win Tin’s Suu Hlut Twe policy is logical. Like everything in Burma, however, the ideas have to be acceptable to Than Shwe.
Wednesday, 1 October 2008
Rights group to probe Burma war crimes
By P. Parameswaran in Washington
News.com - October 01, 2008
AN independent US group is to carry out unprecedented studies to determine whether Burma's military rulers, accused of rampant human rights abuses, have committed international crimes.
The Centre for Constitutional Democracy at Indiana University's school of law said it would launch the research based on anecdotal human rights evidence of "severe mistreatment" of marginalised ethnic groups by the military junta.
"At this stage of the project, I can't honestly say that there are international crimes," the centre's executive director, David Williams, told AFP by telephone.
"What I can say is there may be, and part of our goal would be to gather the evidence and try to come out with some objective conclusions about whether there are or not," he said.
The centre's goal, he said, was to make focused research "in areas where perhaps it is most likely that international crimes were committed".
Only the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) can determine whether international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, have been committed by any individual or group.
So far, Professor Williams said, there has been no institutional focus on possible international crimes committed by Burma's junta, which imposed a bloody crackdown of pro-democracy protests in September last year that was condemned worldwide.
The crackdown - according to United Nations figures - left 31 people dead and 74 others missing, and resulted in thousands of arrests.
The military rulers had also come under international fire and were called "heartless" by some humanitarian groups for initially not allowing foreign aid into the country when a cyclone left 138,000 people dead or missing in May.
Burma also houses more than 2100 political prisoners, including democracy icon and Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent more than 12 of the last 18 years under house arrest.
Prof Williams said that although the ICC had not initiated any study on the military junta's record so far, "ours might be a good place for them to get started".
"It might help the various investigators know where to go and what allegations to examine and so forth," he said.
When asked whether in his personal opinion some of the junta's actions could be deemed as international crimes, Prof Williams said: "What I might be able to say is that it looks to me, in my professional opinion, like there is a good chance that it is.
"And it makes sense therefore to bring a prosecution because there is enough evidence that a court should be able to see it," he pointed out.
The university group's staff had been for the last six years helping ethnic groups inside Burma - at their request - draw up constitutional reforms in their struggle to win greater freedom and rights.
Law professor David Williams had smuggled himself into Burma on various occasions and worked on constitutional reforms with the Karen ethnic group, waging the world's longest running civil war against the government since 1947.
"I am hearing endless stories about how the military government is murdering villagers, it's blowing up rice paddies so that they dry out, it's setting fires to villages, it's laying mines in those villages so that when the people come back some of them get blown up," he said.
"The result is that they have to move often to hills and find a new place to build a village and start growing rice. That means in a relatively short period of time there is famine because old rice paddies have to be abandoned."
Prof Williams said while he did not witness the Burma military units attacking the Karen guerrilla resistance units, he saw "evidence of the military going after the civilian population".
"That's just the tip of the iceberg in itself and that doesn't constitute conclusive evidence of an international crime but it makes you think," he said.
News.com - Article from: Agence France-Presse
News.com - October 01, 2008
AN independent US group is to carry out unprecedented studies to determine whether Burma's military rulers, accused of rampant human rights abuses, have committed international crimes.
The Centre for Constitutional Democracy at Indiana University's school of law said it would launch the research based on anecdotal human rights evidence of "severe mistreatment" of marginalised ethnic groups by the military junta.
"At this stage of the project, I can't honestly say that there are international crimes," the centre's executive director, David Williams, told AFP by telephone.
"What I can say is there may be, and part of our goal would be to gather the evidence and try to come out with some objective conclusions about whether there are or not," he said.
The centre's goal, he said, was to make focused research "in areas where perhaps it is most likely that international crimes were committed".
Only the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) can determine whether international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, have been committed by any individual or group.
So far, Professor Williams said, there has been no institutional focus on possible international crimes committed by Burma's junta, which imposed a bloody crackdown of pro-democracy protests in September last year that was condemned worldwide.
The crackdown - according to United Nations figures - left 31 people dead and 74 others missing, and resulted in thousands of arrests.
The military rulers had also come under international fire and were called "heartless" by some humanitarian groups for initially not allowing foreign aid into the country when a cyclone left 138,000 people dead or missing in May.
Burma also houses more than 2100 political prisoners, including democracy icon and Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent more than 12 of the last 18 years under house arrest.
Prof Williams said that although the ICC had not initiated any study on the military junta's record so far, "ours might be a good place for them to get started".
"It might help the various investigators know where to go and what allegations to examine and so forth," he said.
When asked whether in his personal opinion some of the junta's actions could be deemed as international crimes, Prof Williams said: "What I might be able to say is that it looks to me, in my professional opinion, like there is a good chance that it is.
"And it makes sense therefore to bring a prosecution because there is enough evidence that a court should be able to see it," he pointed out.
The university group's staff had been for the last six years helping ethnic groups inside Burma - at their request - draw up constitutional reforms in their struggle to win greater freedom and rights.
Law professor David Williams had smuggled himself into Burma on various occasions and worked on constitutional reforms with the Karen ethnic group, waging the world's longest running civil war against the government since 1947.
"I am hearing endless stories about how the military government is murdering villagers, it's blowing up rice paddies so that they dry out, it's setting fires to villages, it's laying mines in those villages so that when the people come back some of them get blown up," he said.
"The result is that they have to move often to hills and find a new place to build a village and start growing rice. That means in a relatively short period of time there is famine because old rice paddies have to be abandoned."
Prof Williams said while he did not witness the Burma military units attacking the Karen guerrilla resistance units, he saw "evidence of the military going after the civilian population".
"That's just the tip of the iceberg in itself and that doesn't constitute conclusive evidence of an international crime but it makes you think," he said.
News.com - Article from: Agence France-Presse
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