By Roland Watson
August 12, 2010
Introduction
Burma has a substantial population, believed to number above fifty million people. For context, Israel and Palestine have eleven million. Afghanistan, which is about the same size as Burma, has twenty-nine million. Iraq, with a third less territory, has thirty-one million.
Inside Burma, everyone - except the small cabal of generals and their cronies who rule the country - is suffering. The Burmese people are suffocated by fear. Anyone is subject to arrest and torture, and at any time. Moreover, there is general but severe deprivation in food, education and health care. Large regions are also war zones, with the Burma Army perpetrating scorched earth attacks against ethnic minority villagers, which attacks constitute nothing less than crimes against humanity.
A basic comparison, then, of Burma with Israel and Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, suggests that the situation in the country should have far greater prominence. For years, though, international concern with the crisis in Burma has been small. This is now changing. Burma pro-democracy leaders, resistance forces and activists, by creating a great amount of publicity and pressure, have been able to force the problems in the country onto the international stage.
In fact, there is so much going on now about Burma that it is difficult to keep track, especially of what is significant. For example, many things that are not significant are being given undue attention by Burmese and international media and commentators. Foremost of these is the SPDC’s plan to have an “election,” and the actions of the different pro-junta parties that have announced they will participate.
This entire event is a charade. It is a psychological warfare operation conceived by the dictator of Burma, Than Shwe. Its primary goal is to distract everyone from the real situation in the country, and secondly, to forestall a popular revolution and other decisive bids for pro-democratic change.
For the most part, Than Shwe’s operation is succeeding. Many people are consumed by the election. Few are focused on what will actually be required to free the people of Burma, much less involved in organizing it.
The end of the Senior General?
The true situation is much more complex, and unstable. Than Shwe is under great pressure. He has experienced three major defeats this year. The first of these is that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD rejected the election. This makes it extremely difficult, as they are the legitimate leaders of Burma, for the International Community to accept the result (if and when a vote is ever even held).
Secondly, Than Shwe hatched another plan, to regain control over areas of Burma that had been ceded to various ethnic armies in return for ceasefire deals. He demanded that they reorganize as Border Guard Forces, under Burma Army - read Burman officer - control. But these groups, content with the autonomy that they have experienced since they signed the ceasefires in the mid-1990s, refused to accept the transformation. Further, they actively prepared their troops and villages to defend against Burma Army attacks.
Thirdly, the one ceasefire group of any size that had actually been willing to fight for the Burma Army, the DKBA, is now in the process of splitting over the BGF issue. A major DKBA unit, Brigade 5, has created an alliance with the pro-democracy resistance group, the KNU/KNLA. The split between the Karen that occurred at Manerplaw appears to be healing. And, if pro-SPDC DKBA units, such as Chit Thu’s Brigade 999, attack Brigade 5, there is a likelihood that his rank and file soldiers will change allegiance as well, effectively ending the DKBA. (Some 999 troops are already changing sides.) This would create a unified, potent Karen fighting force in eastern Burma.
There are also two other important factors but which are less well recognized. The first is that the morale of Burma Army troops is extremely low. There have been dozens of instances of desertion and insubordination in the last two years, all over the country, and in the police as well. Many soldiers and police are now demanding early retirement, and repayment of the portions of their pay that have supposedly been invested as pensions. It is because of the morale problem that the Burma Army has not attacked the major ceasefire groups, the Wa and Kachin, not the argument that China objected to the refugee crisis that might develop.
Finally, there is a split at the top of the SPDC over the election. The reason why the election date has not been announced is that this split has not been resolved. Than Shwe’s Roadmap, of which the election is the most important step, is intended to transfer power to a civilian administration. He believes this type of regime will protect him following his retirement. If power remains directly within a military junta, the future leading generals could purge him - and his family - at any time, just as he did to the original dictator of Burma, Ne Win.
The problem of course is that there is no place in this plan for Maung Aye, the second top general of the junta. Maung Aye leads his own clique of officers, and with their own divisions and battalions. The Burma Army - the Tatmadaw - is not unified. It has two major factions, and perhaps a third as well under General Shwe Mann.
The Maung Aye group, fearing arrest, as occurred with former Intelligence chief Khin Nyunt, has refused to retire, and, frankly, there is nothing Than Shwe can do about it. If he tries to move his units against Maung Aye’s, this will constitute civil war within the Tatmadaw, and it will inevitably collapse.
This is the real situation in Burma, and which everyone would do well to contemplate. Than Shwe’s position, underneath the apparent calm, is desperate. The election is a diversion and a farce. Its only true significance is what the lack of a date for the vote reveals.
International pro-dictatorship supporters
Than Shwe has a lot of foreign friends, who do not want to see him fall. These include China, Russia, North Korea and Singapore, and also India and Thailand. Even though the last two are democratic, with governments that presumably would support the aspirations of the Burmese, they do not. India and Thailand fear the unrest that might develop in Burma during a democratic transition, as well as a resurgent free Burma. India also worries that autonomy and separatist claims by ethnic groups such as the Naga in its northeast would be magnified following Burma’s freedom. And, business groups in both countries are profiting heavily from natural resource deals with the SPDC, and for Thailand from exploitation of migrant workers.
The lobbying of multinational corporations, who are blind to if not direct partners in the SPDC’s crimes, has also undermined the foreign policy of the United States, European Union, Japan and Australia. It is not an overstatement to say that these countries and the EU are Than Shwe’s friends as well, and this also applies to ASEAN and the United Nations.
The nuclear solution
Even with all of this international support, Than Shwe’s hold on power is tenuous. The five factors listed earlier (the situation on the ground within Burma's borders right now) are much more important:
- Rejection by DASSK of the election.
- Refusal of the ceasefire groups to transform to BGF.
- Breakup of the DKBA and re-alliance with the KNLA.
- Burma Army morale problem including desertions and unwillingness to follow orders.
- Split at the top of the SPDC.
There is no real solution for Than Shwe to these problems. Freedom and democracy for Burma are coming. In a last-ditch attempt to prevent this historical inevitability, he is trying to produce a nuclear trump card. He is working hard with his allies to obtain a functioning atomic weapon, as quickly as possible. The purpose of this weapon, however, is not - as many have speculated - to deter a United States invasion. Indeed, the nuclear program may push the U.S. to the point where it has to intervene. Rather, if Than Shwe, personally, has his finger on a bomb inside Burma - his mansion connects directly to Naypyidaw’s command bunkers and tunnels - he believes this will protect him even after he retires.
Dictator Watch has published reams of intelligence about the nuclear program over the last four years, and which intel has been confirmed by other sources. The basic situation is that the SPDC is mining uranium, milling at least some of it into Yellow Cake, and then bartering this as well as raw ore to North Korea and we believe also Iran. The junta, with North Korean assistance, and European and Japanese machine tools, is further producing components necessary to enrich uranium to bomb grade, and to extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel that could further be shaped into a bomb core. While construction of a reactor is as yet unconfirmed, the number of officers studying reactor science and operations in Russia is proof that this plan exists.
As expert commentators have pointed out, though, this is still a long-term project, potentially five years or more from yielding a functioning weapon. Than Shwe does not have this much time. He knows it. His regime could fall this year - indeed, at any time. He needs a bomb now.
We believe that this will force him to focus on the enriched uranium route to a bomb instead of the reactor/plutonium path. It would also be amazing if he did not attempt to buy a weapon directly from either China or North Korea. Probably the only thing preventing this type of sale is that both countries would be afraid of supplying one to such an unstable regime. Were it to be detonated, under any circumstances (Thailand beware!), this could easily lead to war in East Asia, and which would bring about their own downfall.
Dictator Watch has received more intelligence about the nuclear program:
- China has signed a long-term lease on the Mo Meik uranium deposit.
- High-grade raw uranium is being transported through China to North Korea.
- In return, North Korea, and with China's direct involvement, is helping the SPDC escalate its atomic weapons program. Factory construction is being accelerated.
Both North Korea and China sent ships to Burma in April. The North Korean shipment at a minimum included equipment for Burma's nuclear factories. The Chinese ship may have as well. Neither was interdicted by the United States.
More such shipments are a certainty, and may have already occurred. We think it is probable, because of the pressure on North Korea following its sinking of a South Korean naval vessel in March, that the plan for the shipments has been modified. Everything that can be transported overland will be sent through China. Some items will first be shipped from North Korea to Chinese ports. Other items will be sent in cargo flights, including from both North Korea and China. Everything that must be sent by sea will be transferred from North Korean ships to Chinese vessels in the China Sea, and then transported all the way to Burma waters, for offloading to Burma Navy vessels. Even though the U.S., under the United Nations sanctions against North Korea, could intervene to disrupt this system, it is unlikely to do so as this would require it to publicly confront China.
The Communist Party of China does not want Burma to become democratic. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao will actively help Than Shwe obtain an atomic bomb if they believe this is the only viable option to prevent it.
It is also likely, with increased nuclear equipment and material deliveries, and with the thousands of trained scientists returning from Russia, that the junta will vastly expand the nuclear program's management structure. Just as the SPDC now has a missile directorate, we expect a similar directorate for the weapons program will be established, if it is not already operational.
With all of this expansion underway, and against the backdrop of the Tatmadaw’s internal instability, we further expect an increasing flow of defectors and other sources with new intel about the program. Than Shwe will not be able to keep it secret.
The real question, then, is how will the world respond.
Conclusion
It is important never to forget that Burma is a failed state. It is being pillaged by a gang of mass murderers and their international co-conspirators.
There is no real government, only a collection of warlords, both inside the SPDC and in the ceasefire areas. Matched against them is the nonviolent pro-democracy movement, led by Daw Suu and the NLD, and the pro-democracy ethnic resistance armies that are fighting to defend their people.
The most apt analogy of the SPDC is that of a dog pack, but not of a collection of pampered pets. Rather, the generals of the SPDC are like the diseased mongrels that roam city streets, hide on the fringes of poor villages, and scavenge at garbage dumps. These types of dogs are always on the edge of survival, and to increase their chances they form packs. The packs are led by the toughest, meanest dogs, and they defend their territory ruthlessly, killing any intruders. As the top dog in such a pack, your life is not that bad. You get the most food, and mating opportunities. But this lasts only as long as your strength. When it fails, younger dogs in your pack, envious of your position, turn on you, tear you apart, and replace you. It is the law of the jungle - natural law.
Than Shwe is a pack leader but he is getting old. The other top dogs of the junta have their hackles up - they sense opportunity. Than Shwe’s days are numbered, and there is nothing he can do about it. Even a nuclear bomb will not protect him from his fellow generals, and more importantly fifty million angry Burmese.
One of Burma's most respected pro-democracy leaders, U Win Tin, recently commented that no one wants to see more instability in Burma. While in principle we agree with this sentiment, we feel obliged to note that this is not the way the real world works. A true democratic transition - not a “power-sharing” arrangement that allows the dictators to retain some control - cannot occur gradually. There must be a break, as the dictators are defeated, and this break will be accompanied by some form of instability. One would hope that it would be limited to violence within the junta itself, as lower-level officers initiate a pro-democracy coup. Offensives against the Burma Army by the ethnic groups and the ABSDF should also be encouraged.
In summary, and as we have been saying for over a decade, the crisis in Burma cannot be resolved by dialogue and activism alone. It requires revolution. The American colonists revolted over “taxation without representation.” A revolution in Burma to end mass oppression and crimes against humanity is more than justified. It is necessary.
Showing posts with label nuclears. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nuclears. Show all posts
Friday, 13 August 2010
Sunday, 6 June 2010
DEMOCRACY FOR CHINA: WHAT WILL IT TAKE?
PLEASE CIRCULATE
By Roland Watson
June 4, 2010
INTRODUCTION
The most populous nation in the world, China, is a dictatorship. It has been ruled for the last sixty-one years by the Communist Party (CCP). Under Mao Zedong, the CCP was a typical communist regime. The population was kept equal – equally poor. Since Deng Xiaoping, it has become more properly a “capitalist dictatorship.” China today has great, and still growing, inequality. It is a merger of the worst in authoritarian political and economic rule.
The CCP provides material and/or diplomatic support to many other dictatorial regimes around the world. These include: North Korea, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Russia, Belarus, Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, and Venezuela. In addition, Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia are so dominated by the CCP – for the moment at least – that they have been annexed into China itself.
We should also not forget all of the problems that emanate from China and which affect the entire planet. These include support for the rogue nuclear states North Korea and Iran (and now Burma); the host of deadly consumer products that have been exported from China (and which the CCP refuses to regulate); as well as wide-ranging environmental abuses. The last extends from an uncontrolled demand for timber, mineral resources and endangered species, which is driving environmental destruction and extinction throughout the earth; to air-borne industrial pollution which circulates it; as well as the CCP's maneuvering last year in Copenhagen to sabotage international efforts to address climate change.
China's more than one billion people are being denied freedom and human rights. The CCP's client states have a total population that approaches another billion, and which similarly are denied their rights. Approximately one-third of the world's population is repressed, either directly or indirectly, due to the CCP.
All of these countries, starting with China, have human rights movements and associated advocacy groups, which protest against the manifold ways in which the regimes abuse the peoples' rights. Many of these groups, though, while laudable, in particular because of the dangers – of arrest and torture, even murder – that their leaders and members regularly face, are nonetheless based on an incorrect premise. They believe, or at least they act on, the assumption that human rights can be improved without change to the regime itself, in other words, that human rights can coexist with dictatorship.
This is a fallacy. There can be no human rights without democracy. A dictatorship may pay lip service to human rights, even allow the people some specific rights from time to time, but our full spectrum of rights can never be established and preserved within a dictatorial system. Indeed, democracy is a system designed to protect human rights. Dictatorship is predicated on their rejection and abuse.
The people of China, and also Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia, will continue to be denied their rights until the CCP loses power and China becomes a democracy. Other dictatorial regimes will continue to receive CCP support. The rest of the world will continue to suffer the problems that arise out of mainland China.
The question, then, is how can the Chinese people achieve democracy? What will this profound transformation require?
CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
The CCP is strong, and its strength is increasing every day. Notwithstanding factionalism within the Party, the leaders are united around the goal to preserve their rule. A key element underlying this unity is the CCP’s wealth. Chinese businesses have profited enormously from the sale of consumer and industrial products, which the world has been happy to buy. The Party takes a substantial percentage of this trade, hence its accumulated reserves of $2.4 trillion. In addition, with its wealth the Party has been rapidly upgrading its military capability. The People's Liberation Army is now equipped with advanced weapons systems that have been internally developed, secured through espionage, or purchased from authoritarian allies such as Russia.
The International Community has been dithering about the rise of the new China. The hunger for cheap goods has convinced the rest of the world to ignore the totalitarian nature of the CCP and its many, many abuses. The Party further has conducted a full-scale charm offensive, buying loyalty from different nations around the globe, particularly in lesser-developed regions and whose own leaders are also authoritarian. China is actually creating a dictatorial block that constitutes a modern form of imperialism. Whereas Rome conquered other nations and peoples by force, China, the new Rome, is doing it quietly and with money.
THE PEOPLE OF CHINA
The natural source for resistance to CCP rule and a demand for democracy is the Chinese public. Within the country's large population, though, there are many different groups. A great number of people actually belong to the Party, or work for or otherwise benefit from it. The CCP further has created the largest propaganda machine in history, which has the dual goals to promote communist rule and to silence all dissent. This propaganda machine is coupled with the similarly largest censorship exercise in history, notably through the Great Firewall that restricts access by the Chinese people to the Internet.
The basic argument that the CCP makes is that “The Party Knows Best.” The leaders are arguing that they are “benevolent dictators,” and that for China this is the only type of political system that will work. (The irony here is that benevolent dictatorship has roots in Confucianism, and the CCP was formed in part to destroy China's ancient traditions. Now, at least in this case, it is embracing them.)
Benevolent dictatorship is the theoretical alternative to democracy. It claims, among other things, that people are unable to govern themselves: that like sheep we must be led. This is certainly arguable, but the position also has numerous obvious flaws. How do we choose who gets to lead, and how do we prevent them from abusing their power? As China saw under Mao, absolute power often has horrific consequences. And, even if under a particular ruler, or emperor, life is good, there is no guarantee that the next will also be benevolent. Indeed, the odds are, as Rome itself experienced, that tyrants will follow just leaders. Finally, as the people in such a society experience abuse, they become resentful and ultimately attempt to rebel. It is an inevitable cycle with this type of system.
In China, CCP members and cronies, and some portion of the general population, accept dictatorship. Most people, though, cannot be bothered with political concerns. They are too absorbed with their daily struggle to worry about such matters.
Contrasting the pro-regime factions, and on the other side of the silent majority, is an active and growing movement for change. This movement, though, is fractured. The largest elements are human rights groups, which are seeking relief for a wide variety of problems, including corruption, inequitable land distribution, sweatshop working conditions, religious persecution, political prisoners, and environmental crimes. A key participant here is the Falun Gong, which is seeking freedom to practice its spiritual exercises. This is a human rights motivation, and it is notable that the Falun Gong fully supports Confucian ideals.
The largest independent “internal” movements, for Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia, also focus on improving human rights, for the Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian peoples, not an outright demand for freedom and independence (although such groups have made it clear that they support democracy in China as well). The few internal groups that actually focus on democracy are small (although they are highly motivated), and include the Charter 08 movement and the China Democracy Party.
Finally, there is a large population of Chinese people who reside outside the mainland yet have an active concern for its problems. Many of these people advocate through groups that focus, once again, on human rights issues. A few, though, such as the international branches of the China Democracy Party, and also the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition, concentrate their efforts on opposition to the CCP and the need for a transition to democracy.
HOW TO CHANGE CHINA TO A DEMOCRACY
The world for the most part backs the CCP. Multinational corporations have lobbied countless governments to ignore the regime’s abuses and to accept the idea that trade with China is acceptable. Also, while the U.S. has consistently held this position as well, it did periodically speak up for democracy and human rights. Under President Obama, though, these gestures have been suspended. The American government is openly “pragmatic.” (One would have thought that the Obama Administration would choose progressive values over corporate lobby positions.)
This means that the burden for change falls to the Chinese people. Of course, one can argue that this is as it should be. People are responsible for themselves, and if they are the subjects of tyrannical rule, they must lead the way to overthrow it.
The problem with China then is how can Chinese people who are already pro-democracy activists encourage more people, ultimately a critical mass of the population, to support this change. There are two factors here. First, the Chinese need to be taught about democracy. They need to understand the ideas on which democracy is based; why it is preferable to benevolent dictatorship; and also the different aspects and variations of the democratic system that are in use around the world. This way they will become politicized, and develop a strong desire for democracy, and through this a willingness to act, and sacrifice, to fulfill this desire.
Secondly, they need to learn that human rights are predicated on democracy. If they want human rights for China, and if their own rights have been abused, in addition to making such a demand, and protesting such abuses, they should join the movement for democratic change. The Charter 08 document and the China Democracy Party should have millions of signatures and members.
The challenge of course is disseminating this education in the face of the CCP’s propaganda and Internet blockade. It is here that the International Community can be of assistance. The Great Chinese Firewall is not impregnable. Initiatives such as the Global Internet Freedom Consortium, through which Chinese people can bypass the Firewall, are already having a large impact. (The Falun Gong is the primary organizer of the GIFC.) The democratic nations of the world, notably the U.S. (which has budgeted large sums to support the GIFC, but dispensed only a small amount), should do everything possible to create a free information flow. And, all democratic nations and groupings, e.g., the E.U., should again make democracy and human rights the foundation of their foreign policy for China.
Will China require a revolution? Must there be a pro-democracy revolution to erase the results of the 1949 communist revolution? One would hope not: that democratic change can be accomplished in China non-violently. Unfortunately, however, having hopes and dreams does not guarantee that they will come true. In the real world change to democracy has invariably been accompanied by either a popular uprising or a military coup, or both.
As a result of the global financial crisis, business activity in China began to slow down and popular unrest to escalate. I have argued for years that there should be a global boycott of consumer products from China. Call it tough love, or whatever you like, but the Chinese people do have the power to overthrow the CCP. A little push wouldn’t hurt. Then, when China is free, trade can be resumed and the proceeds used to build schools and hospitals, not guns and missiles.
CONCLUSION
Two things are certain with China. For the first, democracy is preferable to the rule of the CCP, but defeating the Party and establishing it will be difficult. All human rights groups, including the Falun Gong, Tibetans, East Turkestanis and Southern Mongolians, should actively organize – both underground operations and international diplomacy – for democratic change. Indeed, if they maintain their primary focus on human rights concerns, such concerns will never be resolved.
Secondly, we, the people of the world, can work to make a difference. If our own political leaders, because of corporate lobbying, choose to back the CCP, we can act on our own to help the Chinese people.
Other than activism within China, the biggest impetus for change will be if either of the neighboring regimes in North Korea and Burma collapse. We can help bring this about as well.
The CCP’s goal is to create a one thousand year empire, that dominates a globe filled with authoritarian allies. This is identical to Adolf Hitler’s dream. Everyone who enjoys or aspires to freedom must work to prevent this from happening.
Dictator Watch
MORE ARTICLES ON BURMA DEMOCRACY
www.dictatorwatch.org
By Roland Watson
June 4, 2010
INTRODUCTION
The most populous nation in the world, China, is a dictatorship. It has been ruled for the last sixty-one years by the Communist Party (CCP). Under Mao Zedong, the CCP was a typical communist regime. The population was kept equal – equally poor. Since Deng Xiaoping, it has become more properly a “capitalist dictatorship.” China today has great, and still growing, inequality. It is a merger of the worst in authoritarian political and economic rule.
The CCP provides material and/or diplomatic support to many other dictatorial regimes around the world. These include: North Korea, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Russia, Belarus, Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, and Venezuela. In addition, Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia are so dominated by the CCP – for the moment at least – that they have been annexed into China itself.
We should also not forget all of the problems that emanate from China and which affect the entire planet. These include support for the rogue nuclear states North Korea and Iran (and now Burma); the host of deadly consumer products that have been exported from China (and which the CCP refuses to regulate); as well as wide-ranging environmental abuses. The last extends from an uncontrolled demand for timber, mineral resources and endangered species, which is driving environmental destruction and extinction throughout the earth; to air-borne industrial pollution which circulates it; as well as the CCP's maneuvering last year in Copenhagen to sabotage international efforts to address climate change.
China's more than one billion people are being denied freedom and human rights. The CCP's client states have a total population that approaches another billion, and which similarly are denied their rights. Approximately one-third of the world's population is repressed, either directly or indirectly, due to the CCP.
All of these countries, starting with China, have human rights movements and associated advocacy groups, which protest against the manifold ways in which the regimes abuse the peoples' rights. Many of these groups, though, while laudable, in particular because of the dangers – of arrest and torture, even murder – that their leaders and members regularly face, are nonetheless based on an incorrect premise. They believe, or at least they act on, the assumption that human rights can be improved without change to the regime itself, in other words, that human rights can coexist with dictatorship.
This is a fallacy. There can be no human rights without democracy. A dictatorship may pay lip service to human rights, even allow the people some specific rights from time to time, but our full spectrum of rights can never be established and preserved within a dictatorial system. Indeed, democracy is a system designed to protect human rights. Dictatorship is predicated on their rejection and abuse.
The people of China, and also Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia, will continue to be denied their rights until the CCP loses power and China becomes a democracy. Other dictatorial regimes will continue to receive CCP support. The rest of the world will continue to suffer the problems that arise out of mainland China.
The question, then, is how can the Chinese people achieve democracy? What will this profound transformation require?
CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
The CCP is strong, and its strength is increasing every day. Notwithstanding factionalism within the Party, the leaders are united around the goal to preserve their rule. A key element underlying this unity is the CCP’s wealth. Chinese businesses have profited enormously from the sale of consumer and industrial products, which the world has been happy to buy. The Party takes a substantial percentage of this trade, hence its accumulated reserves of $2.4 trillion. In addition, with its wealth the Party has been rapidly upgrading its military capability. The People's Liberation Army is now equipped with advanced weapons systems that have been internally developed, secured through espionage, or purchased from authoritarian allies such as Russia.
The International Community has been dithering about the rise of the new China. The hunger for cheap goods has convinced the rest of the world to ignore the totalitarian nature of the CCP and its many, many abuses. The Party further has conducted a full-scale charm offensive, buying loyalty from different nations around the globe, particularly in lesser-developed regions and whose own leaders are also authoritarian. China is actually creating a dictatorial block that constitutes a modern form of imperialism. Whereas Rome conquered other nations and peoples by force, China, the new Rome, is doing it quietly and with money.
THE PEOPLE OF CHINA
The natural source for resistance to CCP rule and a demand for democracy is the Chinese public. Within the country's large population, though, there are many different groups. A great number of people actually belong to the Party, or work for or otherwise benefit from it. The CCP further has created the largest propaganda machine in history, which has the dual goals to promote communist rule and to silence all dissent. This propaganda machine is coupled with the similarly largest censorship exercise in history, notably through the Great Firewall that restricts access by the Chinese people to the Internet.
The basic argument that the CCP makes is that “The Party Knows Best.” The leaders are arguing that they are “benevolent dictators,” and that for China this is the only type of political system that will work. (The irony here is that benevolent dictatorship has roots in Confucianism, and the CCP was formed in part to destroy China's ancient traditions. Now, at least in this case, it is embracing them.)
Benevolent dictatorship is the theoretical alternative to democracy. It claims, among other things, that people are unable to govern themselves: that like sheep we must be led. This is certainly arguable, but the position also has numerous obvious flaws. How do we choose who gets to lead, and how do we prevent them from abusing their power? As China saw under Mao, absolute power often has horrific consequences. And, even if under a particular ruler, or emperor, life is good, there is no guarantee that the next will also be benevolent. Indeed, the odds are, as Rome itself experienced, that tyrants will follow just leaders. Finally, as the people in such a society experience abuse, they become resentful and ultimately attempt to rebel. It is an inevitable cycle with this type of system.
In China, CCP members and cronies, and some portion of the general population, accept dictatorship. Most people, though, cannot be bothered with political concerns. They are too absorbed with their daily struggle to worry about such matters.
Contrasting the pro-regime factions, and on the other side of the silent majority, is an active and growing movement for change. This movement, though, is fractured. The largest elements are human rights groups, which are seeking relief for a wide variety of problems, including corruption, inequitable land distribution, sweatshop working conditions, religious persecution, political prisoners, and environmental crimes. A key participant here is the Falun Gong, which is seeking freedom to practice its spiritual exercises. This is a human rights motivation, and it is notable that the Falun Gong fully supports Confucian ideals.
The largest independent “internal” movements, for Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia, also focus on improving human rights, for the Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian peoples, not an outright demand for freedom and independence (although such groups have made it clear that they support democracy in China as well). The few internal groups that actually focus on democracy are small (although they are highly motivated), and include the Charter 08 movement and the China Democracy Party.
Finally, there is a large population of Chinese people who reside outside the mainland yet have an active concern for its problems. Many of these people advocate through groups that focus, once again, on human rights issues. A few, though, such as the international branches of the China Democracy Party, and also the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition, concentrate their efforts on opposition to the CCP and the need for a transition to democracy.
HOW TO CHANGE CHINA TO A DEMOCRACY
The world for the most part backs the CCP. Multinational corporations have lobbied countless governments to ignore the regime’s abuses and to accept the idea that trade with China is acceptable. Also, while the U.S. has consistently held this position as well, it did periodically speak up for democracy and human rights. Under President Obama, though, these gestures have been suspended. The American government is openly “pragmatic.” (One would have thought that the Obama Administration would choose progressive values over corporate lobby positions.)
This means that the burden for change falls to the Chinese people. Of course, one can argue that this is as it should be. People are responsible for themselves, and if they are the subjects of tyrannical rule, they must lead the way to overthrow it.
The problem with China then is how can Chinese people who are already pro-democracy activists encourage more people, ultimately a critical mass of the population, to support this change. There are two factors here. First, the Chinese need to be taught about democracy. They need to understand the ideas on which democracy is based; why it is preferable to benevolent dictatorship; and also the different aspects and variations of the democratic system that are in use around the world. This way they will become politicized, and develop a strong desire for democracy, and through this a willingness to act, and sacrifice, to fulfill this desire.
Secondly, they need to learn that human rights are predicated on democracy. If they want human rights for China, and if their own rights have been abused, in addition to making such a demand, and protesting such abuses, they should join the movement for democratic change. The Charter 08 document and the China Democracy Party should have millions of signatures and members.
The challenge of course is disseminating this education in the face of the CCP’s propaganda and Internet blockade. It is here that the International Community can be of assistance. The Great Chinese Firewall is not impregnable. Initiatives such as the Global Internet Freedom Consortium, through which Chinese people can bypass the Firewall, are already having a large impact. (The Falun Gong is the primary organizer of the GIFC.) The democratic nations of the world, notably the U.S. (which has budgeted large sums to support the GIFC, but dispensed only a small amount), should do everything possible to create a free information flow. And, all democratic nations and groupings, e.g., the E.U., should again make democracy and human rights the foundation of their foreign policy for China.
Will China require a revolution? Must there be a pro-democracy revolution to erase the results of the 1949 communist revolution? One would hope not: that democratic change can be accomplished in China non-violently. Unfortunately, however, having hopes and dreams does not guarantee that they will come true. In the real world change to democracy has invariably been accompanied by either a popular uprising or a military coup, or both.
As a result of the global financial crisis, business activity in China began to slow down and popular unrest to escalate. I have argued for years that there should be a global boycott of consumer products from China. Call it tough love, or whatever you like, but the Chinese people do have the power to overthrow the CCP. A little push wouldn’t hurt. Then, when China is free, trade can be resumed and the proceeds used to build schools and hospitals, not guns and missiles.
CONCLUSION
Two things are certain with China. For the first, democracy is preferable to the rule of the CCP, but defeating the Party and establishing it will be difficult. All human rights groups, including the Falun Gong, Tibetans, East Turkestanis and Southern Mongolians, should actively organize – both underground operations and international diplomacy – for democratic change. Indeed, if they maintain their primary focus on human rights concerns, such concerns will never be resolved.
Secondly, we, the people of the world, can work to make a difference. If our own political leaders, because of corporate lobbying, choose to back the CCP, we can act on our own to help the Chinese people.
Other than activism within China, the biggest impetus for change will be if either of the neighboring regimes in North Korea and Burma collapse. We can help bring this about as well.
The CCP’s goal is to create a one thousand year empire, that dominates a globe filled with authoritarian allies. This is identical to Adolf Hitler’s dream. Everyone who enjoys or aspires to freedom must work to prevent this from happening.
Dictator Watch
MORE ARTICLES ON BURMA DEMOCRACY
www.dictatorwatch.org
Sunday, 14 March 2010
Burmese Reactors Close to Completion: Military Sources
Burma's ruling junta has finished construction work on three nuclear reactors in the country's north and will soon be ready to put them into operation, according to military sources at the elite Defense Services Academy (DSA) in Maymyo, Mandalay Division.
 |
 Enlarge ImageA map showing the Pon Taung Pon Nya mountain range, the site of one of three nuclear reactors recently constructed by the Burmese junta. |
“They [military leaders] chose Pon Taung Pon Nya because it is a safe distance from highly populated cities,” said a military official in Maymyo, also known as Pyin Oo Lwin.
According to local residents, the site is about 30 km from the village of Kyaw in Gantgaw Township, situated on the Pakokkuu-Kalay railway line in Magwe Division.
“Since the project started in 2007, there have been many foreigners who look like they might be Chinese coming and going,” said a local source living in Kyaw.
“We are not allowed to go anywhere near this area built for military use,” the source added.
Although there has been confirmation that construction work on the projects has been completed, it remains unclear how soon the reactors will be ready to go online. However, a recent flurry of activity, including high-level visits by senior members of the ruling regime, suggests that the reactors will soon be ready for use, according to military sources.
The sources say that Vice Sen-Gen Maung Aye, the junta's No. 2, has made frequent trips to the DSA in Maymyo in recent months to meet with Maj-Gen Sein Win, the head of the Directorate of Defense Services Science and Technology Research, which is responsible for Burma’s nuclear program.
According to Ye Htet, a former lieutenant who defected from the Burmese military while studying for a graduate degree at the DSA, the regime has invested heavily in the project with an eye to early completion. He said the junta has sent around 60,000 military officials to Russia to study nuclear technology.
“The project is at least half finished,” said Ye Htet, who fled to Mae Sot, on the Thai-Burmese border, earlier this year.
The technology for Burma’s nuclear research project was provided by Russia’s Federal Atomic Energy Agency (RFAEA), which agreed in May 2007 to help design and build a 10-megawatt light-water reactor using 20 percent enriched uranium-235 fuel.
However, the Russian agency has since distanced itself from the Burmese nuclear program. This has led to fears that the regime has turned to North Korea for assistance in achieving its nuclear ambitions.
Thursday, 24 July 2008
Asia's premier security forum begins in Singapore
Singapore (Earth Times)- Asia's top security forum began its annual meeting on Thursday to discuss measures that will make member- countries more responsive in dealing with the challenges in the region, especially in the area of disaster response. Foreign ministers of the 27-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) were to focus on improving disaster planning and response in the wake of the deadly cyclone that devastated Myanmar and the earthquake that wrecked havoc in China.
The group was also scheduled to discuss concrete and practical cooperation among member countries in dealing with common security challenges.
ARF spokesman Andrew Tan said the recent calamities that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives in Myanmar, China and the Philippines pushed emergency planning and disaster response to the top of the agenda.
Tan said a joint civilian-military disaster relief exercise is expected to be considered, among other measures.
Although ARF foreign ministers adopted a statement on disaster management in 2006, two years after the Asian tsunami that killed 220,000 people, aid workers noted little else had emerged from the group regarding emergency relief.
The ARF includes the 10 members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Australia, Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, the United States, Russia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Japan, China and India.
Tan said North Korea and Myanmar will be discussed in the day-long meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expected to brief the other ministers on the outcome of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear programme that took place Wednesday.
The group was also scheduled to discuss concrete and practical cooperation among member countries in dealing with common security challenges.
ARF spokesman Andrew Tan said the recent calamities that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives in Myanmar, China and the Philippines pushed emergency planning and disaster response to the top of the agenda.
Tan said a joint civilian-military disaster relief exercise is expected to be considered, among other measures.
Although ARF foreign ministers adopted a statement on disaster management in 2006, two years after the Asian tsunami that killed 220,000 people, aid workers noted little else had emerged from the group regarding emergency relief.
The ARF includes the 10 members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Australia, Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, the United States, Russia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Japan, China and India.
Tan said North Korea and Myanmar will be discussed in the day-long meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expected to brief the other ministers on the outcome of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear programme that took place Wednesday.
Sunday, 20 July 2008
Asian security talks to tackle NKorea, Myanmar
SINGAPORE (Channel New Asia) - North Korea and Myanmar will top the billing at Asia's main security forum this week, but the inflation crisis and disaster response have emerged as critical new concerns.
The 27-member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes nations from Asia as well as the European Union and the United States, meets here Thursday after talks by ministers from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
With civil war in Sri Lanka, insurgencies in Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, and a dangerous new standoff at an ancient temple on the Thai-Cambodian border, Asia's list of security issues is long.
But the North Korean nuclear issue tops the agenda and the highlight of the conference will be a meeting of foreign ministers from the six nations negotiating a denuclearisation plan -- the first since 2003.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is to meet her North Korean counterpart Pak Ui-chun for the first time at the informal talks tipped for Wednesday, which will also include South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said the meeting was not aimed at generating "some specific negotiated outcome" but would "review where the six-party process is at the moment."
Myanmar, which has infuriated the international community by refusing to introduce democratic reforms or free opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, is likely to face a fresh challenge.
Myanmar could face a demand from its neighbours to release all political prisoners, a proposal made by the bloc's senior officials which their foreign ministers must decide whether to endorse.
If approved at the ministerial talks that start late Sunday and continue the following day, the measure would signal a toughening of ASEAN's stance that would be welcomed by Western governments.
The move comes after the government earned widespread contempt by refusing to open its doors to foreign relief workers in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May, a disaster that left 138,000 people dead or missing.
ASEAN won plaudits for winning approval to co-ordinate the international effort to bring help to two million people who the bloc's secretary general, Surin Pitsuwan, has said remain in a "very precarious situation."
Working under an agreement with the United Nations and the Myanmar government, nearly 300 ASEAN volunteers operating in the hard-hit Irrawaddy Delta have prepared an assessment that is to be released on Monday.
Myanmar's cyclone disaster, a recent earthquake in China and a ferry sinking in the Philippines have made disaster preparedness a burning issue this week, two years after the ARF vowed to develop guidelines for joint disaster relief.
Since then, precious little has been done but the 27 members are now expected to discuss a joint civilian-military disaster relief exercise, among other measures.
Amid warnings that spiralling prices of food and fuel in the largely impoverished region could threaten political stability, the ASEAN ministers will attempt to hammer out some solutions.
The problem, if left unchecked, could pose a challenge to the region's long-term aim of evolving into a European Union-style community where goods and services are freely traded across the region by 2015, officials said.
Ministers will discuss "the growing challenge posed by rising oil and food prices, which pose a serious challenge to our people's welfare as well as our countries' continued economic development," according to a draft joint communique obtained by AFP. - AFP/vm
The 27-member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes nations from Asia as well as the European Union and the United States, meets here Thursday after talks by ministers from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
With civil war in Sri Lanka, insurgencies in Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, and a dangerous new standoff at an ancient temple on the Thai-Cambodian border, Asia's list of security issues is long.
But the North Korean nuclear issue tops the agenda and the highlight of the conference will be a meeting of foreign ministers from the six nations negotiating a denuclearisation plan -- the first since 2003.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is to meet her North Korean counterpart Pak Ui-chun for the first time at the informal talks tipped for Wednesday, which will also include South Korea, China, Japan and Russia.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said the meeting was not aimed at generating "some specific negotiated outcome" but would "review where the six-party process is at the moment."
Myanmar, which has infuriated the international community by refusing to introduce democratic reforms or free opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, is likely to face a fresh challenge.
Myanmar could face a demand from its neighbours to release all political prisoners, a proposal made by the bloc's senior officials which their foreign ministers must decide whether to endorse.
If approved at the ministerial talks that start late Sunday and continue the following day, the measure would signal a toughening of ASEAN's stance that would be welcomed by Western governments.
The move comes after the government earned widespread contempt by refusing to open its doors to foreign relief workers in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May, a disaster that left 138,000 people dead or missing.
ASEAN won plaudits for winning approval to co-ordinate the international effort to bring help to two million people who the bloc's secretary general, Surin Pitsuwan, has said remain in a "very precarious situation."
Working under an agreement with the United Nations and the Myanmar government, nearly 300 ASEAN volunteers operating in the hard-hit Irrawaddy Delta have prepared an assessment that is to be released on Monday.
Myanmar's cyclone disaster, a recent earthquake in China and a ferry sinking in the Philippines have made disaster preparedness a burning issue this week, two years after the ARF vowed to develop guidelines for joint disaster relief.
Since then, precious little has been done but the 27 members are now expected to discuss a joint civilian-military disaster relief exercise, among other measures.
Amid warnings that spiralling prices of food and fuel in the largely impoverished region could threaten political stability, the ASEAN ministers will attempt to hammer out some solutions.
The problem, if left unchecked, could pose a challenge to the region's long-term aim of evolving into a European Union-style community where goods and services are freely traded across the region by 2015, officials said.
Ministers will discuss "the growing challenge posed by rising oil and food prices, which pose a serious challenge to our people's welfare as well as our countries' continued economic development," according to a draft joint communique obtained by AFP. - AFP/vm
Friday, 27 June 2008
RUSSIA-BURMA NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE REPORT
By Roland Watson
Dictator Watch Org
June 26, 2008
We have new, disturbing, and detailed intelligence about the assistance Russia is providing Burma’s dictatorship, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), on its nuclear program and more generally its military modernization. This new information both confirms earlier intelligence that we have published, and expands what is known about the overall program.
Nuclear reactor and uranium mining
It has been widely reported that Russia is going to provide Burma a nuclear reactor, for so-called “research” purposes. We have received information that the SPDC has now purchased the 10 MW reactor. It is not new, but is reportedly in good condition. It is being dismantled, transported to Burma, and rebuilt. While we cannot confirm that it has arrived, our sources say that installation is due to be completed by December this year. (We have previously reported that North Korean technicians will assist with the construction.)
The reactor will be built at a site some ten kilometers from Kyauk Pa Toe, in Tha Beik Kyin township, approximately one hundred kilometers north of Mandalay near the Irrawaddy River.
In return for the reactor and other services, a Russian government mining company has received concessions to mine gold, titanium and uranium. There are two gold mining sites: in Kyauk Pa Toe; and in the mountains to the right of the Thazi-Shwe Nyaung railway line from Mandalay Division to Southern Shan State in the Pyin Nyaung area.
Titanium is also being mined, or derived from the same ore, at Kyauk Pa Toe.
Uranium is being mined at three locations: in the Pegu-Yoma mountain range in Pauk Kaung Township of Prome District (aka Pyi); in the Paing Ngort area in Mo Meik Township in Shan State; and at Kyauk Pa Toe.
The reactor site has been chosen because of its proximity to the Tha Beik Kyin and Mo Meik uranium mines. It is likely that the gold mining operation at the former will be used as cover, to conceal the nuclear facilities.
We have previously reported, from different sources, that the SPDC has a yellowcake mill somewhere in the Tha Beik Kyin area. Now we know the exact location (or at least enough information to find it with satellite imagery).
The reactor has been publicized as being for research purposes, meaning research on nuclear power generation. We believe that the SPDC has no real interest in generating electricity, or at best that this is a secondary consideration, and that the primary purpose is atomic weapons development. Our sources say that the SPDC expects to have full nuclear capability within ten years.
Russia is presumably supplying the reactor fuel as well. While Burma has uranium ore, and mills to convert it to yellowcake, this must be enriched to create the fuel, typically using cascades of gas centrifuges. We have received one report that the SPDC has begun a centrifuge program, at the South Nawin Dam, but this is unconfirmed. Barring this operation, the source of the fuel therefore must be Russia.
Note: Locating the reactor at Kyauk Pa Toe really only makes sense if there are plans to build an enrichment facility there. This way you would have the full industrial cycle in close proximity: mine, mill, enrichment, and reactor.
What is perhaps most disturbing about Russia’s program with the SPDC is that it is identical to the Soviet Union’s assistance that propelled North Korea to become a nuclear power. Why, with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, is Russia still helping rogue regimes proliferate? The surface answer of course is money, in this case in the form of natural resources, but the deeper question remains. Russia is considered to be a democracy. What would the people of the country think of their leaders giving such help to the likes of the SPDC and Than Shwe?
In 1965, the Soviet Union gave North Korea a 2 MW reactor, which was upgraded in 1973 to 8 MW. It also supplied fuel through at least this period. North Korea then went on to construct a much larger reactor, and in the 1980s began weapons development. This included building separation facilities to obtain plutonium, and high explosives detonation tests. (We have received reports that the SPDC has already conducted such tests, in the Setkhya Mountains southeast of Mandalay.) At some point North Korea also began its own uranium enrichment program, to produce weapons grade material, and the U.S. confronted the country about this in 2002. This means that the North has two different sources of fissile material for weapons, reactor plutonium and enriched uranium.
The North detonated a small atomic weapon, with a yield of less than one kiloton, in October 2006, using some of its plutonium. It is now reportedly about to disclose its nuclear assets, and also destroy its plutonium producing reactor, but the sticking point has been the enriched uranium. The North appears unwilling to discuss this (and at this point to disclose its weapons cache), which means that even with the destruction of the reactor and the plutonium stockpile (for the latter the size of which is subject to serious dispute), the North would retain the ability to produce weapons with the uranium. At the moment the U.S. appears willing to accept partial disclosure, i.e., of only the plutonium.
In addition to Russia, North Korean technicians have been helping Burma with its nuclear ambitions (and other weapons programs), and we have received information that the SPDC has given the North refined uranium in return, which may be destined for the enrichment program.
This is all very disturbing, all the more so because of the apparent weakness of the Bush Administration, which has been unwilling to press the North, and which refuses even to mention Burma (its nuclear program). It took North Korea forty years before it detonated a weapon. It will likely take the SPDC only a fraction of this period. Once the Burmese junta has atomic weapons, its rule will be entrenched, and its neighbors, foremost Thailand, will be seriously endangered.
Precision-guided munitions
We have also previously reported that Burma has a wide variety of missile installations, including large quantities of land-based SAMs; ship-launched missiles, both surface to air and surface to surface; weapons for its MIG 29s; and even short range ballistic missiles. We have now received information that while Burma formerly bought anti-aircraft weapons from the Ukraine, in 2007 it purchased four shiploads of such weapons from Russia. We have also learned that the SPDC has multi-tube mechanized rocket launchers from North Korea. (Note: these may be for use with the ballistic missiles, and if so they confirm our earlier intelligence.)
Moreover, Burma is researching the production of guided missiles, and with Russian assistance intends to build a rocket factory in Thazi Township. This will mark the latest step in a well-recognized proliferation of Russian precision-guided munitions in the Asia Pacific region. This class of weapons includes surface to air, to attack jets, and surface to surface to attack land-based targets and also ships. Cruise missiles fall within the category. We do not know which specific PGMs the factory intends to produce, only that they will be medium range guided rockets and that production is scheduled to begin within five years.
It is clear that the SPDC is intent on developing a strong defense against an international intervention, including foreign jets, helicopters and ships. Perhaps one reason why the U.S. and the French balked at dropping relief supplies following Cyclone Nargis was the risk of missile attack on their helicopters and ships.
Military modernization
We have previously noted that the Burma Army is weapons-deficient. It is clear that the extensive procurement program underway with Russia, as well as China, North Korea and others, is intended to rectify this. During the era of Ne Win and the BSPP (Burma Socialist Program Party), the junta established six weapons production facilities. There are now twenty-two, and clearly more are planned.
Coupled with the materiel acquisitions is a major educational program. There are more than 5,000 State Scholars in Russia, all of whom passed their Defense Services Academy class, a nine-month program in the Russian language, and an entrance exam in their specialty. (This is an increase from the 3,000 we previously reported.) They are candidates for either a masters (2 years) or doctorate (4 years – we previously reported 3 years for this degree). They study in Moscow or St. Petersburg, in the former in a suburb at the Moscow Air Institute. There are additional State Scholars from Burma in China, North Korea, Pakistan and India.
One of the more recent groups of scholars, Batch Seven, included 1,100 DSA officers. Their majors are as follows:
250 Nuclear science
100 Tunneling science
200 Rockets
100 Electronics
200 Computer science
100 Aircraft construction
150 Artillery
The students also learn other military subjects, including: tanks; maintenance; anti-aircraft training; ammunition production; fighter pilot training; naval craft construction; naval craft captaincy; and anti-terrorist training.
While it is clear that the overall modernization program will improve the SPDC’s preparedness against attack, the junta still has a significant problem with soldier morale. Many of the state scholars, who are an elite in the Tatmadaw, are not motivated and would seek asylum given the chance. Their stipends barely cover their expenses. The Russian language and their training programs are difficult. They are overworked and separated from the civilian population. Their visas prohibit them from buying air, train or long-distance bus tickets. When they return to Burma, some are used as Russian language teachers or as instructors at the SPDC’s Central Research and Training Unit, but many are sent to the front lines.
As an example, in January this year one scholar fled to the border of Finland, but was arrested by Russian intelligence agents when he used his cell phone to call his contact on the other side. There is widespread dissatisfaction at all levels within the SPDC, except perhaps the very top – although there is reportedly a split there as well, between Than Shwe and Maung Aye. While the new weapons systems improve the junta’s defense against an intervention, they still need operators. The SPDC is poised to fall, through an internal coup, and it is subject to a renewed popular uprising as well.
Acquiring a nuclear weapon would alter this equation somewhat, but really only by creating a new defense against an intervention, and this is as yet some years away, unless the SPDC acquires a warhead directly from North Korea. Still, any such development has to be prevented, which raises the question, yet again: what is the U.S. doing? Under geopolitical realism, the only concerns are national interests. On a superficial level, for the U.S. and Burma, these are limited to Chevron’s investment in Burma’s natural gas production and pipelines. A secondary interest is the concern of U.S. citizens of Burmese origin, but since this group is small it can effectively be ignored. It would seem, therefore, that all the Administration bluster notwithstanding, its only real policy objective for Burma is to protect Chevron, which corporation to bolster its case also makes large campaign donations.
The real direct national interest of the United States is to deny Burma nuclear weapons. It is not only North Korea, Iran and Syria that America (and the world) must contain. Having a nuclear-armed SPDC is an unacceptable risk. This trumps the need to assist a domestic corporation. Further, since Chevron is also a major cash source for the junta, which uses money as well as the direct transfer of natural resources to pay its weapons suppliers, it demands that the company be forced to divest.
Dictator Watch Org
June 26, 2008
We have new, disturbing, and detailed intelligence about the assistance Russia is providing Burma’s dictatorship, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), on its nuclear program and more generally its military modernization. This new information both confirms earlier intelligence that we have published, and expands what is known about the overall program.
Nuclear reactor and uranium mining
It has been widely reported that Russia is going to provide Burma a nuclear reactor, for so-called “research” purposes. We have received information that the SPDC has now purchased the 10 MW reactor. It is not new, but is reportedly in good condition. It is being dismantled, transported to Burma, and rebuilt. While we cannot confirm that it has arrived, our sources say that installation is due to be completed by December this year. (We have previously reported that North Korean technicians will assist with the construction.)
The reactor will be built at a site some ten kilometers from Kyauk Pa Toe, in Tha Beik Kyin township, approximately one hundred kilometers north of Mandalay near the Irrawaddy River.
In return for the reactor and other services, a Russian government mining company has received concessions to mine gold, titanium and uranium. There are two gold mining sites: in Kyauk Pa Toe; and in the mountains to the right of the Thazi-Shwe Nyaung railway line from Mandalay Division to Southern Shan State in the Pyin Nyaung area.
Titanium is also being mined, or derived from the same ore, at Kyauk Pa Toe.
Uranium is being mined at three locations: in the Pegu-Yoma mountain range in Pauk Kaung Township of Prome District (aka Pyi); in the Paing Ngort area in Mo Meik Township in Shan State; and at Kyauk Pa Toe.
The reactor site has been chosen because of its proximity to the Tha Beik Kyin and Mo Meik uranium mines. It is likely that the gold mining operation at the former will be used as cover, to conceal the nuclear facilities.
We have previously reported, from different sources, that the SPDC has a yellowcake mill somewhere in the Tha Beik Kyin area. Now we know the exact location (or at least enough information to find it with satellite imagery).
The reactor has been publicized as being for research purposes, meaning research on nuclear power generation. We believe that the SPDC has no real interest in generating electricity, or at best that this is a secondary consideration, and that the primary purpose is atomic weapons development. Our sources say that the SPDC expects to have full nuclear capability within ten years.
Russia is presumably supplying the reactor fuel as well. While Burma has uranium ore, and mills to convert it to yellowcake, this must be enriched to create the fuel, typically using cascades of gas centrifuges. We have received one report that the SPDC has begun a centrifuge program, at the South Nawin Dam, but this is unconfirmed. Barring this operation, the source of the fuel therefore must be Russia.
Note: Locating the reactor at Kyauk Pa Toe really only makes sense if there are plans to build an enrichment facility there. This way you would have the full industrial cycle in close proximity: mine, mill, enrichment, and reactor.
What is perhaps most disturbing about Russia’s program with the SPDC is that it is identical to the Soviet Union’s assistance that propelled North Korea to become a nuclear power. Why, with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, is Russia still helping rogue regimes proliferate? The surface answer of course is money, in this case in the form of natural resources, but the deeper question remains. Russia is considered to be a democracy. What would the people of the country think of their leaders giving such help to the likes of the SPDC and Than Shwe?
In 1965, the Soviet Union gave North Korea a 2 MW reactor, which was upgraded in 1973 to 8 MW. It also supplied fuel through at least this period. North Korea then went on to construct a much larger reactor, and in the 1980s began weapons development. This included building separation facilities to obtain plutonium, and high explosives detonation tests. (We have received reports that the SPDC has already conducted such tests, in the Setkhya Mountains southeast of Mandalay.) At some point North Korea also began its own uranium enrichment program, to produce weapons grade material, and the U.S. confronted the country about this in 2002. This means that the North has two different sources of fissile material for weapons, reactor plutonium and enriched uranium.
The North detonated a small atomic weapon, with a yield of less than one kiloton, in October 2006, using some of its plutonium. It is now reportedly about to disclose its nuclear assets, and also destroy its plutonium producing reactor, but the sticking point has been the enriched uranium. The North appears unwilling to discuss this (and at this point to disclose its weapons cache), which means that even with the destruction of the reactor and the plutonium stockpile (for the latter the size of which is subject to serious dispute), the North would retain the ability to produce weapons with the uranium. At the moment the U.S. appears willing to accept partial disclosure, i.e., of only the plutonium.
In addition to Russia, North Korean technicians have been helping Burma with its nuclear ambitions (and other weapons programs), and we have received information that the SPDC has given the North refined uranium in return, which may be destined for the enrichment program.
This is all very disturbing, all the more so because of the apparent weakness of the Bush Administration, which has been unwilling to press the North, and which refuses even to mention Burma (its nuclear program). It took North Korea forty years before it detonated a weapon. It will likely take the SPDC only a fraction of this period. Once the Burmese junta has atomic weapons, its rule will be entrenched, and its neighbors, foremost Thailand, will be seriously endangered.
Precision-guided munitions
We have also previously reported that Burma has a wide variety of missile installations, including large quantities of land-based SAMs; ship-launched missiles, both surface to air and surface to surface; weapons for its MIG 29s; and even short range ballistic missiles. We have now received information that while Burma formerly bought anti-aircraft weapons from the Ukraine, in 2007 it purchased four shiploads of such weapons from Russia. We have also learned that the SPDC has multi-tube mechanized rocket launchers from North Korea. (Note: these may be for use with the ballistic missiles, and if so they confirm our earlier intelligence.)
Moreover, Burma is researching the production of guided missiles, and with Russian assistance intends to build a rocket factory in Thazi Township. This will mark the latest step in a well-recognized proliferation of Russian precision-guided munitions in the Asia Pacific region. This class of weapons includes surface to air, to attack jets, and surface to surface to attack land-based targets and also ships. Cruise missiles fall within the category. We do not know which specific PGMs the factory intends to produce, only that they will be medium range guided rockets and that production is scheduled to begin within five years.
It is clear that the SPDC is intent on developing a strong defense against an international intervention, including foreign jets, helicopters and ships. Perhaps one reason why the U.S. and the French balked at dropping relief supplies following Cyclone Nargis was the risk of missile attack on their helicopters and ships.
Military modernization
We have previously noted that the Burma Army is weapons-deficient. It is clear that the extensive procurement program underway with Russia, as well as China, North Korea and others, is intended to rectify this. During the era of Ne Win and the BSPP (Burma Socialist Program Party), the junta established six weapons production facilities. There are now twenty-two, and clearly more are planned.
Coupled with the materiel acquisitions is a major educational program. There are more than 5,000 State Scholars in Russia, all of whom passed their Defense Services Academy class, a nine-month program in the Russian language, and an entrance exam in their specialty. (This is an increase from the 3,000 we previously reported.) They are candidates for either a masters (2 years) or doctorate (4 years – we previously reported 3 years for this degree). They study in Moscow or St. Petersburg, in the former in a suburb at the Moscow Air Institute. There are additional State Scholars from Burma in China, North Korea, Pakistan and India.
One of the more recent groups of scholars, Batch Seven, included 1,100 DSA officers. Their majors are as follows:
250 Nuclear science
100 Tunneling science
200 Rockets
100 Electronics
200 Computer science
100 Aircraft construction
150 Artillery
The students also learn other military subjects, including: tanks; maintenance; anti-aircraft training; ammunition production; fighter pilot training; naval craft construction; naval craft captaincy; and anti-terrorist training.
While it is clear that the overall modernization program will improve the SPDC’s preparedness against attack, the junta still has a significant problem with soldier morale. Many of the state scholars, who are an elite in the Tatmadaw, are not motivated and would seek asylum given the chance. Their stipends barely cover their expenses. The Russian language and their training programs are difficult. They are overworked and separated from the civilian population. Their visas prohibit them from buying air, train or long-distance bus tickets. When they return to Burma, some are used as Russian language teachers or as instructors at the SPDC’s Central Research and Training Unit, but many are sent to the front lines.
As an example, in January this year one scholar fled to the border of Finland, but was arrested by Russian intelligence agents when he used his cell phone to call his contact on the other side. There is widespread dissatisfaction at all levels within the SPDC, except perhaps the very top – although there is reportedly a split there as well, between Than Shwe and Maung Aye. While the new weapons systems improve the junta’s defense against an intervention, they still need operators. The SPDC is poised to fall, through an internal coup, and it is subject to a renewed popular uprising as well.
Acquiring a nuclear weapon would alter this equation somewhat, but really only by creating a new defense against an intervention, and this is as yet some years away, unless the SPDC acquires a warhead directly from North Korea. Still, any such development has to be prevented, which raises the question, yet again: what is the U.S. doing? Under geopolitical realism, the only concerns are national interests. On a superficial level, for the U.S. and Burma, these are limited to Chevron’s investment in Burma’s natural gas production and pipelines. A secondary interest is the concern of U.S. citizens of Burmese origin, but since this group is small it can effectively be ignored. It would seem, therefore, that all the Administration bluster notwithstanding, its only real policy objective for Burma is to protect Chevron, which corporation to bolster its case also makes large campaign donations.
The real direct national interest of the United States is to deny Burma nuclear weapons. It is not only North Korea, Iran and Syria that America (and the world) must contain. Having a nuclear-armed SPDC is an unacceptable risk. This trumps the need to assist a domestic corporation. Further, since Chevron is also a major cash source for the junta, which uses money as well as the direct transfer of natural resources to pay its weapons suppliers, it demands that the company be forced to divest.
Friday, 13 June 2008
Australian PM pledges cooperation with Indonesia president
by Stephen Coates
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd Friday promised a "new phase of cooperation" with Indonesia on disaster response and the environment during his first state visit to Jakarta.
Rudd praised the "very strong friendship" between the two neighbours after he met President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and senior ministers at the presidential palace.
"Australia and Indonesia are neighbours through geographic circumstance but we are friends through active national choice, and this is a very good friendship," he told reporters after the talks.
He said the countries had agreed to broaden cooperation over nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change and disaster response.
The recent natural catastrophes in Myanmar, which was devastated by a cyclone in May, and quake-hit China underscored the need for a regional disaster response mechanism, he said.
"Indonesia has experienced the tsunami, the people of Burma (Myanmar) the terrible impact of the cyclone, the people of western China the earthquake most recently," he said.
"We do not know where a natural disaster will hit but between us we believe we can take a good and strong proposal" for a regional disaster-response system to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting next year, Rudd said.
The two leaders also discussed Rudd's plans for an EU-style Asia-Pacific Community to be set up by 2020 and to include the major economies of India, China, India and the United States.
He said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had provided a model of regional cooperation which could be expanded.
It was Rudd's first state visit to Indonesia since he defeated conservative prime minister John Howard in elections in November.
He flew into Jakarta late Thursday on the second leg of an Asian trip which started in Japan on the weekend. He will travel to Sumatra's Aceh province on Saturday to visit areas devastated by the 2004 tsunami.
Rudd and Yudhoyono signed an agreement on forests and carbon trading at the end of the meeting, reflecting the growing importance of climate change to the neighbours' relations.
The prime minister, who ratified the Kyoto treaty in one of his first acts after taking power from conservative premier John Howard in November, called climate change the "great economic, environmental and moral challenge of our generation."
Rudd lauded cooperation between Australia and Indonesia in fighting Islamic terror groups but refused to give a timeframe of when Australia might lift a travel warning against visiting parts of Indonesia.
"Indonesia and our future security cooperation will go from strength to strength as we continue in our common resolve to deal with our common enemy, which is terrorism," he said.
Scores of Australians were killed in terror bombings on the holiday island of Bali in 2002 and 2005, and the Australian embassy in Jakarta was attacked in 2004 as Canberra backed the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ties between Indonesia and Australia are regularly tested by suspicion on both sides, reaching a nadir in 1999 when Australian troops landed in East Timor to help restore order after the province voted to break away from Indonesia.
Current sore points include the treatment of Indonesian fishermen suspected of illegal fishing in Australian waters and the pending execution of Australian drug traffickers jailed in Indonesia.
Rudd's moves to withdraw troops from Iraq and ratify Kyoto have won broad favour in Indonesia after the more openly pro-US policies of Howard.
France24.com
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd Friday promised a "new phase of cooperation" with Indonesia on disaster response and the environment during his first state visit to Jakarta.
Rudd praised the "very strong friendship" between the two neighbours after he met President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and senior ministers at the presidential palace.
"Australia and Indonesia are neighbours through geographic circumstance but we are friends through active national choice, and this is a very good friendship," he told reporters after the talks.
He said the countries had agreed to broaden cooperation over nuclear weapons proliferation, climate change and disaster response.
The recent natural catastrophes in Myanmar, which was devastated by a cyclone in May, and quake-hit China underscored the need for a regional disaster response mechanism, he said.
"Indonesia has experienced the tsunami, the people of Burma (Myanmar) the terrible impact of the cyclone, the people of western China the earthquake most recently," he said.
"We do not know where a natural disaster will hit but between us we believe we can take a good and strong proposal" for a regional disaster-response system to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting next year, Rudd said.
The two leaders also discussed Rudd's plans for an EU-style Asia-Pacific Community to be set up by 2020 and to include the major economies of India, China, India and the United States.
He said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had provided a model of regional cooperation which could be expanded.
It was Rudd's first state visit to Indonesia since he defeated conservative prime minister John Howard in elections in November.
He flew into Jakarta late Thursday on the second leg of an Asian trip which started in Japan on the weekend. He will travel to Sumatra's Aceh province on Saturday to visit areas devastated by the 2004 tsunami.
Rudd and Yudhoyono signed an agreement on forests and carbon trading at the end of the meeting, reflecting the growing importance of climate change to the neighbours' relations.
The prime minister, who ratified the Kyoto treaty in one of his first acts after taking power from conservative premier John Howard in November, called climate change the "great economic, environmental and moral challenge of our generation."
Rudd lauded cooperation between Australia and Indonesia in fighting Islamic terror groups but refused to give a timeframe of when Australia might lift a travel warning against visiting parts of Indonesia.
"Indonesia and our future security cooperation will go from strength to strength as we continue in our common resolve to deal with our common enemy, which is terrorism," he said.
Scores of Australians were killed in terror bombings on the holiday island of Bali in 2002 and 2005, and the Australian embassy in Jakarta was attacked in 2004 as Canberra backed the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ties between Indonesia and Australia are regularly tested by suspicion on both sides, reaching a nadir in 1999 when Australian troops landed in East Timor to help restore order after the province voted to break away from Indonesia.
Current sore points include the treatment of Indonesian fishermen suspected of illegal fishing in Australian waters and the pending execution of Australian drug traffickers jailed in Indonesia.
Rudd's moves to withdraw troops from Iraq and ratify Kyoto have won broad favour in Indonesia after the more openly pro-US policies of Howard.
France24.com
Thursday, 1 May 2008
Junta's U- turn and future Sino-Burma Relation
By Myat Soe
Mizzima News
01 May 2008 - Dishonest Burmese rulers' decision to bar Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting the elections shows that its process leading to a democratic transition in the country is not convincing. The purpose of this decision was that the military regime threatened to ban the NLD and its leadership completely.
This announcement evidently defied the international community by refusing to pursue democratization and national reconciliation. It appeared to be on the verge of a major U-turn, and it was aimed at undermining the on-going regional and international efforts.
Since the September people's movement in 2007, no political tangible result has been achieved. The regime did not free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners which the international community has been urging for. The house arrest of U Tin Oo, the deputy leader of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party was extended. More political prisoners have been locked up. The UN special envoy was not allowed to go back to Burma whenever he needed to follow up on the UNSC resolution. Freedom of press has been prohibited, and citizens have no space to express their views openly and peacefully. In addition, the junta's referendum law released in February 2008 prohibits people from criticizing or campaigning against the referendum process and imposes a penalty of three years in prison. In fact, the regime's lip service to political solutions, buying time, blaming the opposition, and attacking its own citizens will not take the place of substantial reforms and will not resolve the country's problems.
Why does the regime remain deaf to the rest of the world? The reason is the regime had two trump cards in the form of Russia and China at the UNSC. Indeed, China and Russia, as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, can promote or prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. Recently, the Burmese military regime agreed to let Russia's Glory International Pte Ltd search for gold and other minerals in the country's northern Kachin State, which borders China. Later, Lt. General Evnevich Valery G from the Russian Defence Ministry followed his visit to Burma. According to reliable sources, the regime is trying to acquire knowledge and nuclear technology from Russia to build nuclear reactors in the country for energy purposes since dealing with North Korea and Iran has been criticized by the neighbours and the international community. Another reason is that the regime is trying to strike a balance with China and find out an alternative source for military supplies. On the other hand, China's interest in Burmese gas and building military bases in Burma's islands are life supports for the ruling regime.
Indeed, Russia and China have ignored many thousands of people in the war zones of Burma who are suffering growing humanitarian crisis for their own self-interests. They never take the burden of the UN for this humanitarian crisis. In doing so, the immoral self-interests will increase threats to Burma's neighbouring countries and the entire region. Currently, more than 4 million people are living in neighbouring countries, and one million people are suffering humanitarian crisis. The recent deaths on 9 April of 54 illegal migrant workers from Burma, who suffocated in the back of a container truck while being smuggled to the Thai resort island of Phuket, highlighted the vulnerability of foreign migrant labourers in Thailand, said UN International Labour Organization (ILO) officials. This tragedy underscored the need to for cooperation to fight against human trafficking, and similar plights in Malaysia, Singapore, India, Bangladesh, and other neighbours. These are obviously evidence that people are suffering humanitarian crisis under military rule. China and Russia should not prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. As a consequence, Russia and China will have to pay a huge political price when building a relationship with Burma's future generation.
Yet, Burma's prominent student activists group, widely known as '8.8.88 generation has called for a worldwide boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics in response to China's bankrolling of the military junta that rules Burma with guns and threats. The group also joined a growing chorus of critics urging an Olympic boycott over complaints ranging from China's human rights record to its failure to press Sudan to end the Darfur conflict and to resolve the Tibet issue. Certainly, the china involvement with the oppressive military regime of Burma has largely been questioned at the beginning of the Beijing Olympics. Now, the world leaders including Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, UK PM Gordon Brown, German chancellor Angela Merkel, Canada's PM Stephen Harper, Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai had considered not attending Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is considering staying away, and U.S. President George W.Bush has not yet committed to attending the opening ceremony.
Certainly, China wants the Beijing Olympics to show off, and the freedom-loving people of Burma, Tibet, and Sudan are not allowed to do that. The voices of one world and one dream have loudly been heard, and it can not be possible that China can continue help to oppress human rights in Tibet, Burma, Darfur and elsewhere and still be considered untouchable for economic reasons.
Now, Burma's regime is going back to a major U turn again, and it is driving the country down a dangerous road. In fact, Burma's military rulers have announced they will hold a referendum on a draft constitution on May 10 and a general election in 2010. However, the opposition groups including 88 generation and the NLD called on the people of Burma to vote 'No' in the ballot boxes to prevent "the country from falling into the depths as a result of the junta's one-sided road-map. By voting 'No' we are not only against the junta's referendum, we want the junta and world to know that the people of Burma do not recognize every step of its road-map or their rule, a statement released by 88 generation group said. The time of casting "No Votes" for the junta's U-turn is near and let us see how the result will affect the Beijing Olympics in political terms. China should not remain deaf to the people of Burma.
The question is: will China defend its policy for the notorious Burmese junta at the UNSC again? Truth to be told, the more China supports Burma's junta, the higher the future relationship of Sino-Burma will be at risk and will cost China dearly in political terms.
(The writer Myat Soe is a former Central Executive Committee member of All Burma Federation of Student Unions (1988) and currently serves as the Research Director of Justice for Human Rights in Burma. He graduated from Indiana University, and earned his MBA from Indiana Wesleyan University.)
Mizzima News
01 May 2008 - Dishonest Burmese rulers' decision to bar Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting the elections shows that its process leading to a democratic transition in the country is not convincing. The purpose of this decision was that the military regime threatened to ban the NLD and its leadership completely.
This announcement evidently defied the international community by refusing to pursue democratization and national reconciliation. It appeared to be on the verge of a major U-turn, and it was aimed at undermining the on-going regional and international efforts.
Since the September people's movement in 2007, no political tangible result has been achieved. The regime did not free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners which the international community has been urging for. The house arrest of U Tin Oo, the deputy leader of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party was extended. More political prisoners have been locked up. The UN special envoy was not allowed to go back to Burma whenever he needed to follow up on the UNSC resolution. Freedom of press has been prohibited, and citizens have no space to express their views openly and peacefully. In addition, the junta's referendum law released in February 2008 prohibits people from criticizing or campaigning against the referendum process and imposes a penalty of three years in prison. In fact, the regime's lip service to political solutions, buying time, blaming the opposition, and attacking its own citizens will not take the place of substantial reforms and will not resolve the country's problems.
Why does the regime remain deaf to the rest of the world? The reason is the regime had two trump cards in the form of Russia and China at the UNSC. Indeed, China and Russia, as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, can promote or prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. Recently, the Burmese military regime agreed to let Russia's Glory International Pte Ltd search for gold and other minerals in the country's northern Kachin State, which borders China. Later, Lt. General Evnevich Valery G from the Russian Defence Ministry followed his visit to Burma. According to reliable sources, the regime is trying to acquire knowledge and nuclear technology from Russia to build nuclear reactors in the country for energy purposes since dealing with North Korea and Iran has been criticized by the neighbours and the international community. Another reason is that the regime is trying to strike a balance with China and find out an alternative source for military supplies. On the other hand, China's interest in Burmese gas and building military bases in Burma's islands are life supports for the ruling regime.
Indeed, Russia and China have ignored many thousands of people in the war zones of Burma who are suffering growing humanitarian crisis for their own self-interests. They never take the burden of the UN for this humanitarian crisis. In doing so, the immoral self-interests will increase threats to Burma's neighbouring countries and the entire region. Currently, more than 4 million people are living in neighbouring countries, and one million people are suffering humanitarian crisis. The recent deaths on 9 April of 54 illegal migrant workers from Burma, who suffocated in the back of a container truck while being smuggled to the Thai resort island of Phuket, highlighted the vulnerability of foreign migrant labourers in Thailand, said UN International Labour Organization (ILO) officials. This tragedy underscored the need to for cooperation to fight against human trafficking, and similar plights in Malaysia, Singapore, India, Bangladesh, and other neighbours. These are obviously evidence that people are suffering humanitarian crisis under military rule. China and Russia should not prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. As a consequence, Russia and China will have to pay a huge political price when building a relationship with Burma's future generation.
Yet, Burma's prominent student activists group, widely known as '8.8.88 generation has called for a worldwide boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics in response to China's bankrolling of the military junta that rules Burma with guns and threats. The group also joined a growing chorus of critics urging an Olympic boycott over complaints ranging from China's human rights record to its failure to press Sudan to end the Darfur conflict and to resolve the Tibet issue. Certainly, the china involvement with the oppressive military regime of Burma has largely been questioned at the beginning of the Beijing Olympics. Now, the world leaders including Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, UK PM Gordon Brown, German chancellor Angela Merkel, Canada's PM Stephen Harper, Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai had considered not attending Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is considering staying away, and U.S. President George W.Bush has not yet committed to attending the opening ceremony.
Certainly, China wants the Beijing Olympics to show off, and the freedom-loving people of Burma, Tibet, and Sudan are not allowed to do that. The voices of one world and one dream have loudly been heard, and it can not be possible that China can continue help to oppress human rights in Tibet, Burma, Darfur and elsewhere and still be considered untouchable for economic reasons.
Now, Burma's regime is going back to a major U turn again, and it is driving the country down a dangerous road. In fact, Burma's military rulers have announced they will hold a referendum on a draft constitution on May 10 and a general election in 2010. However, the opposition groups including 88 generation and the NLD called on the people of Burma to vote 'No' in the ballot boxes to prevent "the country from falling into the depths as a result of the junta's one-sided road-map. By voting 'No' we are not only against the junta's referendum, we want the junta and world to know that the people of Burma do not recognize every step of its road-map or their rule, a statement released by 88 generation group said. The time of casting "No Votes" for the junta's U-turn is near and let us see how the result will affect the Beijing Olympics in political terms. China should not remain deaf to the people of Burma.
The question is: will China defend its policy for the notorious Burmese junta at the UNSC again? Truth to be told, the more China supports Burma's junta, the higher the future relationship of Sino-Burma will be at risk and will cost China dearly in political terms.
(The writer Myat Soe is a former Central Executive Committee member of All Burma Federation of Student Unions (1988) and currently serves as the Research Director of Justice for Human Rights in Burma. He graduated from Indiana University, and earned his MBA from Indiana Wesleyan University.)
Monday, 14 April 2008
Junta's U- turn and future Sino-Burma Relation
By Myat Soe
Mizzima News
April 14, 2008 - Dishonest Burmese rulers' decision to bar Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting the elections shows that its process leading to a democratic transition in the country is not convincing. The purpose of this decision was that the military regime threatened to ban the NLD and its leadership completely. This announcement evidently defied the international community by refusing to pursue democratization and national reconciliation. It appeared to be on the verge of a major U-turn, and it was aimed at undermining the on-going regional and international efforts.
Since the September people's movement in 2007, no political tangible result has been achieved. The regime did not free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners which the international community has been urging for. The house arrest of U Tin Oo, the deputy leader of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party was extended. More political prisoners have been locked up. The UN special envoy was not allowed to go back to Burma whenever he needed to follow up on the UNSC resolution. Freedom of press has been prohibited, and citizens have no space to express their views openly and peacefully. In addition, the junta's referendum law released in February 2008 prohibits people from criticizing or campaigning against the referendum process and imposes a penalty of three years in prison. In fact, the regime's lip service to political solutions, buying time, blaming the opposition, and attacking its own citizens will not take the place of substantial reforms and will not resolve the country's problems.
Why does the regime remain deaf to the rest of the world? The reason is the regime had two trump cards in the form of Russia and China at the UNSC. Indeed, China and Russia, as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, can promote or prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. Recently, the Burmese military regime agreed to let Russia's Glory International Pte Ltd search for gold and other minerals in the country's northern Kachin State, which borders China. Later, Lt. General Evnevich Valery G from the Russian Defence Ministry followed his visit to Burma. According to reliable sources, the regime is trying to acquire knowledge and nuclear technology from Russia to build nuclear reactors in the country for energy purposes since dealing with North Korea and Iran has been criticized by the neighbours and the international community. Another reason is that the regime is trying to strike a balance with China and find out an alternative source for military supplies. On the other hand, China's interest in Burmese gas and building military bases in Burma's islands are life supports for the ruling regime.
Indeed, Russia and China have ignored many thousands of people in the war zones of Burma who are suffering growing humanitarian crisis for their own self-interests. They never take the burden of the UN for this humanitarian crisis. In doing so, the immoral self-interests will increase threats to Burma's neighbouring countries and the entire region. Currently, more than 4 million people are living in neighbouring countries, and one million people are suffering humanitarian crisis. The recent deaths on 9 April of 54 illegal migrant workers from Burma, who suffocated in the back of a container truck while being smuggled to the Thai resort island of Phuket, highlighted the vulnerability of foreign migrant labourers in Thailand, said UN International Labour Organization (ILO) officials. This tragedy underscored the need to for cooperation to fight against human trafficking, and similar plights in Malaysia, Singapore, India, Bangladesh, and other neighbours. These are obviously evidence that people are suffering humanitarian crisis under military rule. China and Russia should not prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. As a consequence, Russia and China will have to pay a huge political price when building a relationship with Burma's future generation.
Yet, Burma's prominent student activists group, widely known as '8.8.88 generation has called for a worldwide boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics in response to China's bankrolling of the military junta that rules Burma with guns and threats. The group also joined a growing chorus of critics urging an Olympic boycott over complaints ranging from China's human rights record to its failure to press Sudan to end the Darfur conflict and to resolve the Tibet issue. Certainly, the china involvement with the oppressive military regime of Burma has largely been questioned at the beginning of the Beijing Olympics. Now, the world leaders including Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, UK PM Gordon Brown, German chancellor Angela Merkel, Canada's PM Stephen Harper, Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai had considered not attending Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is considering staying away, and U.S. President George W.Bush has not yet committed to attending the opening ceremony.
Certainly, China wants the Beijing Olympics to show off, and the freedom-loving people of Burma, Tibet, and Sudan are not allowed to do that. The voices of one world and one dream have loudly been heard, and it can not be possible that China can continue help to oppress human rights in Tibet, Burma, Darfur and elsewhere and still be considered untouchable for economic reasons.
Now, Burma's regime is going back to a major U turn again, and it is driving the country down a dangerous road. In fact, Burma's military rulers have announced they will hold a referendum on a draft constitution on May 10 and a general election in 2010. However, the opposition groups including 88 generation and the NLD called on the people of Burma to vote 'No' in the ballot boxes to prevent "the country from falling into the depths as a result of the junta's one-sided road-map. By voting 'No' we are not only against the junta's referendum, we want the junta and world to know that the people of Burma do not recognize every step of its road-map or their rule, a statement released by 88 generation group said. The time of casting "No Votes" for the junta's U-turn is near and let us see how the result will affect the Beijing Olympics in political terms. China should not remain deaf to the people of Burma.
The question is: will China defend its policy for the notorious Burmese junta at the UNSC again? Truth to be told, the more China supports Burma's junta, the higher the future relationship of Sino-Burma will be at risk and will cost China dearly in political terms.
(The writer Myat Soe is a former Central Executive Committee member of All Burma Federation of Student Unions (1988) and currently serves as the Research Director of Justice for Human Rights in Burma. He graduated from Indiana University, and earned his MBA from Indiana Wesleyan University.)
Mizzima News
April 14, 2008 - Dishonest Burmese rulers' decision to bar Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting the elections shows that its process leading to a democratic transition in the country is not convincing. The purpose of this decision was that the military regime threatened to ban the NLD and its leadership completely. This announcement evidently defied the international community by refusing to pursue democratization and national reconciliation. It appeared to be on the verge of a major U-turn, and it was aimed at undermining the on-going regional and international efforts.
Since the September people's movement in 2007, no political tangible result has been achieved. The regime did not free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners which the international community has been urging for. The house arrest of U Tin Oo, the deputy leader of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party was extended. More political prisoners have been locked up. The UN special envoy was not allowed to go back to Burma whenever he needed to follow up on the UNSC resolution. Freedom of press has been prohibited, and citizens have no space to express their views openly and peacefully. In addition, the junta's referendum law released in February 2008 prohibits people from criticizing or campaigning against the referendum process and imposes a penalty of three years in prison. In fact, the regime's lip service to political solutions, buying time, blaming the opposition, and attacking its own citizens will not take the place of substantial reforms and will not resolve the country's problems.
Why does the regime remain deaf to the rest of the world? The reason is the regime had two trump cards in the form of Russia and China at the UNSC. Indeed, China and Russia, as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, can promote or prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. Recently, the Burmese military regime agreed to let Russia's Glory International Pte Ltd search for gold and other minerals in the country's northern Kachin State, which borders China. Later, Lt. General Evnevich Valery G from the Russian Defence Ministry followed his visit to Burma. According to reliable sources, the regime is trying to acquire knowledge and nuclear technology from Russia to build nuclear reactors in the country for energy purposes since dealing with North Korea and Iran has been criticized by the neighbours and the international community. Another reason is that the regime is trying to strike a balance with China and find out an alternative source for military supplies. On the other hand, China's interest in Burmese gas and building military bases in Burma's islands are life supports for the ruling regime.
Indeed, Russia and China have ignored many thousands of people in the war zones of Burma who are suffering growing humanitarian crisis for their own self-interests. They never take the burden of the UN for this humanitarian crisis. In doing so, the immoral self-interests will increase threats to Burma's neighbouring countries and the entire region. Currently, more than 4 million people are living in neighbouring countries, and one million people are suffering humanitarian crisis. The recent deaths on 9 April of 54 illegal migrant workers from Burma, who suffocated in the back of a container truck while being smuggled to the Thai resort island of Phuket, highlighted the vulnerability of foreign migrant labourers in Thailand, said UN International Labour Organization (ILO) officials. This tragedy underscored the need to for cooperation to fight against human trafficking, and similar plights in Malaysia, Singapore, India, Bangladesh, and other neighbours. These are obviously evidence that people are suffering humanitarian crisis under military rule. China and Russia should not prevent meaningful U.N. action on Burma. As a consequence, Russia and China will have to pay a huge political price when building a relationship with Burma's future generation.
Yet, Burma's prominent student activists group, widely known as '8.8.88 generation has called for a worldwide boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics in response to China's bankrolling of the military junta that rules Burma with guns and threats. The group also joined a growing chorus of critics urging an Olympic boycott over complaints ranging from China's human rights record to its failure to press Sudan to end the Darfur conflict and to resolve the Tibet issue. Certainly, the china involvement with the oppressive military regime of Burma has largely been questioned at the beginning of the Beijing Olympics. Now, the world leaders including Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, UK PM Gordon Brown, German chancellor Angela Merkel, Canada's PM Stephen Harper, Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai had considered not attending Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is considering staying away, and U.S. President George W.Bush has not yet committed to attending the opening ceremony.
Certainly, China wants the Beijing Olympics to show off, and the freedom-loving people of Burma, Tibet, and Sudan are not allowed to do that. The voices of one world and one dream have loudly been heard, and it can not be possible that China can continue help to oppress human rights in Tibet, Burma, Darfur and elsewhere and still be considered untouchable for economic reasons.
Now, Burma's regime is going back to a major U turn again, and it is driving the country down a dangerous road. In fact, Burma's military rulers have announced they will hold a referendum on a draft constitution on May 10 and a general election in 2010. However, the opposition groups including 88 generation and the NLD called on the people of Burma to vote 'No' in the ballot boxes to prevent "the country from falling into the depths as a result of the junta's one-sided road-map. By voting 'No' we are not only against the junta's referendum, we want the junta and world to know that the people of Burma do not recognize every step of its road-map or their rule, a statement released by 88 generation group said. The time of casting "No Votes" for the junta's U-turn is near and let us see how the result will affect the Beijing Olympics in political terms. China should not remain deaf to the people of Burma.
The question is: will China defend its policy for the notorious Burmese junta at the UNSC again? Truth to be told, the more China supports Burma's junta, the higher the future relationship of Sino-Burma will be at risk and will cost China dearly in political terms.
(The writer Myat Soe is a former Central Executive Committee member of All Burma Federation of Student Unions (1988) and currently serves as the Research Director of Justice for Human Rights in Burma. He graduated from Indiana University, and earned his MBA from Indiana Wesleyan University.)
Saturday, 5 April 2008
US Concerned over North Korea Missile Sales to Burma
By LALIT K JHA AND WAI MOE
The Irrawaddy
The United States said Thursday it would take the matter seriously if there are any indications of North Korea selling rocket launchers to Burma, though the US State Department could not confirm the report that appeared in the Japanese media on Wednesday.
“We've seen those reports, but we don't have any information that would be able to substantiate them,” State Department spokesman Tom Casey told reporters in Washington.
“Certainly, though, we would take seriously any indications that there have been violations of the various sanctions that were imposed on North Korea after its nuclear test the previous year,” Casey said.
The Japanese NHK public broadcast reported Wednesday that North Korea has been selling rocket launchers to Burma in violation of UN sanctions imposed against North Korea after it conducted nuclear tests in 2006.
Quoting the NHK report, news agencies reported the sale of rocket launchers was being handled by an unnamed Singapore trading country. No other immediate details were available however.
Htay Aung, a Burmese military researcher based in Thailand, told The Irrawaddy on Friday the Burmese military junta is seeking arms and other military equipment anywhere in the world to upgrade its Tatmadaw (armed forces).
“North Korea is one country among them,” he said. “But what we see is that Naypyidaw’s military upgrading seems to aim at external threats rather than internal ones, because the generals don’t need these kind of rockets to attack guerrilla groups. It is not useful for guerrilla warfare.”
Htay Aung added he heard that the Burmese army had set up new artillery, such as howitzers and rocket-launchers, along Burma’s eastern border. “Of course, the Royal Thai Army is scanning every footstep of the Burmese army,” Htay Aung added. “It means there is an ongoing arms race between Thailand and Burma in silence.”
Burmese-North Korean military ties are said to have been reestablished in 1999 when members of the Burmese junta paid a low-profile visit to the rogue state. The junta sent a delegation to North Korea secretly again in November 2000 for a meeting with high-ranking officials of North Korea’s the People’s Armed Forces. A North Korean delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Park Kil-yon met with his counterpart, Khin Maung Win, in June 2001.
Military analysts say the North Korean regime has provided weapons, military technology transfers and expertise in underground tunneling used for concealing secret military installations and, since 2002, dozens of North Korean technicians have worked for the Tatmadaw.
Burma and North Korea restored diplomatic ties last year ending a diplomatic crisis after North Korean special agents assassinated 18 South Korean officials, including four cabinet ministers, who were on a delegation to Burma in 1983.
The Irrawaddy
The United States said Thursday it would take the matter seriously if there are any indications of North Korea selling rocket launchers to Burma, though the US State Department could not confirm the report that appeared in the Japanese media on Wednesday.
“We've seen those reports, but we don't have any information that would be able to substantiate them,” State Department spokesman Tom Casey told reporters in Washington.
“Certainly, though, we would take seriously any indications that there have been violations of the various sanctions that were imposed on North Korea after its nuclear test the previous year,” Casey said.
The Japanese NHK public broadcast reported Wednesday that North Korea has been selling rocket launchers to Burma in violation of UN sanctions imposed against North Korea after it conducted nuclear tests in 2006.
Quoting the NHK report, news agencies reported the sale of rocket launchers was being handled by an unnamed Singapore trading country. No other immediate details were available however.
Htay Aung, a Burmese military researcher based in Thailand, told The Irrawaddy on Friday the Burmese military junta is seeking arms and other military equipment anywhere in the world to upgrade its Tatmadaw (armed forces).
“North Korea is one country among them,” he said. “But what we see is that Naypyidaw’s military upgrading seems to aim at external threats rather than internal ones, because the generals don’t need these kind of rockets to attack guerrilla groups. It is not useful for guerrilla warfare.”
Htay Aung added he heard that the Burmese army had set up new artillery, such as howitzers and rocket-launchers, along Burma’s eastern border. “Of course, the Royal Thai Army is scanning every footstep of the Burmese army,” Htay Aung added. “It means there is an ongoing arms race between Thailand and Burma in silence.”
Burmese-North Korean military ties are said to have been reestablished in 1999 when members of the Burmese junta paid a low-profile visit to the rogue state. The junta sent a delegation to North Korea secretly again in November 2000 for a meeting with high-ranking officials of North Korea’s the People’s Armed Forces. A North Korean delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Park Kil-yon met with his counterpart, Khin Maung Win, in June 2001.
Military analysts say the North Korean regime has provided weapons, military technology transfers and expertise in underground tunneling used for concealing secret military installations and, since 2002, dozens of North Korean technicians have worked for the Tatmadaw.
Burma and North Korea restored diplomatic ties last year ending a diplomatic crisis after North Korean special agents assassinated 18 South Korean officials, including four cabinet ministers, who were on a delegation to Burma in 1983.
Friday, 4 April 2008
Hill to discuss N. Korea, Myanmar
Abdul Khalik
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta - United States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill will meet with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and several ministers Friday to discuss the growing tension in the Korean peninsula and Myanmar.
Hill, also the chief U.S. negotiator for North Korean nuclear disarmament, was in Bali on Thursday to attend an international conference before flying to Jakarta on Friday.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Kristiarto Suryo Legowo said the U.S. senior diplomat was scheduled for separate meetings with Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda and Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono before visiting the President at the Presidential Palace later in the afternoon.
"The discussion will be about issues that concern both countries. For instance, we will listen to his briefing about the latest developments in the Korean peninsula," Kristiarto told The Jakarta Post.
Yonhap news agency reported Wednesday that Hill was slated to meet North Korea's chief negotiator Kim Kye-wan in Bali on Thursday or in Jakarta on Friday.
Kristiarto said he was unaware if such a meeting would take place.
Some officials have suggested the President and his ministers would use the meeting with Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, as an opportunity to raise Indonesia's ideas on other high-profile international issues, such as Myanmar and Tibet.
Indonesia has expressed its interest in playing a bigger role in resolving South Korea-North Korea conflicts.
Tension in the peninsula has heightened since new South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office in February with pledges to get tough on the North and hold it accountable to its commitments to roll back its nuclear program.
Official from both countries have exchanged threatening statements, with North Korea warning of nuclear catastrophe and making a series of angry gestures, including conducting missile tests recently.
Indonesia is one of the few countries that have a good relationship with North Korea. The relationship stretches back to the Sukarno era. Subsequent presidents have maintained the good relationship, with President Megawati Soekarnoputri visiting Pyongyang in 2003 to meet Kim Jong-il.
On Myanmar, Yudhoyono has repeatedly shown his support for the military junta's steps toward democracy, although Western countries, including the U.S., have dismissed the process and establishment of the new constitution as a way for the military to legitimize the grip on power it has held since its 1962 coup.
International relations expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Bantarto Bandoro, urged Yudhoyono to push the U.S. to be more proactive in solving the North Korea nuclear crisis.
"But Indonesia can tell Hill the U.S. should not push Myanmar too hard as it will be counterproductive for the country's democratic process," he said.
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta - United States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill will meet with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and several ministers Friday to discuss the growing tension in the Korean peninsula and Myanmar.
Hill, also the chief U.S. negotiator for North Korean nuclear disarmament, was in Bali on Thursday to attend an international conference before flying to Jakarta on Friday.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Kristiarto Suryo Legowo said the U.S. senior diplomat was scheduled for separate meetings with Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda and Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono before visiting the President at the Presidential Palace later in the afternoon.
"The discussion will be about issues that concern both countries. For instance, we will listen to his briefing about the latest developments in the Korean peninsula," Kristiarto told The Jakarta Post.
Yonhap news agency reported Wednesday that Hill was slated to meet North Korea's chief negotiator Kim Kye-wan in Bali on Thursday or in Jakarta on Friday.
Kristiarto said he was unaware if such a meeting would take place.
Some officials have suggested the President and his ministers would use the meeting with Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, as an opportunity to raise Indonesia's ideas on other high-profile international issues, such as Myanmar and Tibet.
Indonesia has expressed its interest in playing a bigger role in resolving South Korea-North Korea conflicts.
Tension in the peninsula has heightened since new South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office in February with pledges to get tough on the North and hold it accountable to its commitments to roll back its nuclear program.
Official from both countries have exchanged threatening statements, with North Korea warning of nuclear catastrophe and making a series of angry gestures, including conducting missile tests recently.
Indonesia is one of the few countries that have a good relationship with North Korea. The relationship stretches back to the Sukarno era. Subsequent presidents have maintained the good relationship, with President Megawati Soekarnoputri visiting Pyongyang in 2003 to meet Kim Jong-il.
On Myanmar, Yudhoyono has repeatedly shown his support for the military junta's steps toward democracy, although Western countries, including the U.S., have dismissed the process and establishment of the new constitution as a way for the military to legitimize the grip on power it has held since its 1962 coup.
International relations expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Bantarto Bandoro, urged Yudhoyono to push the U.S. to be more proactive in solving the North Korea nuclear crisis.
"But Indonesia can tell Hill the U.S. should not push Myanmar too hard as it will be counterproductive for the country's democratic process," he said.
S'pore to probe alleged N. Korea rocket exports to Myanmar
April 3, 2008 - SINGAPORE will investigate allegations that a local trading company was linked to North Korean exports of rockets to military-ruled Myanmar, the foreign affairs ministry said on Thursday.
Japan's public broadcaster NHK reported on Wednesday, citing unnamed diplomatic sources, that Pyongyang has started exporting multiple-launch rockets to Myanmar after the two nations agreed to normalise ties last year.
It said 'full-scale' exports of the weapons had been handled by an unnamed Singapore trading company but gave no further details.
'We take such allegations very seriously and will certainly investigate,' a spokesman with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.
'We are committed to fulfilling our international obligations to prevent the proliferation and illicit trafficking of arms and weapons of mass destruction.'
NHK said the weapons exports are in violation of economic sanctions imposed on North Korea after the communist state conducted a nuclear test in October 2006.
Multiple-launch rockets are 24cm in diameter and about one metre long, each with a range of about 65km, according to the report. --
Source: Straits Times
Japan's public broadcaster NHK reported on Wednesday, citing unnamed diplomatic sources, that Pyongyang has started exporting multiple-launch rockets to Myanmar after the two nations agreed to normalise ties last year.
It said 'full-scale' exports of the weapons had been handled by an unnamed Singapore trading company but gave no further details.
'We take such allegations very seriously and will certainly investigate,' a spokesman with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.
'We are committed to fulfilling our international obligations to prevent the proliferation and illicit trafficking of arms and weapons of mass destruction.'
NHK said the weapons exports are in violation of economic sanctions imposed on North Korea after the communist state conducted a nuclear test in October 2006.
Multiple-launch rockets are 24cm in diameter and about one metre long, each with a range of about 65km, according to the report. --
Source: Straits Times
Saturday, 15 March 2008
What Bush can win while at the Olympics in China
Source: The Christian Science Monitor
When he attends the Olympics this summer in Beijing, President Bush will have two scorecards: One to follow athletes and one to check on China's global actions. Mr. Bush plans to ask Chinese leaders about their hand in three trouble spots: Darfur, Burma, and Iran. Of the three, Iran is the most critical.
That's because China has become the largest trading partner with Iran during the past year (not counting the United Arab Emirates, which serve as transit traders for Iran). And China is putting more than $2 billion into Iran's oil fields. All this Chinese trade and investment gives an unsettling boost to the Islamic Republic in its drive to build a capability for nuclear weapons and to dominate the Middle East. It also helps Iran in supporting terrorist groups, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hizbullah in Lebanon.
China's mercantile rush into Iran isn't because it is more competitive but because Europe and many countries have been pulling back their economic ties with Iran to be in line with a growing global consensus on squeezing Iran with sanctions.
To its credit, China has tried in a minimal way to be a global stakeholder in the United Nations effort to end Iran's nuclear threat. In the past two years, it has voted in favor of Security Council measures that have imposed limited but increasingly stricter sanctions on Iran, such as the latest one March 3 that bars civilian goods that could have a military use.
But these measures mainly serve as a strong signal of world censure to Iran and are weak in pinching Iran's oil-rich economy and forcing an end to the regime's efforts to make weapons-grade uranium.
Sanctions with more bite are coming from outside of the UN, with the United States trying to enlist Europe, Russia, and Arab states to cut off financing, trade, and oil investments. Even many US states are ensuring that their pension plans aren't invested in Iran.
And although he's a lame duck and knows a Democrat may succeed him, Bush enjoys bipartisan support in Congress for his global leadership in isolating Iran. For the next president, Iran's nuclear program and its terrorist support will remain a top foreign-policy concern. The US has time to line up more sanction supporters. Iran can't produce enough weapons-grade uranium until at least 2010.
Having China draw down economic ties with Iran might further help moderates within Tehran's fractured leadership to gain some sway over Iran's intransigent policy. China itself has felt pressure from global activists for its support of Sudan and that regime's heavy hand in Darfur. Steven Spielberg's decision to withdraw as an artistic adviser to the Olympics may have helped push China to nudge Sudan to change it actions in Darfur.
The US and other big powers offered to talk with Iran on a range of issues and to help it build nuclear power plants (with safeguards) – if Iran simply suspends its enrichment. Iran's clerical leaders have refused that offer several times, perhaps because of internal power struggles and worries about popular unrest over an increasingly troubled economy.
Bush can bring home a gold medal from Beijing if he persuades China now to fully join the sanctions bandwagon.
When he attends the Olympics this summer in Beijing, President Bush will have two scorecards: One to follow athletes and one to check on China's global actions. Mr. Bush plans to ask Chinese leaders about their hand in three trouble spots: Darfur, Burma, and Iran. Of the three, Iran is the most critical.
That's because China has become the largest trading partner with Iran during the past year (not counting the United Arab Emirates, which serve as transit traders for Iran). And China is putting more than $2 billion into Iran's oil fields. All this Chinese trade and investment gives an unsettling boost to the Islamic Republic in its drive to build a capability for nuclear weapons and to dominate the Middle East. It also helps Iran in supporting terrorist groups, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hizbullah in Lebanon.
China's mercantile rush into Iran isn't because it is more competitive but because Europe and many countries have been pulling back their economic ties with Iran to be in line with a growing global consensus on squeezing Iran with sanctions.
To its credit, China has tried in a minimal way to be a global stakeholder in the United Nations effort to end Iran's nuclear threat. In the past two years, it has voted in favor of Security Council measures that have imposed limited but increasingly stricter sanctions on Iran, such as the latest one March 3 that bars civilian goods that could have a military use.
But these measures mainly serve as a strong signal of world censure to Iran and are weak in pinching Iran's oil-rich economy and forcing an end to the regime's efforts to make weapons-grade uranium.
Sanctions with more bite are coming from outside of the UN, with the United States trying to enlist Europe, Russia, and Arab states to cut off financing, trade, and oil investments. Even many US states are ensuring that their pension plans aren't invested in Iran.
And although he's a lame duck and knows a Democrat may succeed him, Bush enjoys bipartisan support in Congress for his global leadership in isolating Iran. For the next president, Iran's nuclear program and its terrorist support will remain a top foreign-policy concern. The US has time to line up more sanction supporters. Iran can't produce enough weapons-grade uranium until at least 2010.
Having China draw down economic ties with Iran might further help moderates within Tehran's fractured leadership to gain some sway over Iran's intransigent policy. China itself has felt pressure from global activists for its support of Sudan and that regime's heavy hand in Darfur. Steven Spielberg's decision to withdraw as an artistic adviser to the Olympics may have helped push China to nudge Sudan to change it actions in Darfur.
The US and other big powers offered to talk with Iran on a range of issues and to help it build nuclear power plants (with safeguards) – if Iran simply suspends its enrichment. Iran's clerical leaders have refused that offer several times, perhaps because of internal power struggles and worries about popular unrest over an increasingly troubled economy.
Bush can bring home a gold medal from Beijing if he persuades China now to fully join the sanctions bandwagon.
Tuesday, 11 March 2008
Zimbabwe wanted isolation, says C’wealth chief
March 11, 2008, LONDON - Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon likened Zimbabwe yesterday to North Korea or Myanmar, saying the southern African country wanted to be isolated. McKinnon, who steps down next month after eight years at the helm of the 53-nation group of mostly ex-British colonies, said the Commonwealth had done all it could over Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe left the Commonwealth in 2003 and calls the organisation a stooge of British neo-imperialism. He is standing for re-election on March 29, accused by rivals of wrecking Zimbabwe's economy.
The United Nations, the World Bank, Britain and the United States had also done all they could over Zimbabwe, McKinnon said. "Everyone was limited by what Zimbabwe did or did not want to do," he told reporters at an event marking Commonwealth Day.
"Regretfully, Zimbabwe, for many countries, has pushed themselves into this situation not dissimilar to Myanmar or North Korea where they just want to be isolated," he said.
North Korea agreed last year to dismantle its nuclear programme in exchange for aid and steps to end its isolation. Myanmar's military rulers remain cut off from the West.
Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe left the Commonwealth in 2003 and calls the organisation a stooge of British neo-imperialism. He is standing for re-election on March 29, accused by rivals of wrecking Zimbabwe's economy.
The United Nations, the World Bank, Britain and the United States had also done all they could over Zimbabwe, McKinnon said. "Everyone was limited by what Zimbabwe did or did not want to do," he told reporters at an event marking Commonwealth Day.
"Regretfully, Zimbabwe, for many countries, has pushed themselves into this situation not dissimilar to Myanmar or North Korea where they just want to be isolated," he said.
North Korea agreed last year to dismantle its nuclear programme in exchange for aid and steps to end its isolation. Myanmar's military rulers remain cut off from the West.
Source: Peninsula Qatar - Reuters
Thursday, 6 March 2008
Samak to Visit Burma
By SAW YAN NAING
The Irrawaddy News
www.irrawaddy.org
Thailand’s premier, Samak Sundaravej, will visit Burma next week to witness the signing of an investment protection pact between the two countries, according to the Bangkok-based English-language daily, The Nation.
The Thai prime minister will pay the official visit to Burma’s new capital, Naypyidaw, on March 12, and will also encourage Thai businessmen to pay more attention to Burma, according to a Thai commercial counselor in Burma quoted by The Nation in its Wednesday edition.
The commercial counselor, Matyawongse Amatyakul, said “the draft on investment protection has been drawn up by both countries and is now waiting for the ministers to sign.”
The agreement will also increase cooperation between the two countries through trade and investment, said the report. Thai businessmen will be encouraged to invest more and set up businesses in Burma, which will benefit from higher employment and economic growth, added the report.
Burma is currently the target of US sanctions. The companies of Tay Za, a crony of the leader of the ruling regime, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, and Tun Myint Naing, one of the richest tycoons in Burma, are among those blacklisted by the US government sanctions.
Despite international pressure on the Burmese regime following its brutal crackdown on monk-led protests in September 2007, Thailand has shown little inclination to join Western countries and the United Nations in their condemnation. Instead, it has indicated that it will continue its business deals with the Burmese generals and seek new opportunities to invest in Burma.
After the September crackdown, Thailand’s former premier, Surayud Chulanont, proposed four-party talks involving China, India, the United Nations and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), including Thailand and Burma, to seek a resolution to the Burmese crisis. However, the proposal, based on a similar multiparty approach that successfully defused tensions over North Korea’s nuclear arms program, never got off the ground.
Meanwhile, Apiradi Tantraporn, director general of Thailand’s Foreign Trade Department, said the government has a clear policy to promote Thai investment overseas, especially in other Asean countries, as the region moves towards integration as a single economic community in 2015.
According to the Foreign Trade Department, Thailand ranked third among foreign investors in Burma, with investment reaching US $1.34 billion in 2007, while the United Kingdom and Singapore were identified as the first and second largest investors in Burma.
Thailand’s exports to Burma rose 14.6 percent to 33.06 billion baht in 2007, while imports increased 9.8 percent to 80.03 billion baht. Exports from Thailand to Burma are expected to surge 20 percent in 2008, according to The Nation.
The Irrawaddy News
www.irrawaddy.org
Thailand’s premier, Samak Sundaravej, will visit Burma next week to witness the signing of an investment protection pact between the two countries, according to the Bangkok-based English-language daily, The Nation.
The Thai prime minister will pay the official visit to Burma’s new capital, Naypyidaw, on March 12, and will also encourage Thai businessmen to pay more attention to Burma, according to a Thai commercial counselor in Burma quoted by The Nation in its Wednesday edition.
The commercial counselor, Matyawongse Amatyakul, said “the draft on investment protection has been drawn up by both countries and is now waiting for the ministers to sign.”
The agreement will also increase cooperation between the two countries through trade and investment, said the report. Thai businessmen will be encouraged to invest more and set up businesses in Burma, which will benefit from higher employment and economic growth, added the report.
Burma is currently the target of US sanctions. The companies of Tay Za, a crony of the leader of the ruling regime, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, and Tun Myint Naing, one of the richest tycoons in Burma, are among those blacklisted by the US government sanctions.
Despite international pressure on the Burmese regime following its brutal crackdown on monk-led protests in September 2007, Thailand has shown little inclination to join Western countries and the United Nations in their condemnation. Instead, it has indicated that it will continue its business deals with the Burmese generals and seek new opportunities to invest in Burma.
After the September crackdown, Thailand’s former premier, Surayud Chulanont, proposed four-party talks involving China, India, the United Nations and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), including Thailand and Burma, to seek a resolution to the Burmese crisis. However, the proposal, based on a similar multiparty approach that successfully defused tensions over North Korea’s nuclear arms program, never got off the ground.
Meanwhile, Apiradi Tantraporn, director general of Thailand’s Foreign Trade Department, said the government has a clear policy to promote Thai investment overseas, especially in other Asean countries, as the region moves towards integration as a single economic community in 2015.
According to the Foreign Trade Department, Thailand ranked third among foreign investors in Burma, with investment reaching US $1.34 billion in 2007, while the United Kingdom and Singapore were identified as the first and second largest investors in Burma.
Thailand’s exports to Burma rose 14.6 percent to 33.06 billion baht in 2007, while imports increased 9.8 percent to 80.03 billion baht. Exports from Thailand to Burma are expected to surge 20 percent in 2008, according to The Nation.
Saturday, 1 March 2008
Where giants jostle
March 1, 2008 - Northern Burma is being transformed by China and India. Hamish McDonald reports from behind the bamboo curtain. Photographs by Kate Geraghty.
Sittwe is a mouldering port of 200,000 people on the neglected Arakan coast of Burma, visited by a few foreigners heading upriver to the ruined pagodas and palaces of an ancient kingdom inland. In five years from now, it promises to be transformed into one of the strategic hubs of Asia, figuring in the calculations of planners and analysts all the way to Washington.
"Think of it as a new Panama Canal," says one well-connected businessman in Rangoon.
A multibillion-dollar deepwater port on a nearby island will receive giant oil tankers from the Middle East and Africa, pumping their cargoes into pipelines that will stretch inland to energy-hungry China, avoiding the choke points of the Strait of Malacca controlled by the US Navy and its allies. Other pipelines will take natural gas from the huge reserves being defined off the Arakan coast and Burma's Gulf of Martaban.
Meanwhile, the Indian Special Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar has just been in Rangoon, nailing down agreement on a new all-weather highway from India's Imphal via Kalemyo to Mandalay, which by 2010 will give India's restive and isolated north-eastern states an alternative outlet to the tenuous route to Kolkata through the "bird's neck" of territory along the Brahmaputra valley.
Across the top of Burma, the Indians are also pouring huge investments into restoring the World War II "Stillwell Road" that once took supplies to the Chinese nationalists fighting the Japanese, relinking the Indian town of Ledo to Myitkyina, north of Mandalay, from where the road leads into China.
At Sittwe, India is also contesting Chinese dominance or any plans to add this port to Beijing's "string of pearls", strategic ports across the Indian Ocean. India plans to dredge the Kaladan River flowing to Sittwe from the north and turn it into a transport corridor for its isolated state of Mizoram.
India is quietly trying to warn Burma's ruling generals about the dangers of too close an embrace by China, a traditional enemy.
"There are sufficient reasons to suspect the junta would prefer to contain, if possible, the overwhelming influence of China," says the veteran New Delhi diplomatic analyst Subhash Chakravarti, a confidant of successive Indian prime ministers. "Its natural choice to seek to do so is to encourage a larger Indian presence in the country."
In return, Burma is helping India suppress its own insurgencies.
"India is hopelessly vulnerable to tribal insurgency in its north-east frontier," Chakravarti says. "We can hardly ensure security there without full co-operation with Burma, which has lately been a splendid success. As a result, India's earlier open criticism of the junta [in diplomatic statements and on All India Radio] is more muted."
But so far, China is winning hands down. Recently, New Delhi was stunned when the Burmese junta ruled that gas from the massive Block A-1 field, being opened up by two Indian state energy firms with South Korea's Daewoo group, would be sold to China instead of going to India by undersea pipeline, and probably (diplomats in Rangoon say) at concessional prices.
We crossed from the gleaming Chinese border city of Ruili into Burma, escorted by a travel agent designated by the Burmese Government. From boom-time China, which had mobile phone coverage and automatic teller machines even in this far corner, it was a short walk into the 1970s: shabby shops fronting shanty houses; old ex-Japanese cars; cycles.
Down the old Burma Road and through five checkpoints to the town of Lashio, where our travel agent minder left us, the economic invasion by China was apparent all around.
Just outside Burma's border town of Muse, facing Ruili, long convoys of 10- and 12-wheel trucks rolled into an export-import checking station extending over a kilometre in length. Stacks of teak logs from Burma's forests waited marked and graded in a lumber yard, ready for shipment into China.
Truckloads of watermelons and other high-value produce, grown by Chinese farmers on rented land with hired Burmese labour, were heading towards China, while young Burmese men, sheepish at being photographed, were driving smuggled Chinese-made motorcycles without numberplates down towards Mandalay. Vast tracts of land, some controlled by the Tatmadaw (Burma's military), were planted with sugar cane, pineapples and cassava (for biofuel) for sale or processing in China.
Later, on the Irrawaddy River outside Bhamo, another town close to China, our boat was packed with polythene-wrapped motorbikes, probably brought across the small, locals-only border crossing nearby.
The Burma Road from the Chinese border to Mandalay is now the toll-collecting fiefdom of Asia World, a construction company run by Stephen Law, son of the former heroin warlord Lo Hsin Han, who was brought into the fold by the junta in 1992 and given the road concession as reward.
Deep in the Shan hills off the road, the Burmese authorities claim to have reduced the opium-growing area to a small fraction of its heyday when the Cold War gave a measure of protection to the country's anti-communist regime. The main illegal game is now the amphetamine laboratories hidden in the eastern corner of Shan state.
But this is well out of sight, like the casinos and brothels that used to attract customers from Chinese border towns slipping across on day passes. Locals in Muse said these had shifted to northern Laos.
In this consciously cleaned-up relationship, China's links with Burma are more pervasive than any simple trade-off of munitions and diplomatic backing for the Burmese generals in return for oil and timber (at the official level) and drugs and trafficked women (in the black markets).
As well as being the planned outlet to the Indian Ocean, Burma has become an open market for China's hungry entrepreneurs and traders, like Mr Lin from the manufacturing powerhouse of Wenzhou. He crossed the border with us on the way to his factory in Rangoon, where 40 Burmese workers earning the equivalent of $30 a month make metal shop awnings and shutters.
In the former British hill station of Maymyo (now Pyin Oo Lwin), one of the 5000 Chinese residents celebrating the lunar new year at the town's Chinese pagoda said the Chinese had emerged in 1996 from intense suspicion provoked by Beijing's Cultural Revolution-era support for the now defunct Burmese communist parties (which included a cross-border invasion in 1968-71). "Things are much better now," he said, to the sound of firecrackers.
In the tourist town of Bagan, an ethnic Chinese businessman talked of plans to help open a Confucius Institute in Burma, part of Beijing's drive for "soft power" by teaching its language and culture. Of Burma's efforts to persuade the world it is moving to democracy, he said: " I hope it doesn't happen. As long as this country doesn't open to the Western countries, people like me will benefit from the strong China-Burma relationship."
FOR the Sittwe plans to materialise, very big natural and political obstacles have to be overcome. For one thing, northern Burma and China's neighbouring Yunnan are cut by soaring mountain ranges running north-south to the eastern end of the Himalayas, with massive rivers such as the Salween and Mekong cutting into chasms thousands of metres deep. Putting roads and pipelines across this country will be fraught with engineering obstacles and expense.
Right from the Arakan shoreline, Burma teems with ethnic groups that have many reasons to hate the ruling junta and disrupt its economic underpinnings.
North of Sittwe live as many as 1.5 million Muslims known as the Rohingya who are denied citizenship or ethnic identity in Burma and neighbouring Bangladesh. Subject to harsh surveillance and restrictions (including a requirement to get permits for local travel), the Rohingya would seem a fertile recruiting ground for violent groups.
Further inland, the Tatmadaw has run a network of local truces with a score of rebel armies and their splinter groups since the mid-1990s, often giving them a slice of cross-border duty collection.
On a road junction between Myitkyina and Bhamo, leading off to a small frontier post, was a large two-storey office signposted as
belonging to the Kachin Independence Organisation, a former separatist movement that signed a truce in 1994.
In the small town of Hsipaw we encountered General Saing Lo, the weather-beaten chief of the Shan State Army, which ended hostilities in 1996. He was supervising a tournament among his men at the local Dodhtawaddy Tennis Club to celebrate Shan Independence Day, his new-model Toyota LandCruiser parked outside with his army's sticker on the windscreen. "Did you watch the Australian Open?" he asked. "We could only see it on a DVD here."
The deals have allowed the Tatmadaw to focus its efforts on crushing the remaining holdout rebel groups along the Thai border, based among the ethnic Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon. More than doubled in size since the 1988 student uprising, the Tatmadaw is now 450,000 strong and rated as one of the most capable armies in the region.
In recent years, mainstream offensive units have kept up the pressure on the rebels in an unrelenting "four cuts" strategy aimed at denying them food, money, information and recruits. The civilian population has borne the brunt of this pressure, maintained now through the wet and dry seasons, with some 140,000 people pushed into refugee camps. The Karen have just suffered a devastating blow in the assassination of their promising new leader, Pado Manh Sha, in the Thai border town of Mae Sot, apparently by a hit squad who fled into Burma.
While the population remains among the most miserably poor in Asia, the Tatmadaw sequesters between 40 and 70 per cent of government revenue, plus cuts from business associates, and is re-equipping itself with modern arms including MiG-29 fighters from Russia, better artillery and communications.
Western intelligence agencies are intrigued by reopened negotiations with Russia for a small nuclear reactor, satellite images of uranium mining and a mysterious delivery of containers by North Korean ships that Burma insists were just allowed to make port calls as "vessels in distress".
One question is whether the ethnic minorities can be permanently bought off or whether new splinter groups will emerge to pose a violent challenge, if only to shake the money tree. A bigger mystery is the ultimate stability of the deeply unpopular Tatmadaw regime and whether it can rely indefinitely on violent suppression.
Security in the central belt of the country north from Rangoon depends on a pervasive and permanent counterinsurgency-style campaign against its own people, involving thousands of Military Intelligence personnel running informer networks and muscle squads throughout the country.
Random checks are mounted on ordinary households for unregistered guests and jailing is automatic for any lapses. Official tirades assail the "lies from the skies" broadcast by Voice of America, the BBC and the Democratic Voice of Burma, which recently began direct satellite TV signals.
Diplomats say the apparent hesitation to crack down on protests sparked by fuel price rises in August and September was deliberate, not a sign of weakness. The delay allowed a massive intelligence operation in which thousands of undercover agents took pictures and identified demonstrators and sympathisers.
Two of the generals said in some reports to have refused to order troops to open fire on crowds have since been promoted, hardly a sign of dissent. Rank-and-file troops showed no hesitation storming monasteries across the country in the midnight crackdown of September 26 against what they were told were "fake monks" acting "contrary to their dharma [spiritual duty]". About 4000 monks and known dissidents were hauled off, of whom most were released after two weeks. About 1100 political prisoners are still in jails and labour camps around the country.
Little escapes the military. On February 12, Burma's official Union Day, the Herald took some photographs of a brass band of the Tatmadaw's White Arrow Division in Bhamo practising by a public road. Three hours later we were hauled off a boat down the Irrawaddy and held for two hours while officers studied our cameras, radioed headquarters for instructions and finally deleted what images of the band they could find. "Anything about the army is very sensitive at this time," an officer explained through a local high-school English teacher called in to interpret.
Than Shwe, the "senior general" heading the State Peace and Development Council (as the junta calls itself), has a firm grip, though at 76 he is showing the effects of diabetes and minor strokes. A former chief of psychological warfare, he employs terror and surprise. In October 2004 he mounted a lightning internal putsch against his powerful but unsuspecting intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, now serving a 44-year jail sentence. Just recently, on December 31, Than Shwe underwent an operation for pancreatic cancer in Singapore, leaving the country for two weeks without any move against him.
Although the junta is not sentimental about its dumped leaders (the founding general Ne Win died in 2002 with no state funeral, his daughter in jail and the family banned from publishing eulogies), its power transitions have been bloodless so far. Its No. 3 general, Shwe Mann, 60, is poised as heir apparent.
ON the tarmac at Rangoon's airport sit two new Airbus passenger jets, painted in the white and turquoise colours of the private carrier Air Bagan. The planes began a regular service to Singapore last October, but two weeks later were grounded when a Singapore bank withdrew the purchase credit from the company.
Tay Za, 40, the owner of Air Bagan, is the most visible victim of the "targeted sanctions" imposed by several Western countries after the September crackdown, including Australia, which lists 418 senior regime figures, family members and associates for denial of banking facilities. Described by one Rangoon-based diplomat as the "junta's No. business crony", his Htoo Trading group is said to have a son of General Shwe Mann on its board and to be the channel for Russian military sales, although Tay Za denies any government connections or illegitimate activities.
It was an early strike for a largely untested weapon, showing that the risk of a US Treasury black-listing was enough even for banks in Singapore, a notorious private banking sanctuary for South-East Asia's dubious characters and a member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations cautious about the regional group's no-interference taboo, to cut off a rich Burmese customer.
On February 9, the junta chief Than Shwe surprised diplomats and even tightly controlled local newspapers by announcing that a referendum on a new constitution would be held in May, followed by multiparty general elections in 2010, putting some dates on a vague "road map" to democracy talked about for 14 years.
Subsequent details contain fewer surprises. Enshrining no fewer than 104 "basic principles" laid down by Than Shwe, the constitution will give overwhelming powers to the president, a quarter of seats in the legislature to the military and bar the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi from standing because she had been married to a foreigner.
Some welcome this as movement of sorts, at least formalising some non-government politics. But with Suu Kyi and the ageing clutch of ex-generals running her National League for Democracy under house arrest and most of the "1988 Generation" of former student leaders back in jail, prospects for anything but a sham democracy are thin.
Many expect the junta to quickly form some token opposition parties to its own civilian cheer squad, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which claims to have 25 million members (out of Burma's 54 million people). After the shock of the last elections - held in 1990, in which Suu Kyi's party won more than 60 per cent of the vote (a result ignored) - fewer chances will be taken.
But if Than Shwe's decision results from external pressure, it probably came from China, whose leaders have urged the regime to speed up democratisation and which could be worried that Burma will join Darfur on the list of blackmail acupuncture points for the Beijing Olympics.
Western governments are trying to influence China and, to some extent, India to go further. The line is that the stability apparently guaranteed by the Burmese generals is fragile: with the civilian economy running down, poverty widespread in a country once the rice bowl of Asia, HIV and avian influenza menacing and an education system that once attracted students from other regional countries deliberately dumbed down under military rule, Burma could descend into chaos.
But this is close to the argument the West uses to try to persuade China's communists to relax their own monopoly on power. And the same nightmare breakdown scenario is used by the influential historian Thant Myint-U, to argue in his book The River of Lost Footsteps for a policy of engagement, not isolation.
Sanctions don't work against generals who care nothing for the outside world and are obsessed with the risk of multi-ethnic Burma falling apart. "There are no easy options, no quick fixes, no grand strategies that will create democracy in Burma overnight or even over several years," Thant Myint-U wrote. "If Burma were less isolated, if there were more trade, more engagement - more tourism in particular - and this were coupled with a desire by the government for greater economic reform, a rebuilding of state institutions, and slow opening up of space for civil society, then perhaps the condition for political change would emerge over the next decade or so."
But the Tatmadaw, at least, is taking seriously Western fantasies about military intervention. During our journey we asked often whether Sylvester Stallone's new Rambo movie, a gory tale of a rescue mission into Burma, has any underground currency. "Please, you not ask," said one pirate DVD peddler in Rangoon. "The Government not laugh. Four years jail."
Sydney Morning Herald
Sittwe is a mouldering port of 200,000 people on the neglected Arakan coast of Burma, visited by a few foreigners heading upriver to the ruined pagodas and palaces of an ancient kingdom inland. In five years from now, it promises to be transformed into one of the strategic hubs of Asia, figuring in the calculations of planners and analysts all the way to Washington.
"Think of it as a new Panama Canal," says one well-connected businessman in Rangoon.
A multibillion-dollar deepwater port on a nearby island will receive giant oil tankers from the Middle East and Africa, pumping their cargoes into pipelines that will stretch inland to energy-hungry China, avoiding the choke points of the Strait of Malacca controlled by the US Navy and its allies. Other pipelines will take natural gas from the huge reserves being defined off the Arakan coast and Burma's Gulf of Martaban.
Meanwhile, the Indian Special Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar has just been in Rangoon, nailing down agreement on a new all-weather highway from India's Imphal via Kalemyo to Mandalay, which by 2010 will give India's restive and isolated north-eastern states an alternative outlet to the tenuous route to Kolkata through the "bird's neck" of territory along the Brahmaputra valley.
Across the top of Burma, the Indians are also pouring huge investments into restoring the World War II "Stillwell Road" that once took supplies to the Chinese nationalists fighting the Japanese, relinking the Indian town of Ledo to Myitkyina, north of Mandalay, from where the road leads into China.
At Sittwe, India is also contesting Chinese dominance or any plans to add this port to Beijing's "string of pearls", strategic ports across the Indian Ocean. India plans to dredge the Kaladan River flowing to Sittwe from the north and turn it into a transport corridor for its isolated state of Mizoram.
India is quietly trying to warn Burma's ruling generals about the dangers of too close an embrace by China, a traditional enemy.
"There are sufficient reasons to suspect the junta would prefer to contain, if possible, the overwhelming influence of China," says the veteran New Delhi diplomatic analyst Subhash Chakravarti, a confidant of successive Indian prime ministers. "Its natural choice to seek to do so is to encourage a larger Indian presence in the country."
In return, Burma is helping India suppress its own insurgencies.
"India is hopelessly vulnerable to tribal insurgency in its north-east frontier," Chakravarti says. "We can hardly ensure security there without full co-operation with Burma, which has lately been a splendid success. As a result, India's earlier open criticism of the junta [in diplomatic statements and on All India Radio] is more muted."
But so far, China is winning hands down. Recently, New Delhi was stunned when the Burmese junta ruled that gas from the massive Block A-1 field, being opened up by two Indian state energy firms with South Korea's Daewoo group, would be sold to China instead of going to India by undersea pipeline, and probably (diplomats in Rangoon say) at concessional prices.
We crossed from the gleaming Chinese border city of Ruili into Burma, escorted by a travel agent designated by the Burmese Government. From boom-time China, which had mobile phone coverage and automatic teller machines even in this far corner, it was a short walk into the 1970s: shabby shops fronting shanty houses; old ex-Japanese cars; cycles.
Down the old Burma Road and through five checkpoints to the town of Lashio, where our travel agent minder left us, the economic invasion by China was apparent all around.
Just outside Burma's border town of Muse, facing Ruili, long convoys of 10- and 12-wheel trucks rolled into an export-import checking station extending over a kilometre in length. Stacks of teak logs from Burma's forests waited marked and graded in a lumber yard, ready for shipment into China.
Truckloads of watermelons and other high-value produce, grown by Chinese farmers on rented land with hired Burmese labour, were heading towards China, while young Burmese men, sheepish at being photographed, were driving smuggled Chinese-made motorcycles without numberplates down towards Mandalay. Vast tracts of land, some controlled by the Tatmadaw (Burma's military), were planted with sugar cane, pineapples and cassava (for biofuel) for sale or processing in China.
Later, on the Irrawaddy River outside Bhamo, another town close to China, our boat was packed with polythene-wrapped motorbikes, probably brought across the small, locals-only border crossing nearby.
The Burma Road from the Chinese border to Mandalay is now the toll-collecting fiefdom of Asia World, a construction company run by Stephen Law, son of the former heroin warlord Lo Hsin Han, who was brought into the fold by the junta in 1992 and given the road concession as reward.
Deep in the Shan hills off the road, the Burmese authorities claim to have reduced the opium-growing area to a small fraction of its heyday when the Cold War gave a measure of protection to the country's anti-communist regime. The main illegal game is now the amphetamine laboratories hidden in the eastern corner of Shan state.
But this is well out of sight, like the casinos and brothels that used to attract customers from Chinese border towns slipping across on day passes. Locals in Muse said these had shifted to northern Laos.
In this consciously cleaned-up relationship, China's links with Burma are more pervasive than any simple trade-off of munitions and diplomatic backing for the Burmese generals in return for oil and timber (at the official level) and drugs and trafficked women (in the black markets).
As well as being the planned outlet to the Indian Ocean, Burma has become an open market for China's hungry entrepreneurs and traders, like Mr Lin from the manufacturing powerhouse of Wenzhou. He crossed the border with us on the way to his factory in Rangoon, where 40 Burmese workers earning the equivalent of $30 a month make metal shop awnings and shutters.
In the former British hill station of Maymyo (now Pyin Oo Lwin), one of the 5000 Chinese residents celebrating the lunar new year at the town's Chinese pagoda said the Chinese had emerged in 1996 from intense suspicion provoked by Beijing's Cultural Revolution-era support for the now defunct Burmese communist parties (which included a cross-border invasion in 1968-71). "Things are much better now," he said, to the sound of firecrackers.
In the tourist town of Bagan, an ethnic Chinese businessman talked of plans to help open a Confucius Institute in Burma, part of Beijing's drive for "soft power" by teaching its language and culture. Of Burma's efforts to persuade the world it is moving to democracy, he said: " I hope it doesn't happen. As long as this country doesn't open to the Western countries, people like me will benefit from the strong China-Burma relationship."
FOR the Sittwe plans to materialise, very big natural and political obstacles have to be overcome. For one thing, northern Burma and China's neighbouring Yunnan are cut by soaring mountain ranges running north-south to the eastern end of the Himalayas, with massive rivers such as the Salween and Mekong cutting into chasms thousands of metres deep. Putting roads and pipelines across this country will be fraught with engineering obstacles and expense.
Right from the Arakan shoreline, Burma teems with ethnic groups that have many reasons to hate the ruling junta and disrupt its economic underpinnings.
North of Sittwe live as many as 1.5 million Muslims known as the Rohingya who are denied citizenship or ethnic identity in Burma and neighbouring Bangladesh. Subject to harsh surveillance and restrictions (including a requirement to get permits for local travel), the Rohingya would seem a fertile recruiting ground for violent groups.
Further inland, the Tatmadaw has run a network of local truces with a score of rebel armies and their splinter groups since the mid-1990s, often giving them a slice of cross-border duty collection.
On a road junction between Myitkyina and Bhamo, leading off to a small frontier post, was a large two-storey office signposted as
belonging to the Kachin Independence Organisation, a former separatist movement that signed a truce in 1994.
In the small town of Hsipaw we encountered General Saing Lo, the weather-beaten chief of the Shan State Army, which ended hostilities in 1996. He was supervising a tournament among his men at the local Dodhtawaddy Tennis Club to celebrate Shan Independence Day, his new-model Toyota LandCruiser parked outside with his army's sticker on the windscreen. "Did you watch the Australian Open?" he asked. "We could only see it on a DVD here."
The deals have allowed the Tatmadaw to focus its efforts on crushing the remaining holdout rebel groups along the Thai border, based among the ethnic Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon. More than doubled in size since the 1988 student uprising, the Tatmadaw is now 450,000 strong and rated as one of the most capable armies in the region.
In recent years, mainstream offensive units have kept up the pressure on the rebels in an unrelenting "four cuts" strategy aimed at denying them food, money, information and recruits. The civilian population has borne the brunt of this pressure, maintained now through the wet and dry seasons, with some 140,000 people pushed into refugee camps. The Karen have just suffered a devastating blow in the assassination of their promising new leader, Pado Manh Sha, in the Thai border town of Mae Sot, apparently by a hit squad who fled into Burma.
While the population remains among the most miserably poor in Asia, the Tatmadaw sequesters between 40 and 70 per cent of government revenue, plus cuts from business associates, and is re-equipping itself with modern arms including MiG-29 fighters from Russia, better artillery and communications.
Western intelligence agencies are intrigued by reopened negotiations with Russia for a small nuclear reactor, satellite images of uranium mining and a mysterious delivery of containers by North Korean ships that Burma insists were just allowed to make port calls as "vessels in distress".
One question is whether the ethnic minorities can be permanently bought off or whether new splinter groups will emerge to pose a violent challenge, if only to shake the money tree. A bigger mystery is the ultimate stability of the deeply unpopular Tatmadaw regime and whether it can rely indefinitely on violent suppression.
Security in the central belt of the country north from Rangoon depends on a pervasive and permanent counterinsurgency-style campaign against its own people, involving thousands of Military Intelligence personnel running informer networks and muscle squads throughout the country.
Random checks are mounted on ordinary households for unregistered guests and jailing is automatic for any lapses. Official tirades assail the "lies from the skies" broadcast by Voice of America, the BBC and the Democratic Voice of Burma, which recently began direct satellite TV signals.
Diplomats say the apparent hesitation to crack down on protests sparked by fuel price rises in August and September was deliberate, not a sign of weakness. The delay allowed a massive intelligence operation in which thousands of undercover agents took pictures and identified demonstrators and sympathisers.
Two of the generals said in some reports to have refused to order troops to open fire on crowds have since been promoted, hardly a sign of dissent. Rank-and-file troops showed no hesitation storming monasteries across the country in the midnight crackdown of September 26 against what they were told were "fake monks" acting "contrary to their dharma [spiritual duty]". About 4000 monks and known dissidents were hauled off, of whom most were released after two weeks. About 1100 political prisoners are still in jails and labour camps around the country.
Little escapes the military. On February 12, Burma's official Union Day, the Herald took some photographs of a brass band of the Tatmadaw's White Arrow Division in Bhamo practising by a public road. Three hours later we were hauled off a boat down the Irrawaddy and held for two hours while officers studied our cameras, radioed headquarters for instructions and finally deleted what images of the band they could find. "Anything about the army is very sensitive at this time," an officer explained through a local high-school English teacher called in to interpret.
Than Shwe, the "senior general" heading the State Peace and Development Council (as the junta calls itself), has a firm grip, though at 76 he is showing the effects of diabetes and minor strokes. A former chief of psychological warfare, he employs terror and surprise. In October 2004 he mounted a lightning internal putsch against his powerful but unsuspecting intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, now serving a 44-year jail sentence. Just recently, on December 31, Than Shwe underwent an operation for pancreatic cancer in Singapore, leaving the country for two weeks without any move against him.
Although the junta is not sentimental about its dumped leaders (the founding general Ne Win died in 2002 with no state funeral, his daughter in jail and the family banned from publishing eulogies), its power transitions have been bloodless so far. Its No. 3 general, Shwe Mann, 60, is poised as heir apparent.
ON the tarmac at Rangoon's airport sit two new Airbus passenger jets, painted in the white and turquoise colours of the private carrier Air Bagan. The planes began a regular service to Singapore last October, but two weeks later were grounded when a Singapore bank withdrew the purchase credit from the company.
Tay Za, 40, the owner of Air Bagan, is the most visible victim of the "targeted sanctions" imposed by several Western countries after the September crackdown, including Australia, which lists 418 senior regime figures, family members and associates for denial of banking facilities. Described by one Rangoon-based diplomat as the "junta's No. business crony", his Htoo Trading group is said to have a son of General Shwe Mann on its board and to be the channel for Russian military sales, although Tay Za denies any government connections or illegitimate activities.
It was an early strike for a largely untested weapon, showing that the risk of a US Treasury black-listing was enough even for banks in Singapore, a notorious private banking sanctuary for South-East Asia's dubious characters and a member of the Association of South-East Asian Nations cautious about the regional group's no-interference taboo, to cut off a rich Burmese customer.
On February 9, the junta chief Than Shwe surprised diplomats and even tightly controlled local newspapers by announcing that a referendum on a new constitution would be held in May, followed by multiparty general elections in 2010, putting some dates on a vague "road map" to democracy talked about for 14 years.
Subsequent details contain fewer surprises. Enshrining no fewer than 104 "basic principles" laid down by Than Shwe, the constitution will give overwhelming powers to the president, a quarter of seats in the legislature to the military and bar the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi from standing because she had been married to a foreigner.
Some welcome this as movement of sorts, at least formalising some non-government politics. But with Suu Kyi and the ageing clutch of ex-generals running her National League for Democracy under house arrest and most of the "1988 Generation" of former student leaders back in jail, prospects for anything but a sham democracy are thin.
Many expect the junta to quickly form some token opposition parties to its own civilian cheer squad, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which claims to have 25 million members (out of Burma's 54 million people). After the shock of the last elections - held in 1990, in which Suu Kyi's party won more than 60 per cent of the vote (a result ignored) - fewer chances will be taken.
But if Than Shwe's decision results from external pressure, it probably came from China, whose leaders have urged the regime to speed up democratisation and which could be worried that Burma will join Darfur on the list of blackmail acupuncture points for the Beijing Olympics.
Western governments are trying to influence China and, to some extent, India to go further. The line is that the stability apparently guaranteed by the Burmese generals is fragile: with the civilian economy running down, poverty widespread in a country once the rice bowl of Asia, HIV and avian influenza menacing and an education system that once attracted students from other regional countries deliberately dumbed down under military rule, Burma could descend into chaos.
But this is close to the argument the West uses to try to persuade China's communists to relax their own monopoly on power. And the same nightmare breakdown scenario is used by the influential historian Thant Myint-U, to argue in his book The River of Lost Footsteps for a policy of engagement, not isolation.
Sanctions don't work against generals who care nothing for the outside world and are obsessed with the risk of multi-ethnic Burma falling apart. "There are no easy options, no quick fixes, no grand strategies that will create democracy in Burma overnight or even over several years," Thant Myint-U wrote. "If Burma were less isolated, if there were more trade, more engagement - more tourism in particular - and this were coupled with a desire by the government for greater economic reform, a rebuilding of state institutions, and slow opening up of space for civil society, then perhaps the condition for political change would emerge over the next decade or so."
But the Tatmadaw, at least, is taking seriously Western fantasies about military intervention. During our journey we asked often whether Sylvester Stallone's new Rambo movie, a gory tale of a rescue mission into Burma, has any underground currency. "Please, you not ask," said one pirate DVD peddler in Rangoon. "The Government not laugh. Four years jail."
Sydney Morning Herald
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)