Monday 21 April 2008

Upcoming political uncertainties hover over Burma

By Kavi Chongkittavorn

In less than three weeks the Burmese people will vote in a national referendum on the country's draft constitution.

April 21, 2008 - It will be a historic democratic battle between the iron-fisted government that wants to impose its rule and impoverished voters who want to be free. The draft constitution, which would give 25 per cent of parliament seats to the military, was recently completed after 15 years. Draft copies are now available in bookstores for 1000 kyats (Bt4,846) - something not all Burmese can afford.

Bangkok-based diplomats and Burmese living in exile around the world have predicted that voters will certainly reject the draft constitution. Growing resentment over the increased price of gas and oil, which triggered the saffron uprising last August, continues to mount and is currently being compounded with increases in the price of rice and other basic-food commodities.

Unfortunately, the exact count will never be known or publicised. The results - whatever they may be - will depend

totally on the whip or rather the imagination of junta leaders. Without international observers, the referendum would lack creditability and legitimacy. There is also a strong possibility that there could be further violence after the referendum if the junta goes against the people's will.

To the junta, public affirmation and legitimacy - even if it has been fabricated to the hilt - is necessary and considered a pivotal step to put its seven-point roadmap for democracy in place. At issue here are the various post-referendum scenarios and the outside world's reaction to them. Whatever happens would inevitably affect Burma's future and its people's aspirations for democracy, including the planned 2010 election. Despite pessimism, Asean, the UN and the international community continue to look for ways to make Burma more democratic and inclusive in future political processes.

They are now trying to gauge the junta leaders' political moves, which have been surprising so far. After repeatedly failing to engage the Burmese regime even before September's crackdown on monks, they have been looking for new ways to keep channels with the junta open.

De-linking politics from humanitarian and development assistance, the approach currently taken by the EU, could serve as a new modus operandi. The idea of punishing the regime, coupled with increasing assistance to those most vulnerable inside Burma, is gaining currency.

With the US continuing to impose harsher sanctions, the EU approach is obviously more attractive at this point. However, it is still too early to tell if this path will lead to more positive outcomes. In past months, vulnerable Burmese have benefited more from increased humanitarian and development assistance, especially in heath care and education, than before. As a matter of urgency, the EU should provide more anti-viral drugs for additional HIV/Aids patients beyond the current 10,000.

Asean's inability to convince Burma to comply with norms of collective responsibility and group interest has been appalling. For over a decade, the Burma debacle has sapped the grouping's energies and marred the grouping's prospects of cooperation with dialogue partners. As the current Asean chair, Singapore, has tried and subsequently failed to engage both Asean members and major powers in resolving the Burmese quagmire.

Burma's bitterness over Singapore's handling of the political fallout from the September crackdown remains evident. The cold shoulder that Burma has been giving UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari over the past six months is linked to his aborted plan to brief East Asian leaders at November's Asean Summit in Singapore.

But the UN remains crucial for any future settlement and rehabilitation in Burma. With continued coordination between US, UK and France, the council is expected to add Burma to its future agenda. A tougher and more binding resolution could be expected.

In the previous council's discussion last year, China and Russia vetoed the resolution calling for sanctions. Given the current international political environment, there could be further trade-offs among the council's members.

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's dealings with Burma have been quite exceptional. He has had personal correspondence with the reclusive General Than Shwe for quite some time. But it was only last week that the president's office had enough confidence to inform the media that Yudhoyono's efforts were not all in vain and that the general has answered his mail.

In his letter, Than Shwe assured Yudhoyono of the continuing democratic process in his country and pledged to continue communicating with him. "This is a unique process as every one of the president's letters has been replied to by General Than Shwe," said presidential spokesman Dino Patti Djalal.

It remains to be seen whether this "unique process" will lead to more tangible progress. After all, Than Shwe is still the leader who decides everything in Burma. With a presidential election scheduled for next year, Yudhoyono is also pondering his own political legacy. As Asean's largest member, Indonesia carries weight with whatever plans it undertakes, especially on regional issues.

To back up Yudhoyono's personal initiative, the Indonesian foreign ministry has fine-tuned a peace plan for Burma that would involve initially informal discussions among a handful of key stakeholders. It is essentially a mechanism similar to the informal talks held in Jakarta in the early 1990s to end the Cambodian conflict. Indonesia skilfully played the role of mediator and employed a strategy that allowed rival Cambodian groups to meet and subsequently agree on common ground, which eventually led to the Paris peace talks.

Before it is formally proposed to Asean, Indonesia wants to make sure that it has the support of its colleagues and the international community for a Burmese peace plan. China has already supported this peace plan and soon Asean would make its position known.

Source: The Nation

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